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Jody Freeman∗ & Sharon Jacobs∗∗ 
Modern critics of the administrative state portray agencies as omnipotent behemoths, 
invested with vast delegated powers and largely unaccountable to the political branches of 
government.  This picture, we argue, understates agency vulnerability to an increasingly 
powerful presidency.  One source of presidential control over agencies in particular has 
been overlooked: the systematic undermining of an agency’s ability to execute its statutory 
mandate.  This strategy, which we call “structural deregulation,” is a dangerous and 
underappreciated aspect of what then-Professor, now-Justice Elena Kagan termed 
“presidential administration.” 
Structural deregulation attacks the core capacities of the bureaucracy.  The phenomenon 
encompasses such practices as leaving agencies understaffed and without permanent 
leadership; marginalizing agency expertise; reallocating agency resources; occupying an 
agency with busywork; and damaging an agency’s reputation.  Structural deregulation 
differs from traditional “substantive” deregulation, which targets the repeal of particular 
agency rules or policies.  While substantive deregulation may have serious consequences, 
it is relatively transparent, limited in scope, and subject to legal challenge.  By contrast, 
structural deregulation is stealthier.  It is death by a thousand cuts. 
We argue that structural deregulation is in tension with constitutional, administrative, 
and democratic norms.  Nevertheless, public law is remarkably ill-equipped to address it.  
Constitutional and administrative law both have blind spots when it comes to presidential 
management of the bureaucracy, especially when the President’s mission is incapacitation.  
Specific statutes meant to protect the civil service or inoculate agency budgets from 
presidential control do not help much either — they are vulnerable to workarounds.  These 
blind spots and workarounds have allowed structural deregulation to flourish as a method 
of presidential control, with serious consequences for the future of the administrative state.  
We therefore propose legislative and regulatory reforms that could help to control the risks 
of structural deregulation. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Critics of the modern administrative state characterize the federal 
bureaucracy as an imperious and unaccountable behemoth that threat-
ens core principles of democratic governance.1  This portrayal misses 
the extent to which agencies are vulnerable to an increasingly powerful 
President capable of undermining them in unappreciated ways.  This 
undermining, what we call “structural deregulation,” targets an agency’s 
core capacities.  Structural deregulation erodes an agency’s staffing, 
leadership, resource base, expertise, and reputation — key determinants 
of the agency’s capacity to accomplish its statutory tasks. 
Structural deregulation has serious long-term consequences for the 
administrative state, and a President committed to it can do lasting dam-
age.  The Supreme Court has enabled structural deregulation by simul-
taneously countenancing a strong presidency while expressing skepti-
cism about the legitimacy of administrative power.2  This combination 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 1 See, e.g., Dep’t of Transp. v. Ass’n of Am. R.Rs., 575 U.S. 43, 91 (2015) (Thomas, J., concurring 
in the judgment) (“We have overseen and sanctioned the growth of an administrative system that 
concentrates the power to make laws and the power to enforce them in the hands of a vast and 
unaccountable administrative apparatus . . . .”); City of Arlington v. FCC, 569 U.S. 290, 313 (2013) 
(Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (“The Framers could hardly have envisioned today’s ‘vast and varied 
federal bureaucracy’ and the authority administrative agencies now hold over our economic, social, 
and political activities.” (quoting Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Acct. Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 
499 (2010))); Gutierrez-Brizuela v. Lynch, 834 F.3d 1142, 1149 (10th Cir. 2016) (Gorsuch, J., concur-
ring) (observing that executive bureaucracies “swallow huge amounts of core judicial and legislative 
power and concentrate federal power” and thus that “[m]aybe the time has come to face the behe-
moth”); PHILIP HAMBURGER, THE ADMINISTRATIVE THREAT 4 (2017) (“Administrative power 
is . . . all about the evasion of governance through law, including an evasion of constitutional pro-
cesses and procedural rights.”); DAVID SCHOENBROD, POWER WITHOUT RESPONSIBILITY: 
HOW CONGRESS ABUSES THE PEOPLE THROUGH DELEGATION 19 (1995) (describing delega-
tion to agencies as the phenomenon by which Congress “broadens the federal government’s regula-
tory jurisdiction over our lives, even while it reduces government’s capacity . . . to protect us from 
the harms about which we care the most”); Charles J. Cooper, Confronting the Administrative State, 
NAT’L AFFS., Fall 2015, at 96, 97 (“It is fitting that we refer to the administrative state as a ‘state,’ 
for it has become a sovereign power unto itself, an imperium in imperio regulating virtually every 
dimension of our lives.”). 
 2 See, e.g., Seila L. LLC v. CFPB, 140 S. Ct. 2183, 2211 (2020) (holding that the President must 
have plenary authority to remove the single head of an executive agency because such removal is a 
key component of “the executive Power” delegated to the President in Article II); id. at 2218–19 
(Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (opining that independent agencies are un-
constitutional because their heads are shielded from presidential removal); Lucia v. SEC, 138 S. Ct. 
2044, 2051–54 (2018) (concluding that administrative law judges at the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) were “Officers” and therefore that their appointment by SEC staff members 
was unconstitutional and that they could be appointed only by the President, heads of department, 
or the courts).  On statements from members of the Court that suggest skepticism about the admin-
istrative enterprise, see cases cited supra note 1.  
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of enthusiasm for presidential authority and animus toward the admin-
istrative state3 helps to create the ideal conditions for structural deregu-
lation to take root. 
Structural deregulation is distinct from what we call “substantive” 
deregulation, which aims to weaken or rescind particular agency rules 
or policies but falls short of a wholesale attack on agency capacity.  Sub-
stantive deregulation might include regulatory rollbacks that weaken 
health, safety, financial, or labor standards;4 shifts in an agency’s en-
forcement priorities;5 or legal interpretations that shrink an agency’s au-
thority or jurisdiction.6  These decisions typically must comply with  
legal procedures requiring transparency and afford opportunities for ju-
dicial review, and are thus relatively straightforward for an incoming 
administration to reverse.  By contrast, structural deregulation tears at 
an agency’s foundation and does so largely out of view and beyond legal 
redress, causing potentially enduring harm.7  
The Trump Administration presents perhaps the most extreme ex-
ample of structural deregulation in recent history,8 but it is not the only 
one.  Other Presidents, including both Richard Nixon and Ronald 
Reagan, also sought to weaken agencies by undermining their capacity 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 3 Professor Gillian Metzger has observed that this combination of opposition to bureaucracy 
and enthusiasm for presidential power is a hallmark of “contemporary anti-administrativism.”  
Gillian E. Metzger, The Supreme Court, 2016 Term — Foreword: 1930s Redux: The Administrative 
State Under Siege, 131 HARV. L. REV. 1, 3–7 (2017). 
 4 See, e.g., Tracking Deregulation in the Trump Era, BROOKINGS INST. (Jan. 19, 2021), 
https://www.brookings.edu/interactives/tracking-deregulation-in-the-trump-era 
[https://perma.cc/H3Q2-48SF] (collecting delayed, repealed, and new rules across environmental, 
health, labor, and other categories). 
 5 Daniel T. Deacon, Note, Deregulation Through Nonenforcement, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 795, 796 
(2010). 
 6 For a treatment of this last approach, see generally William W. Buzbee, Agency Statutory 
Abnegation in the Deregulatory Playbook, 68 DUKE L.J. 1509 (2019).  Typically, instances of sub-
stantive deregulation take the form of notice-and-comment rulemaking, but sometimes they occur 
via interpretive rules, guidance, or other policy vehicles. 
 7 While an extreme campaign of substantive deregulation may converge with structural dereg-
ulation at some point, we treat them as conceptually distinct.  Structural deregulation is not about 
any one, or even a handful, of particular regulatory policies.  And it does not include standard policy 
differences, or enforcement priorities, which are expected to swing somewhat from administration 
to administration.  It is concerned rather with steps Presidents can take to incapacitate institutions 
and prevent them from fulfilling their statutory mandates.  
 8 The Trump Administration aggressively pursued both substantive and structural deregula-
tion.  It sought to repeal or weaken regulations related to environmental protection, civil rights, 
education, health care, and immigration, among other areas.  While not the first administration to 
employ such tactics, the Trump Administration used them more aggressively, comprehensively, and 
in a more coordinated fashion than its predecessors.  See sources cited infra notes 29–33 and ac-
companying text.  These instruments are likely to remain appealing to deregulatory Presidents.  The 
history of regulation shows that new tools, once exercised, tend to remain in the deregulatory arse-
nal.  See, e.g., Bethany A. Davis Noll & Richard L. Revesz, Regulation in Transition, 104 MINN. 
L. REV. 1, 64–65 (2019). 
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to do their work, through strategies ranging from impoundment to in-
tentional understaffing.9  And while Republican Presidents historically 
have been more likely to engage in structural deregulation, that pattern 
may not always hold true.  The same tools we identify can be used by a 
President of any party, who for whatever reasons wishes to destroy the 
institutional capacity of particular agencies or of the administrative state 
as a whole. 
In Part I, we offer a typology of structural deregulation, with exam-
ples organized into several broad categories.  The examples show that 
presidential undermining can be piecemeal and incremental, with the 
cumulative impact becoming clear only over time.  In essence, it is death 
by a thousand cuts. 
Our account has several important implications, which we discuss in 
Part II.  First, structural deregulation exemplifies a different, more trou-
bling side of “presidential administration.”  It shows that while Presi-
dents may sometimes embrace agency achievements for political gain — 
the trend then-Professor, now-Justice Elena Kagan identified in her 
iconic article10 — they also can seek political advantage by undermining 
agency capacity.  Justice Kagan’s portrayal assumed a good faith chief 
executive on the hunt for credit-claiming opportunities that would am-
plify agency competence and, inevitably, tie the agency tightly to the 
President.11  Rather than aligning the President with his agencies, how-
ever, structural deregulation drives a wedge between them.12  
Second, structural deregulation has repercussions for the separation 
of powers.  By making it harder for agencies to fulfill their statutory 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 9 See Jeff Gerth, Absent Watchdogs–A Reagan Legacy; Regulators Say 80’s Budget Cuts May 
Cost U.S. Billions in 1990’s, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 19, 1989), https://www. 
nytimes.com/1989/12/19/us/absent-watchdogs-reagan-legacy-regulators-say-80-s-budget-cuts-may-
cost-us.html [https://perma.cc/DB48-REW8]; David E. Rosenbaum, The Savings Debacle: A Special 
Report: A Financial Disaster with Many Culprits, N.Y. TIMES (June 6, 1990), https://www. 
nytimes.com/1990/06/06/business/the-savings-debacle-a-special-report-a-financial-disaster-with-
many-culprits.html [https://perma.cc/3CDP-H4T5]; infra notes 139–140 and accompanying text 
(discussing President Nixon’s impoundment practices). 
 10 Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV 2245 (2001). 
 11 See id. at 2252. 
 12 The literature on presidential control of agencies is both broad and deep.  See, e.g., Lisa 
Schultz Bressman & Michael P. Vandenbergh, Inside the Administrative State: A Critical Look 
at the Practice of Presidential Control, 105 MICH. L. REV. 47, 49 (2006) (interviewing agency 
officials to develop a portrait of presidential control as more complex and less positive than Justice 
Kagan’s account suggests); Daphna Renan, Pooling Powers, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 211, 234–35 
(2015) (identifying the President’s ability to pool resources across agencies as a key tool of presiden-
tial control); Peter L. Strauss, Foreword, Overseer, or “The Decider”? The President in Administra-
tive Law, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 696, 704–05 (2007) (concluding that the President should oversee 
the bureaucracy but not make decisions on agencies’ behalf unless Congress has assigned that au-
thority to him by statute); Kathryn A. Watts, Controlling Presidential Control, 114 MICH. L. REV. 
683, 734–35 (2016) (expressing optimism about the potential for transparency and process to con-
strain the worst aspects of presidential control). 
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mandates, a campaign of structural deregulation can be seen as both an 
encroachment on Congress’s lawmaking authority and, arguably, a der-
eliction of the President’s constitutional duty to faithfully execute the 
laws. 
Third, structural deregulation’s relative obscurity and informality — 
the very qualities that make it appealing to Presidents as a tool of con-
trol — mean that it contravenes longstanding administrative law norms 
of procedural regularity, transparency, rationality, and accountability.  If 
these norms continue to represent desirable features of American gov-
ernment, their systematic erosion is troubling. 
Finally, structural deregulation can be difficult to undo.  It forces a 
President’s successor to take time away from governing in order to re-
build what has been torn down.  Structural deregulation is thus in ten-
sion with democratic norms disfavoring political and policy  
entrenchment. 
Preventing or remediating structural deregulation presents a consid-
erable challenge — especially when “presidential administration” is at 
its apex, courts are unwilling to check executive power, and Congress is 
gridlocked.13  To pose the question starkly: If the other branches are 
disinclined, who can stop a President from dismantling the administra-
tive state?  In Part III, we explore legal strategies for redressing struc-
tural deregulation but conclude that existing public law does not offer 
much of a foothold. 
Constitutional law seems unavailing: even if the President’s consti-
tutional duty to faithfully execute the laws includes a commitment to 
maintain the core capacities of agencies, it is not clear that there is a 
judicial remedy for its violation.14  Existing statutes are similarly un-
helpful.  In most instances, substantive statutes do not provide the basis 
for a lawsuit challenging presidential undermining of agencies.  The 
various procedural protections in the Pendleton Civil Service Reform 
Act,15 Federal Vacancies Reform Act of 1998,16 and Impoundment  
Control Act of 197417 do not effectively block Presidents from manipu-
lating agency resources, despite being designed to do so.18  The  
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 13 See, e.g., Sarah A. Binder, Going Nowhere: A Gridlocked Congress, BROOKINGS INST. (Dec. 
1, 2000), https://www.brookings.edu/articles/going-nowhere-a-gridlocked-congress [https://perma. 
cc/GZJ9-7NP3]; Lisa L. Miller, Too Little Too Late: The Supreme Court as a Check on Executive 
Power, MOTHER JONES (Feb. 16, 2006), https://www.motherjones.com/politics/2006/02/too-little-
too-late-supreme-court-check-executive-power [https://perma.cc/8PFF-DPVQ]. 
 14 See Jack Goldsmith & John F. Manning, The Protean Take Care Clause, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 
1835, 1847 (2016) (arguing courts have understood the Take Care Clause as creating “exclusive 
presidential authority to assure government officials’ fidelity to law”).  
 15 Ch. 27, 22 Stat. 403 (1883), amended by Civil Service Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-
454, 92 Stat. 1111. 
 16 5 U.S.C. §§ 3345–3349. 
 17 2 U.S.C. §§ 601–688. 
 18 See infra section III.B.2, pp. 644–48. 
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Administrative Procedure Act19 (APA) is not much help either.  Alt-
hough Congress defined “agency” broadly in the APA,20 the President is 
generally considered exempt from its scope.21  Congress also expressly 
exempted from the statute’s rulemaking requirements “matter[s] relating 
to agency management or personnel.”22  “[R]ules of agency organization, 
procedure, or practice” are exempt from the Act’s notice and comment 
requirements as well.23  And while statutes such as the Freedom of  
Information Act24 and other “sunshine” laws force some agency trans-
parency,25 these laws are limited in their reach, subject to exemptions, 
and can be circumvented.26  The upshot is that Presidents can do a lot 
to undermine agencies without incurring significant legal risk. 
With legal strategies so limited, the best response to structural dereg-
ulation is likely to be political.  In Part IV, we suggest tools that Congress 
might use to limit structural deregulation, ranging from ex ante statu-
tory safeguards to ex post oversight.  All of these potential responses 
face serious political hurdles, however, and even if politically viable, 
they each bring significant downsides.  Nevertheless, we conclude that 
the only way to stop a President bent on structural deregulation is for 
Congress to push back. 
I.  50 WAYS TO KILL AN AGENCY 
In this Part, we offer a typology of structural deregulation consisting 
of four broad categories.  Each category contains separate actions that 
a President may use to weaken agencies and which, when deployed sim-
ultaneously, can operate synergistically to more powerful, detrimental 
effect.27  In the first category are actions that interfere with agency staff-
ing.  Examples include intentionally declining to fill open agency  
positions at both the leadership and line levels.  The second category 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 19 5 U.S.C. §§ 551–559, 561–570a, 701–706. 
 20 Id. § 551(1). 
 21 See Franklin v. Massachusetts, 505 U.S. 788, 800–01 (1992). 
 22 5 U.S.C. § 553(a)(2).  
 23 Id. § 553(b)(A).  
 24 5 U.S.C. § 552. 
 25 See, e.g., id. § 552b(b) (requiring that government agencies’ meetings be open to the public); 
id. app. §§  2–12 (Federal Advisory Committee Act). 
 26 See infra p. 651. 
 27 In the examples below we ascribe all actions, ultimately, to the President.  In most cases, this 
line of responsibility is easy to trace.  However, we acknowledge that the connections between 
presidential policy and agency action are not always transparent.  And we do not pretend that the 
President makes these decisions personally in all or even most cases.  But, in an era of presidential 
administration especially, responsibility for executive agency action ultimately lies with the occu-
pant of the Oval Office.  In contrast to our approach, in a forthcoming article, Professor David Noll 
identifies the agency itself as the key actor when it comes to understaffing and other forms of ad-
ministrative “sabotage.”  David L. Noll, Administrative Sabotage, 120 MICH. L. REV. (forthcoming 
2022) (manuscript at 1) (on file with the Harvard Law School Library). 
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comprises presidential manipulation of other resources, including sub-
stantially reducing an agency’s budget by reallocating funds, making 
funding more difficult to spend for particular purposes, and diverting 
agency attention from more material statutory responsibilities with 
“busywork” or “churn.”  Third is undermining the institutional expertise 
that is essential to performing congressionally assigned tasks.  Fourth 
are attacks on agency reputation.  When a President or other high- 
ranking executive official persistently charges an agency with incompe-
tence, bias, or worse, it can have a corrosive effect.  The ensuing harm 
to reputation can make it incrementally more difficult for the agency to 
secure funding from Congress, influence regulated entities, and even 
prevail in the courts.28  There may be other things a President can do 
that would contribute to structural deregulation; our list is not exhaus-
tive.  The examples also can be thought of as falling along a spectrum, 
with the most concerning being those actions that are least transparent, 
least vulnerable to legal challenge, and “stickiest” or hardest to undo. 
Delegation necessarily affords Presidents some “play in the joints,” 
which they can exploit to pursue their policy prerogatives.  It can be 
difficult to distinguish structural deregulation from so-called “good gov-
ernance” reforms intended to improve the government’s performance, 
cut costs, or streamline cumbersome procedures.  In section I.E, we sug-
gest considerations that can help to distinguish legitimate, good govern-
ance efforts from structural deregulation.  The line is difficult to draw 
in the abstract, since it depends on a number of factors that can be 
evaluated only in the context of specific examples.  Nevertheless, we 
argue that there is both a conceptual and practical difference between 
the two. 
The Trump Administration aggressively pursued both substantive 
and structural deregulation.  It sought to repeal or weaken regulations 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 28 See, e.g., Elizabeth Guo, Ruling by Repute: Agency Reputation on Judicial Affirmance of 
Agency Action, 74 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 379, 382, 399 (2019) (reviewing data on Food and Drug 
Administration (FDA) and Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) win rates and concluding 
that an agency’s reputation is positively correlated with better judicial  
outcomes). 
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related to environmental protection,29 civil rights,30 education,31 health 
care,32 and immigration,33 among other areas.  In addition, the  
Administration modified agency procedures in ways that would system-
atically produce deregulatory outcomes.34  In Executive Order 13,771, 
for example, the President updated centralized regulatory review proce-
dures.35  That order imposed an Administration-wide regulatory 
“budget” that purported to limit the total number of regulations.36  It 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 29 See, e.g., Repeal of the Clean Power Plan; Emission Guidelines for Greenhouse Gas Emissions 
from Existing Electric Utility Generating Units; Revisions to Emission Guidelines Implementing 
Regulations, 84 Fed. Reg. 32,520 (July 8, 2019) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 60) (repealing and replacing 
the Clean Power Plan with less stringent emission guidelines for greenhouse gases); National  
Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants: Coal- and Oil-Fired Electric Utility Steam  
Generating Units — Reconsideration of Supplemental Finding and Residual Risk and Technology 
Review, 85 Fed. Reg. 31,286 (May 22, 2020) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 63) (reversing agency finding 
that it was “appropriate and necessary” to regulate hazardous air emissions from electric generating 
units); Definition of “Waters of the United States” — Recodification of Pre-existing Rules, 84 Fed. 
Reg. 56,626 (Oct. 22, 2019) (codified at 33 C.F.R. pt. 338 and scattered sections of 40 C.F.R.) (ex-
cluding certain streams, wetlands, and other waters from regulation). 
 30 See, e.g., Making Admission or Placement Determinations Based on Sex in Facilities Under 
Community Planning and Development Housing Programs, 85 Fed. Reg. 44,811 (proposed July 24, 
2020) (to be codified at 24 C.F.R. pts. 5, 576) (proposing to rescind protections for transgender and 
gender-nonconforming individuals in HUD-funded shelters); HUD’s Implementation of the Fair 
Housing Act’s Disparate Impact Standard, 85 Fed. Reg. 60,288 (Sept. 24, 2020) (codified at 24 C.F.R. 
pt. 100) (making it more difficult for challengers to show a housing policy or practice is discriminatory). 
 31 See, e.g., Child Nutrition Programs: Flexibilities for Milk, Whole Grains, and Sodium  
Requirements, 83 Fed. Reg. 63,775 (Dec. 12, 2018) (codified at 7 C.F.R. pts. 210, 215, 220, 226) 
(relaxing nutritional requirements for school lunch programs); Secretarial Determination to Lower 
Head Start Center-Based Duration Requirements, 85 Fed. Reg. 5332 (Jan. 30, 2020) (codified at 45 
C.F.R. pt. 1302) (rescinding requirement that Head Start programs provide more in-school hours). 
 32 See, e.g., Nondiscrimination in Health and Health Education Programs or Activities,  
Delegation of Authority, 85 Fed. Reg. 37,160 (June 19, 2020) (codified in scattered sections of 42 and 
45 C.F.R.) (loosening antidiscrimination requirements and adopting blanket exemptions for provid-
ers on religious grounds); State Relief and Empowerment Waivers, 83 Fed. Reg. 53,575 (Oct. 24, 
2018) (codified at 31 C.F.R. pt. 33 & 45 C.F.R. pt. 155) (expanding availability of state waivers from 
Affordable Care Act mandates).   
 33 See, e.g., Removal of 30-Day Processing Provision for Asylum Applicant-Related Form I-765 
Employment Authorization Applications, 85 Fed. Reg. 37,502 (June 22, 2020) (codified at 8 C.F.R. 
pt. 208) (extending timeline for USCIS to adjudicate employment authorization applications);  
Procedures for Asylum and Withholding of Removal; Credible Fear and Reasonable Fear Review, 
85 Fed. Reg. 80,274 (Dec. 11, 2020) (codified at scattered sections of 8 C.F.R.) (expediting removal 
and screenings); Asylum Eligibility and Procedural Modifications, 85 Fed. Reg. 82,260 (Dec. 17, 
2020) (codified at 8 C.F.R. pts. 208, 1208) (requiring asylum applicants to apply for protection in a 
third country before seeking asylum in the United States). 
 34 Strengthening Transparency in Pivotal Science Underlying Significant Regulatory Actions 
and Influential Scientific Information, 86 Fed. Reg. 469 (Jan. 6, 2021) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 30) 
(limiting the studies the EPA may rely on in promulgating regulations); Energy Conservation Pro-
gram for Appliance Standards: Procedures for Use in New or Revised Energy Conservation Stand-
ards and Test Procedures for Consumer Products and Commercial/Industrial Equipment, 85 Fed. 
Reg. 8626 (Feb. 14, 2020) (codified at 10 C.F.R. pts. 430–31) (establishing higher threshold before 
conservation standard can be tightened). 
 35 See Exec. Order No. 13,771, 82 Fed. Reg. 9339 (Jan. 30, 2017). 
 36 See id. 
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also commanded agencies to eliminate two rules for every new regula-
tion promulgated.37 
However, President Trump went further and deployed a variety of 
other strategies to impair agencies — strategies that we call structural 
deregulation.  While not the first administration to employ such tactics, 
the Trump Administration used them more aggressively, comprehen-
sively, and in a more coordinated fashion than its predecessors.  These 
instruments are likely to remain appealing to deregulatory Presidents.  
The history of regulation shows that new tools, once exercised, tend to 
remain in the deregulatory arsenal.38 
A.  Staffing 
It should go without saying that the daily operation of the U.S.  
government, including the military and law enforcement, and the broad 
array of functions assigned by Congress to both executive branch and 
independent regulatory agencies, requires an adequate and competent 
staff with relevant subject matter expertise.39  Modern administration is 
complex, requiring decisionmakers to make judgments about intricate 
financial, economic, public health, medical, scientific, technological, se-
curity, and other matters.  It cannot operate without a civil service of 
skilled and dedicated professionals.40  As administrations come and go, 
and political appointees cycle through the agencies, the permanent civil 
service is a source of stability and continuity.  It has been described as 
the “cartilage” of the federal government.41 
While Congress does not set precise staffing levels for agencies (other 
than for agency leadership), it delegates tasks that presuppose adequate 
staffing for their fulfillment.  The optimal size of the civil service is open 
to debate; it may be impossible to pinpoint the precise level of staffing 
required by any one agency or set of tasks.  Yet there have been instances 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 37 Id. 
 38 See, e.g., Noll & Revesz, supra note 8, at 3–4. 
 39 Between 2016 and 2021, nearly half of all federal employees became eligible for retirement, 
raising the prospect that the federal government soon could have insufficient personnel to fulfill its 
tasks.  Recognizing this problem, the Obama Administration made recruiting and retaining millen-
nials a key part of its agenda for strengthening the federal workforce.  See Carten Cordell, How the 
Obama Administration Shaped the Federal Workforce, FED. TIMES (Dec. 5, 2016), https://www.fed-
eraltimes.com/management/2016/12/05/how-the-obama-administration-shaped-the-federal-work-
force [https://perma.cc/L2G4-75LB]. 
 40 See generally PAUL R. VERKUIL, VALUING BUREAUCRACY: THE CASE FOR 
PROFESSIONAL GOVERNMENT (2017). 
 41 “[T]he permanent civil service at the federal level and its collective delegated responsibilities 
might be considered modern America’s ‘cartilage’ developed over time to maintain continuity and 
soften the friction inherent to the country’s constitutional skeleton.”  William G. Resh, The  
Administrative Presidency and the Degradation of the United States Civil Service, in HANDBOOK 
OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION 25, 26 (W. Bartley Hildreth et al. eds., 4th ed. 2021). 
  
2021] STRUCTURAL DEREGULATION 595 
where agency staffing, on any fair assessment, has fallen below the req-
uisite minimum.42  Where such shortfalls are the direct or predictably 
indirect result of a purposeful presidential policy designed to weaken 
the agency, we attribute them to structural deregulation. 
Presidents can undermine agency capacity by reducing or otherwise 
manipulating staffing, such as by intentionally declining to fill open 
agency positions at both the leadership and line level, by inducing staff 
departures through demoralization, and by weakening staffing agency 
mechanisms. 
1.  Line-Level Staffing. — Presidents can hinder agencies’ capacity 
to do their work by shrinking the size of their workforces.  Sometimes 
these efforts are overt, sometimes covert.  For example, President Trump 
made plain his desire to reduce the size of the federal workforce in a 
memorandum issued shortly after he assumed office.43  In it, he imposed 
a hiring freeze and directed the Office of Management and Budget 
(OMB), in consultation with the Office of Personnel Management 
(OPM), to “recommend a long-term plan to reduce the size of the Federal 
Government’s workforce through attrition.”44  Such initiatives are noth-
ing new and are not necessarily aimed at agency incapacitation.   
President Reagan, too, announced a federal hiring freeze shortly after 
his inauguration;45 President Obama froze pay levels for federal employ-
ees for three years.46 
As we discuss in more detail below, staff reductions or temporary 
caps on pay are not necessarily linked to structural deregulation.  But 
where those reductions appear designed to marginalize particular 
agency programs or operations, or when they cut so deeply that they 
may compromise an agency’s ability to fulfill core functions, they ought 
to raise red flags.  The size of the federal civil service has remained 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 42 For example, a former Inspector General (IG) for the Department of Homeland Security in 
the Trump Administration testified in Congress that some offices were “simply too thinly staffed to 
be able to even be aware of, much less effectively manage, the significant and varied issues that 
face DHS.”  Trouble at the Top: Are Vacancies at the Department of Homeland Security  
Undermining the Mission? Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Homeland Sec., 116th Cong. 20 (2019) 
[hereinafter Trouble at the Top] (statement of John Roth, Former Inspector General, Department of  
Homeland Security). 
 43 See Hiring Freeze, 82 Fed. Reg. 8493 (Jan. 23, 2017). 
 44 Id. 
 45 Joe Davidson, Reagan’s Complicated Legacy for Federal Workforce, WASH. POST (Feb. 8, 
2011), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/despite-reagans-actions-government-workforce-
grew-in-his-tenure/2011/02/07/ABuzkZF_story.html [https://perma.cc/EJG8-UQHD].  President 
Reagan announced that “[i]mposing a freeze now can eventually lead to a significant reduction in 
the size of the Federal work force.”  Id.  However, the federal workforce actually increased in size 
during Reagan’s presidency.  Id. 
 46 Cordell, supra note 39. 
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relatively constant for the past fifty years,47 but fluctuations within spe-
cific agencies matter more than overall numbers, and several agencies 
have at times lost a notable amount of key staff.48  For example, in 2018, 
the Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA) staff dropped to its lowest 
level in thirty years, and the Agency lost several mission-critical posi-
tions.49  Administrations can reduce line staff through attrition simply 
by failing to replace departing employees.  Even after the hiring freeze 
imposed at the start of President Trump’s term was lifted, one Labor 
Department official reported that political leadership at the Department 
prevented hiring, which left remaining staff “doing the work that four 
or five people used to handle.”50  Similarly, due to delays in replacing 
departing inspectors, the Occupational Safety and Health  
Administration in 2020 had just 761 inspectors — an all-time low.51 
While it might be reasonable to expect a modest amount of attrition 
in any given administration, a pattern of severe attrition across numer-
ous agencies suggests something is amiss.  Especially troubling is the 
data on civil service attrition during the Trump Administration showing 
that attrition was higher for senior members of the executive service, 
who have significant expertise and valuable institutional knowledge, 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 47 The federal civil service includes approximately two million employees.  Contractors and 
grantees increase that number to between seven and nine million.  PAUL C. LIGHT, VOLCKER 
ALL., THE TRUE SIZE OF GOVERNMENT 1, 3 tbl.1 (2017), https://www.volckeralliance.org/sites/ 
default/files/attachments/Issue%20Paper_True%20Size%20of%20Government.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/F4H9-KD87].  The total size of the workforce decreased under President Obama 
by more than two million.  Id.  However, President Obama increased permanent employees by 
68,000 in his first nine months, compared to a net loss of 16,000 in President Trump’s first nine 
months.  Lisa Rein & Andrew Ba Tran, How the Trump Era Is Changing the Federal Bureaucracy, 
WASH. POST (Dec. 30, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/how-the-trump-era-is-
changing-the-federal-bureaucracy/2017/12/30/8d5149c6-daa7-11e7-b859-fb0995360725_story.html 
[https://perma.cc/684M-BQ36]. 
 48 See Emily Badger et al., The Government Agencies that Became Smaller, and Unhappier, 
Under Trump, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 13, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/02/01/upshot/trump- 
effect-government-agencies.html [https://perma.cc/CZ2L-8WM2] (showing that the Departments of 
Labor, State, Education, Interior, Agriculture, Energy, Health and Human Services, Housing and 
Urban Development, Transportation, and Justice, along with the EPA, saw net workforce losses 
during the Trump Administration).  
 49 See Timothy Cama, EPA Staffing Falls to Reagan-Era Levels, THE HILL (Jan. 9, 2018,  
11:39 AM), https://thehill.com/policy/energy-environment/368090-epa-staffing-hits-reagan-levels 
[https://perma.cc/AH6N-W88J]. 
 50 Rachel M. Cohen, “I Fully Intend to Outlast These People”: 18 Federal Workers on What It’s 
Really Like to Work for the Trump Administration, WASHINGTONIAN (Apr. 7, 2019), 
https://www.washingtonian.com/2019/04/07/18-federal-workers-what-its-really-like-to-work-for-
the-trump-administration [https://perma.cc/C3C2-NEYH]. 
 51 Joe Yerardi & Alexia Fernández Campbell, Fewer Inspectors, More Deaths: The Trump  
Administration Rolls Back Workplace Safety Inspections, VOX (Aug. 18, 2020, 5:05 AM), 
https://www.vox.com/2020/8/18/21366388/osha-worker-safety-trump [https://perma.cc/UMD6-
WYLN].  A former policy adviser to the Agency opined that the Trump Administration was “starv-
ing” the Agency of staff and that this was “undermining the effectiveness of the agency.”  Id.  The 
article also details the “human cost” of fewer inspections.  Id. 
  
2021] STRUCTURAL DEREGULATION 597 
and who work most closely with an administration’s political  
appointees.52 
Civil servants are difficult to fire because of civil-service job protec-
tions, but an administration can induce them to retire by offering a va-
riety of incentives.  In implementing the recommendations of the  
National Performance Review under President Clinton, for example, the 
government offered federal employees up to $50,000 each to leave their 
positions.53  During the Trump Administration, an EPA scientist re-
ported that the Agency bought out several high-level scientist positions 
and then designated those jobs as unnecessary.54  While such buyout 
programs may be standard fare and even beneficial, the question is 
whether, in context, they are part of a larger effort to hollow out the 
agency by depleting key staff.  When used together with other destaffing 
techniques — firing, attrition, relocation, and the like — buyouts can be 
evidence of a larger campaign of structural deregulation. 
A President or an agency’s political leadership may also seek to dis-
hearten staff to induce them to quit.  President Reagan, who memorably 
announced that “government is the problem,”55 took an approach to ad-
ministration that was “deeply demoralizing to federal civil servants and 
left a legacy of distrust which has never completely faded.”56  More re-
cently, the president of the National Treasury Employees Union com-
mented in 2017 that “[m]orale has never been lower” and that  
“[g]overnment is making itself a lot less attractive as an employer.”57  
The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) lost at least 129 
employees after Mick Mulvaney assumed the position of Acting  
Director.58  Political appointees might also demoralize staff by excluding 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 52 See Daniel Lim, Federal Workforce Attrition Under the Trump Administration, GOV’T 
EXEC. (Dec. 28, 2020), https://www.govexec.com/management/2020/12/federal-workforce-attrition-
under-trump-administration/171045 [https://perma.cc/P49Y-4BH8] (“[B]etween calendar years 
2016 and 2017, 1,616 senior executives voluntarily left government service, a year-over-year in-
crease of 799 (98%), or more than twice the 2009 spike.  Based solely on separations, many more 
experienced civil servants were willing to work through a change of administration under Obama 
than under Trump.”). 
 53 Charles S. Clark, Reinventing Government — Two Decades Later, GOV’T EXEC. (Apr. 26, 
2013), https://www.govexec.com/management/2013/04/what-reinvention-wrought/62836 [https:// 
perma.cc/6JYH-Q7XZ]. 
 54 Cohen, supra note 50.  
 55 President Ronald Reagan, First Inaugural Address 2 (Jan. 20, 1981) (transcript on file with 
the Ronald Reagan Presidential Foundation and Institute), https://www.reaganfoundation.org/ 
media/128614/inaguration.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y2JC-2M9Q]. 
 56 Davidson, supra note 45 (quoting Linda J. Bilmes, a senior lecturer at the Harvard Kennedy 
School). 
 57 Rein & Tran, supra note 47. 
 58 Robert O’Harrow Jr. et al., How Trump Appointees Curbed a Consumer Protection Agency 
Loathed by the GOP, WASH. POST (Dec. 4, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/ 
investigations/how-trump-appointees-curbed-a-consumer-protection-agency-loathed-by-the-
gop/2018/12/04/3cb6cd56-de20-11e8-aa33-53bad9a881e8_story.html [https://perma.cc/5WJH-44WZ].  
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them from key decisionmaking.59  A 2019 State Department Inspector 
General’s report cited examples of hostile treatment of staff and im-
proper withholding of promotions.60  Finally, career staff who cannot be 
fired easily or otherwise prodded to leave might be moved into jobs that 
hold no interest for them.61 
An administration can also trigger staff departures by relocating cer-
tain jobs or entire offices.  In summer 2019, for example, the Department 
of Agriculture (USDA) moved two of its research agencies — the  
Economic Research Service and the National Institute of Food and  
Agriculture — from Washington, D.C., to Kansas City, Missouri.62  
About two-thirds of affected employees declined their reassignments 
and were let go.63  Few of those positions were filled by new hires.64  A 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
Some employees blamed these departures on choices made by political leadership, including the 
slower pace of enforcement actions and staff micromanagement by political employees.  Id.  A 
Bureau lawyer observed that “[t]hey want everyone to leave.”  Id.  Employees of other agencies 
have reported similar demoralization.  An employee at the Defense Department reported that 
“[m]orale is pretty low, and I think it has to do with the general lack of respect for civil servants.”  
Cohen, supra note 50.  An employee at the Treasury Department noted a general lack of respect for 
career staff under the Trump Administration.  Id. 
 59 See Juliet Eilperin & Emma Brown, Cabinet Secretaries’ Tough Task: Lack of Funding,  
Support for Agency Missions, WASH. POST (July 2, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/ 
politics/cabinet-secretaries-tough-task-lack-of-funding-support-for-agency-missions/2017/07/02/ 
d17279ee-4ad9-11e7-a186-60c031eab644_story.html [https://perma.cc/68F6-R4DX]. 
 60 Rachel Oswald, Trump Appointees Routinely Bullied State Department Staffers, IG Reports, 
ROLL CALL (Aug. 16, 2019, 7:27 AM), https://www.rollcall.com/2019/08/16/trump-appointees- 
routinely-bullied-state-department-staffers-ig-reports [https://perma.cc/EW4F-ZLBU].  While this 
example concerns a nonregulatory agency, it shows that administrations bent on doing so can de-
moralize agency staff to the point of driving an exodus.  
 61 The Department of the Interior’s policy analysis head until 2017 described being moved to 
the Agency’s Office of Natural Resources Revenue, whose work is to collect royalty payments from 
oil and gas companies.  Joel Clement, Opinion, I’m a Scientist. I’m Blowing the Whistle on the 




 62 The reason given for the move was that it would enable the Department to “provide more 
streamlined and efficient services.”  Ben Guarino, Many USDA Workers to Quit as Research  
Agencies Move to Kansas City: “The Brain Drain We All Feared,” WASH. POST (July 18, 2019), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/science/2019/07/18/many-usda-workers-quit-research-agencies-
move-kansas-city-brain-drain-we-all-feared [https://perma.cc/M5Y3-XHPU]. 
 63 Id. (quoting Jack Payne, the vice president for agriculture and natural resources at the  
University of Florida, as commenting that “[t]his is the brain drain we all feared, possibly a destruc-
tion of the agencies”).  As one former employee pointed out, even if the Department hired someone 
to fill his position, it could take that new employee “years” to get up to speed on the modeling 
programs he oversaw.  Annie Gowen et al., Science Ranks Grow Thin in Trump Administration, 
WASH. POST (Jan. 23, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/climate-environment/science-
ranks-grow-thin-in-trump-administration/2020/01/23/5d22b522-3172-11ea-a053-dc6d944ba776_ 
story.html [https://perma.cc/L8KS-ME6D]. 
 64 See Internal USDA Memo Shows Move to KC Left Offices Fallow, KAN. CITY BUS. J. (Feb. 
28, 2020, 9:21 AM), https://www.bizjournals.com/kansascity/news/2020/02/28/usda-memo-ers-nifa-
kansas-city-office-emloyment.html [https://perma.cc/66PF-XV43].  These departures created deep 
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similar relocation effort by the Department of the Interior’s Bureau of 
Land Management prompted more than eighty-seven percent of em-
ployees asked to move from Washington, D.C., to Grand Junction,  
Colorado, to resign or retire instead.65  In a reverse move, the  
Department of Health and Human Services asked employees in its  
Administration for Community Living to move from regional offices to 
the nation’s capital in order to “improve efficiency.”66  Transferring or 
reassigning particular senior officials rather than whole offices may also 
be part of an effort to weaken an agency.67 
Sometimes, staff vacancies are filled by contractors and other tem-
porary workers — strategies that an administration can embrace as 
“cost-saving” but might compromise an agency’s capacity.68  For exam-
ple, the Trump Administration more than doubled funding previously 
spent contracting with temporary employment agencies to fill federal 
vacancies,69 a practice OMB defended, in part, as a way to “bridge  
staffing shortages.”70  Contracting out a significant share of federal jobs, 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
deficits in particular areas, including farm finance, tax, bees and pollination, and trade and inter-
national development.  See Guarino, supra note 62.  
 65 Juliet Eilperin, Trump Officials Moved Most Bureau of Land Management Positions out of 
D.C. More than 87 Percent Quit Instead., WASH. POST (Jan. 28, 2021, 6:24 PM), https://www. 
washingtonpost.com/climate-environment/2021/01/28/trump-blm-reorganization 
[https://perma.cc/7RBZ-4S2N]. 
 66 Arthur Delaney & Dave Jamieson, The Trump Administration Is Literally Pushing Workers 
Around, HUFFPOST (July 1, 2019, 5:45 AM), https://www.huffpost.com/entry/trump-federal- 
workers-relocation_n_5d166993e4b07f6ca57d12c8 [https://perma.cc/48CQ-VTZ2]. 
 67 For example, a senior EPA lawyer who had worked on high-profile air quality rules, including 
the Obama-era Clean Power Plan, was, in the Trump Administration, reassigned from her Associate 
General Counsel role to work on “special projects.”  Doug Obey, In “Highly Unusual Move,” Trump 
EPA Reassigns Top Agency Air Lawyer, INSIDEEPA (Jan. 17, 2018), https://insideepa.com/daily-
news/highly-unusual-move-trump-epa-reassigns-top-agency-air-lawyer [https://perma.cc/W9PM-
7RSL].  
 68 Hiring temporary workers or contracting with private employees can compromise agency 
expertise.  CHRIS SCHWARTZ & LAURA PADIN, NAT’L EMP. L. PROJECT, TEMPING OUT THE 
FEDERAL GOVERNMENT 1–2 (2019), https://s27147.pcdn.co/wp-content/uploads/Policy-Brief-
Temping-Out-Federal-Government-6-19.pdf [https:/perma.cc/QN6L-3FWK].  Temporary workers 
might also prove just as costly as federal employees while providing lower-quality services.  Id. at 
4.  The combination of pervasive outsourcing and extensive reliance on nonexpert “loyalists” in 
leadership “has brought about a lack of attention to long-term human capital planning.  This, in 
turn, leads to a lack of functional expertise and competence . . . and simply a shortage in the number 
of professionals needed to capably run the many functions of the federal government.”  Resh, supra 
note 41, at 35. 
 69 See SCHWARTZ & PADIN, supra note 68, at 2; Joe Davidson, Trump Is Outsourcing  
Government to Temps. Why That Might Not Be Good., WASH. POST (June 19, 2019), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/trump-is-outsourcing-government-to-temps-why-that-
might-not-be-good/2019/06/18/8f0fd07e-9212-11e9-b570-6416efdc0803_story.html [https://perma. 
cc/YZM3-596M].  Most of the increase in outsourcing comes from efforts to privatize federal  
government–provided healthcare.  Id. 
 70 Davidson, supra note 69.   
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including military functions, is a long-term trend, but it reached new 
levels in the Trump Administration.71 
We recognize that Presidents may wish to rely more heavily on po-
litical appointees than career staff in some instances because they be-
lieve those political appointees will be more aligned with their agendas.  
Likewise, they may wish to reassign staff whom they believe do not 
support, or might undermine, their priorities.  And physically relocating 
offices may in some cases be entirely legitimate.  We grow concerned, 
however, when efforts to reduce, reassign, relocate, or demoralize career 
staff are so expansive that they evince something more reckless or de-
structive, or when they cut so deeply that they may prevent an agency 
from fulfilling its congressionally assigned mission. 
 2.  Officers. — Presidents can also seek to disable agencies by failing 
to nominate leadership.  The Constitution states that the President shall 
nominate, and the Senate shall confirm, all “Officers of the United 
States.”72  The Supreme Court has interpreted this language to mean 
that the Senate must confirm “principal” officers, including the heads of 
executive departments and independent commissions.73  There are more 
than 1,100 such positions in the federal government.74  However,  
Presidents do not always nominate, nor does the Senate always confirm, 
candidates for these positions in a timely manner.75  By April 2018, fif-
teen months into his presidency, President Trump had nominated 589 
candidates for key positions, compared with 734 by that same point un-
der President Obama, 746 under President George W. Bush, and 734 
under President Clinton.76  Halfway through President Trump’s presi-
dency, sixty-three nominees had withdrawn their candidacies or seen 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 71 For example, the Department of Defense has increasingly relied on contractors.  See, e.g., 
MARK F. CANCIAN, CTR. FOR STRATEGIC & INT’L STUD., U.S. MILITARY FORCES IN FY 2020: 
SOF, CIVILIANS, CONTRACTORS, AND NUKES 9–10 (2019), https://csis-website-prod.s3.amazo-
naws.com/s3fs-public/publication/191024_Cancian_FY2020_OtherForces_v2.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/KG4A-RFN3].  
 72 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
 73 While the Court has never defined the category of “principal” officers precisely, it has sug-
gested that the category includes those not subject to removal by higher executive branch officials 
(other than the President), who exercise broad duties and whose tenure is not temporary.  See Free 
Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Acct. Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 510 (2010); Edmond v. United States, 
520 U.S. 651, 662–63 (1997); Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 671–72 (1988). 
 74 Anne Joseph O’Connell, Vacant Offices: Delays in Staffing Top Agency Positions, 82 S. CAL. 
L. REV. 913, 917 (2009).  
 75 It is important not to conflate presidential failures to nominate with Senate failures to confirm.  
 76 Press Release, Senate Democrats, Special Report: How the Trump Administration and 
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their nominations pulled before confirmation — almost double the fig-
ure for the Obama Administration by the same point.77  As with staffing 
shortages, it is not the failure to nominate in any one instance that mat-
ters, but its strategic and systematic use to weaken agency capacity.  
Here, we discuss two effects of the failure to appoint: relying for ex-
tended periods on “acting” heads of executive branch agencies and de-
priving independent regulatory commissions of a quorum. 
(a)  Acting Officials. — When vacancies arise at executive agencies,78 
Presidents may appoint acting officials pending the nomination and con-
firmation of more permanent officers.79  Presidents have increasingly 
relied on acting officials to head agencies for at least some period of 
time, but President Trump’s use of acting officials “has been far more 
extensive and controversial than his predecessors’.”80  By early 2020, 
acting officials in the Trump Administration had already served more 
days, combined, than had acting officials in all eight years of the Obama 
Administration, and by a significant margin.81 
Substituting an acting official for one who is Senate confirmed is 
sometimes necessary, of course.  The Vacancies Act of 1868,82 most re-
cently amended by the Federal Vacancies Reform Act of 1998, contem-
plates that vacancies will occur in high-level government posts and that 
it can be beneficial to fill those posts on a temporary basis while waiting 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 77 Michael Collins, Donald Trump’s Picks for Administration Jobs Keep Dropping Out with John 
Ratcliffe Latest to Go, USA TODAY (Aug. 2, 2019, 11:17 PM), https://www. 
usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2019/06/17/from-heather-nauert-to-herman-cain-trumps-job- 
candidates-keep-quitting/3758484002 [https://perma.cc/YX98-3UE6]. 
 78 The Vacancies Act of 1868 does not apply to multimember commissions.  5 U.S.C. § 3349c(1). 
 79 Id. §§ 3345–3349d.  
 80 Anne Joseph O’Connell, Actings, 120 COLUM. L. REV. 613, 623 (2020). 
 81 See Aaron Blake, Trump’s Government Full of Temps, WASH. POST (Feb. 21, 2020), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2020/02/21/trump-has-had-an-acting-official-cabinet-
level-job-1-out-every-9-days [https://perma.cc/T3Z2-C6QS]; see also W. James Antle III, Opinion, 
Trump’s Acting Troupe, WASH. EXAMINER (Apr. 26, 2019, 12:00 AM), https://www. 
washingtonexaminer.com/opinion/trumps-acting-troupe [https://perma.cc/WA9N-JTQ3].  President 
Trump emphasized that “I like acting because I can move so quickly.  It gives me more flexibility.”  
Brett Samuels, Trump Learns to Love Acting Officials, THE HILL (Apr. 14, 2019, 10:30 AM), 
https://thehill.com/homenews/administration/438660-trump-learns-to-love-acting-officials 
[https://perma.cc/8A9U-CJLN]; see also KATHRYN DUNN TENPAS, BROOKINGS INST., 
TRACKING TURNOVER IN THE TRUMP ADMINISTRATION (2021), https://www. 
brookings.edu/research/tracking-turnover-in-the-trump-administration [https://perma.cc/PLA5-
8KFC].  The Trump Administration has also had higher levels of turnover in cabinet-level posts 
than any first-term elected administration in the past 100 years.  Tamara Keith, Trump Cabinet 
Turnover Sets Record Going Back 100 Years, NPR (Mar. 29, 2018, 5:00 AM), https:// 
www.npr.org/2018/03/19/594164065/trump-cabinet-turnover-sets-record-going-back-100-years 
[https://perma.cc/W9GB-HZU3].  
 82 Act of July 23, 1868, ch. 227, 15 Stat. 168 (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. §§ 3345–3349). 
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for presidential nomination and Senate confirmation of a permanent re-
placement.83  During such vacancies, Presidents may generally assign 
the responsibilities of the office to a senior officer or employee of the 
same agency or to a Senate-confirmed officer serving in a different gov-
ernmental position, subject to certain limitations.84  Acting officials can 
have salutary effects — rejuvenating an agency after scandal or mis-
management, keeping an agency on track through presidential transi-
tion periods, or caretaking the agency when a senior official suddenly 
must resign.85  Assigning leadership responsibilities to career civil serv-
ants during nomination or confirmation delays might also enhance 
agency expertise.86 
Yet, the President’s power to appoint acting officials also can be 
abused to prevent the agency from executing its statutory duties.  The 
Vacancies Act does not contemplate acting officials remaining in place 
perennially, yet Presidents sometimes press the statute’s limits.87   
Agencies may function less well under acting officials for a variety of 
reasons, including uncertainty about how long they will remain.88  While 
some acting officials may have considerable sway with the White House, 
not all will.  Temporary heads may lack the “stature” to push back on 
controversial actions by the White House, which is sometimes necessary 
to defend the agency’s pursuit of its statutory obligations.89  The inferior 
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 83 O’Connell, supra note 80, at 695, 700–01 (noting the potential benefits of continuity for agency 
action, morale, stability, and stature).  
 84 Vacancies Act § 3345.  There is a 210-day time limit on service as an acting officer, but that 
period can be extended if there are nominations for the office pending before the Senate.  Id. § 3346.  
 85 Professor Anne O’Connell argues that “[t]he costs of gaps in confirmed leadership may not be 
as dire as the conventional wisdom suggests,” and she concludes that acting officials continue to 
make important decisions and provide stability and continuity at the agency.  O’Connell, supra note 
80, at 699–702. 
 86 See Nina A. Mendelson, The Uncertain Effects of Senate Confirmation Delays in the  
Agencies, 64 DUKE L.J. 1571, 1596–97 (2015); O’Connell, supra note 80, at 702.  
 87 See VALERIE C. BRANNON, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R44997, THE VACANCIES ACT: A 
LEGAL OVERVIEW 13–14 (2021).  For examples of the Trump Administration’s use of acting offi-
cials and the legal questions these uses raised, see L.M.-M. v. Cuccinelli, 442 F. Supp. 3d 1, 24–25 
(D.D.C. 2020) (holding that President Trump’s appointment of Acting Director of United States 
Citizenship and Immigration Services violated the text, structure, and purpose of the Federal  
Vacancies Reform Act), judgment entered, No. CV 19-2676, 2020 WL 1905063 (D.D.C. Apr. 16, 
2020), appeal dismissed, No. 20-5141, 2020 WL 5358686 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 25, 2020); Becca Damante, 
At Least 15 Trump Officials Do Not Hold Their Positions Lawfully, JUST SEC. (Sept. 17, 2020), 
https://www.justsecurity.org/72456/at-least-15-trump-officials-do-not-hold-their-positions-lawfully 
[https://perma.cc/WDM9-SFN2]; Joel Rose, How Trump Has Filled High-Level Jobs Without  
Senate Confirmation Votes, NPR (Mar. 9, 2020, 5:04 AM), https://www.npr.org/2020/03/09/ 
813577462/how-trump-has-filled-high-level-jobs-without-senate-confirmation [https://perma.cc/ 
8V8G-PJPN]. 
 88 See O’Connell, supra note 80, at 698 & n.461 (citing PAUL C. LIGHT, BROOKINGS INST., A 
CASCADE OF FAILURES: WHY GOVERNMENT FAILS, AND HOW TO STOP IT 16–19 (2014)) (ob-
serving that “vacancies and delays” contributed to eight of forty-one examples of agency failure studied).  
 89 Id. at 696–97 (citing example of Pentagon acting head’s failure to push back on Trump  
Administration’s holdup of aid to Ukraine); see also Wesley Morgan, Trump’s Ukraine Holdup Hit 
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designation of “acting” also may undermine the ability of these officials 
to drive the agency’s agenda forward in Congress and influence im-
portant interagency and cabinet-level debates. 
The former Inspector General (IG) of the Department of Homeland 
Security identified the shortcomings of temporary “actings” when he tes-
tified before Congress in 2019 that “the nature and extent of senior lead-
ership vacancies in the Department . . . significantly hamper the  
Department’s ability to carry out its all-important mission.”90  He noted 
that acting officials “are simply in a caretaker role and are justifiably 
hesitant to make decisions that would tie the hands of the individual 
ultimately appointed to that position” and that presidential appointees 
are “better able to represent the Department’s interests in interagency 
coordination” because they are seen as more legitimate.91 
As with all of our examples, any one instance of failing to nominate 
agency leadership and relying on acting officials for a time might easily 
be explained.  But a persistent failure to name critical officers to key 
agency posts across the government for extended periods of time is more 
troubling and suggests something is awry.  A President might rely on 
acting officials temporarily to energize or reform agencies, but it seems 
more likely that a President wanting agencies to actively pursue their 
statutory mandates would try to equip them with Senate-confirmed 
leaders. 
(b)  Commission Vacancies. — Nearly all of the so-called independ-
ent agencies in the federal government are headed by commissions or 
boards rather than single individuals.92  While there are multiple fea-
tures that make agencies more or less independent from White House 
influence, the primary feature identified by scholars is whether agency 
heads are removable at will by the President.93  The President lacks the 
ability to remove independent commissioners without cause, but he may 
nominate new members to fill vacancies, and he generally names the 
commission chair.94 
In some cases, Presidents may be slow to fill these vacancies, which 
can interfere with agency operations to the extent that commissions re-
quire a quorum to act.  Quorum requirements vary by commission.  For 
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a Rudderless Pentagon, POLITICO (Sept. 25, 2019, 6:24 PM), https://www. 
politico.com/news/2019/09/25/trump-ukraine-military-aid-pentagon-000679 [https://perma.cc/ 
LNT5-CWSF].  
 90 Trouble at the Top, supra note 42, at 1 (statement of John Roth, Former Inspector General, 
Department of Homeland Security). 
 91 Id. at 4–5.  
 92 Seila L. LLC v. CFPB, 140 S. Ct. 2183, 2201–02 (2020).  
 93 See Rachel E. Barkow, Insulating Agencies: Avoiding Capture Through Institutional Design, 
89 TEX. L. REV. 15, 15 (2010) (noting that discussions of independent agencies hinge on this factor 
as well as their multimember structure and their exemption from centralized regulatory review).  
 94 See Paul R. Verkuil, The Purposes and Limits of Independent Agencies, 1988 DUKE L.J. 257, 265. 
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example, the Federal Election Commission (FEC) needs at least four 
commissioners for most policymaking and enforcement actions.95  The 
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) may issue decisions 
with three of its five members.96  A few commissions can operate with 
smaller quorums.97 
For the first time in its history, FERC operated without a quorum 
for six months in 2017.98  The FEC, whose duties include investigating 
allegations of campaign finance violations, was also without a quorum 
from September 2019 until May 2020.99  The Senate surely bears some 
responsibility for this problem, since President Trump had nominated 
one commissioner, Trey Trainor, in September 2017.  However, the  
President had nominated no other candidates.100  Thus, even after  
Trainor’s confirmation in May 2020, when another FEC commissioner 
resigned in June, the Commission was again without power to act.   
Commissions with multiple vacancies are also more likely to lose 
their quorums if a commissioner must recuse herself from a particular 
decision.  For example, FERC, which oversees wholesale electricity 
markets, was unable to vote on a controversial regulatory filing by a 
regional grid operator in August 2019 because two of its four members 
had recused themselves.101  Commissions can take some steps to protect 
decisionmaking authority in the event of a loss of quorum by redefining 
quorum rules or delegating particular decisions to staff, but these au-
thorities are limited.102 
The Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board (PCLOB) is an-
other example of an agency that has been disabled by Presidents failing 
to nominate appointees.  The independent agency — established in 2004 
by the 9/11 Commission to help ensure that the executive branch’s coun-
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 95 52 U.S.C. § 30106(c); see also CONG. RSCH. SERV., R45160, FEDERAL ELECTION 
COMMISSION: MEMBERSHIP AND POLICYMAKING QUORUM, IN BRIEF 7 (2020).  
 96 42 U.S.C. § 7171(e).  
 97 The SEC amended its quorum requirements by regulation in the 1990s to allow fewer than 
three members to constitute a quorum if there are fewer than three members in office.  17 C.F.R. 
§ 200.41 (2019). 
 98 Devin Henry, Energy Commission Swears in New Members, Regains Quorum, THE HILL 
(Aug. 10, 2017, 12:10 PM), https://thehill.com/policy/energy-environment/346048-ferc-swears-in-
new-members-regains-quorum [https://perma.cc/RX4M-C7TK]. 
 99 See Kate Ackley, FEC Set to Lose Its Quorum Again, ROLL CALL (June 26, 2020, 3:31 PM), 
https://www.rollcall.com/2020/06/26/fec-set-to-lose-its-quorum-again [https://perma.cc/32YK-
PVXQ]; Dave Levinthal, Prepare to Be Shocked! Trump’s One Weird Trick to Avoid a Campaign 
Investigation., CTR. FOR PUB. INTEGRITY (Jan. 13, 2020), https://publicintegrity.org/ 
politics/trump-fec-campaign-election-quorum-pascrell [https://perma.cc/TNK6-3ZBQ]. 
 100 Ackley, supra note 99. 
 101 Rod Kuckro, Lack of FERC Quorum Prompts Market Changes, E&E NEWS (Aug. 7, 2019), 
https://www.eenews.net/stories/1060870495 [https://perma.cc/L89Z-NPDS]. 
 102 See Ryan J. Levan, Note, Do We Have a Quorum?: Anticipating Agency Vacancies and the 
Prospect for Judicial Remedy, 48 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 181, 219–20 (2015).  
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terterrorism efforts consider individual rights — reviews national secu-
rity legislation, regulations, and policy; advises the executive branch; 
and compels agencies to produce documents and undergo investiga-
tion.103  President Obama took nearly two years to name nominees, de-
spite the statutory requirement that the President appoint members in a 
timely manner.104  The PCLOB did not begin work until August 2012 
and became fully operational only the following May when a Chair was  
confirmed.105 
PCLOB’s operational status was short lived; the Chair unexpectedly 
resigned in 2016, and three part-time members resigned.106  The 
PCLOB President Trump inherited had only one member by March 
2017, far short of the full-time Chair and four additional members re-
quired by the Agency’s enabling statute.107  Without the statutory 
quorum of three members, the PCLOB could not initiate new investiga-
tions, offer formal advice to the intelligence community, submit reports 
to Congress, or hold public meetings.108  Since even public reports re-
quire majority approval to be released, the PCLOB could not release 
information from concluded investigations, such as the long-awaited 
study of surveillance and intelligence powers authorized by the Reagan-
era Executive Order 12,333.109  That report was not released until April 
2021 — six years after the study began.110  Additionally, PCLOB was 
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 103 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000ee(c)–(d); David P. Fidler, Is the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight 
Board Back in Business?, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELS. BLOG (Sept. 11, 2017, 10:53 AM), 
https://www.cfr.org/blog/privacy-and-civil-liberties-oversight-board-back-business 
[https://perma.cc/5MLU-VVFF]; see also Declan McCullagh, Obama Privacy Board Gets Members 
After Two Years, CNET (Dec. 16, 2010, 3:57 PM), https://www.cnet.com/tech/services-and- 
software/obama-privacy-board-gets-members-after-two-years [https://perma.cc/UQJ8-M6XL]; Jay 
Stanley, What Powers Does the Civil Liberties Oversight Board Have?, ACLU (Nov. 4, 2013, 9:28 
AM), https://www.aclu.org/blog/national-security/privacy-and-surveillance/what-powers-does-
civil-liberties-oversight-board [https://perma.cc/77F7-FT8U]. 
 104 See Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-
53, § 801, 121 Stat. 266, 357; Andrea Peterson, Key Government Privacy Watchdog Muzzled During 
Surveillance Debate, SLATE (June 26, 2017, 7:30 AM), https://slate.com/technology/2017/06/trump-
hasnt-appointed-anyone-to-a-privacy-oversight-board.html [https://perma.cc/3P93-3VHW]; see 
also McCullagh, supra note 103. 
 105 See Fidler, supra note 103. 
 106 See id.; Jenna McLaughlin, Top Privacy Watchdog Suddenly Resigns, THE INTERCEPT 
(Mar. 29, 2016, 11:14 AM), https://www.theintercept.com/2016/03/29/top-privacy-watchdog- 
suddenly-resigns [https://perma.cc/6547-JFYP]. 
 107 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000ee(h)(1). 
 108 Jenna McLaughlin, The U.S. Government’s Privacy Watchdog Is Basically Dead, Emails  
Reveal, THE INTERCEPT (Mar. 3, 2017, 2:24 PM), https://theintercept.com/2017/03/03/the- 
governments-privacy-watchdog-is-basically-dead-emails-reveal [https://perma.cc/D25V-JCEV]. 
 109 Exec. Order No. 12,333, 46 Fed. Reg. 59,941 (Dec. 4, 1981); see also Peterson, supra note 104. 
 110 Jacob Schulz, PCLOB Releases Public Report on Executive Order 12333, LAWFARE (Apr. 5, 
2021, 11:17 AM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/pclob-releases-public-report-executive-order-12333 
[https://perma.cc/26F7-5XMW]. 
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unable to hire any new staff since only the Chair had hiring  
authority.111 
President Trump’s failure to fill PCLOB vacancies stymied the 
Agency’s ability to contribute promptly to the surveillance debate and 
left it “essentially paralyzed.”112  The delay prevented timely release of 
the Executive Order 12,333 report, debilitated the Agency from serving 
as a watchdog on the country’s counterterrorism operations, and frus-
trated privacy protections related to European and U.S. data.113   
President Trump did not nominate a chair until September 2017114 or 
announce nominations for two part-time vacancies until August of the 
following year.115  Intentionally opting not to staff the Agency may have 
done enduring damage, tarnishing the PCLOB’s reputation as a “credi-
ble evaluator of key surveillance programs.”116 
Certainly, Presidents enjoy virtually unconstrained latitude under 
the Appointments Clause to nominate their preferred appointees, and 
the order and timing of those nominations, we recognize, must be man-
aged by a busy White House.  Yet persistent failures to nominate that 
in fact prevent an agency from doing the business assigned to it by stat-
ute do seem to thwart congressional design.  So, while periodic and tem-
porary staffing shortfalls seem to us both inevitable and relatively in-
nocuous, intentionally failing to staff as a strategy of incapacitation is 
something altogether different.117 
3.  Structural Changes to Staffing Mechanisms. — Presidents can 
impede an agency’s ability to hire or backfill staff by weakening the 
agencies responsible for overseeing the staffing process.  With over 1,000 
federal positions requiring nomination and confirmation and over two 
million full-time federal employees, Presidents cannot single-handedly 
manage federal employment.  Instead, they rely on agencies for support.  
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 111 Peterson, supra note 104. 
 112 Id. (quoting Senator Ron Wyden, Democrat of Oregon). 
 113 See Cameron F. Kerry, It’s Time for the Senate to Act on PCLOB Nominations, LAWFARE 
(Aug. 27, 2018, 9:08 AM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/its-time-senate-act-pclob-nominations 
[https://perma.cc/FNV7-W9FK].  Democratic members of the House Permanent Select Committee 
on Intelligence implored President Trump to nominate candidates to fill the open seats.  Press  
Release, U.S. House of Reps. Permanent Select Comm. on Intel., Intelligence Committee Democrats 
Send Letter to President Asking for Nomination of PCLOB Members (July 28, 2017), https:// 
intelligence.house.gov/news/documentsingle.aspx?DocumentID=255 [https://perma.cc/333Q-
QTCJ].  The European Commission called for the “swift appointment of . . . missing members,” 
with the European Parliament also weighing in.  Kerry, supra.  
 114 See David Hoffman & Riccardo Masucci, One PCLOB Nomination to Applaud and Three 
More to Urge, LAWFARE (Sept. 14, 2017, 3:49 PM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/one-pclob- 
nomination-applaud-and-three-more-urge [https://perma.cc/ATK5-TAFE]. 
 115 See Kerry, supra note 113.  
 116 Id. (quoting Adam Klein, Chairman nominee, PCLOB). 
 117 To be clear, our argument applies regardless of how we might personally feel about the value 
of an agency’s work.  As long as Congress has created it and assigned it regulatory tasks, the  
President should not be able to prevent it from functioning through a wholesale failure to nominate.  
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The Presidential Personnel Office (PPO) sources potential nominees  
and conducts background diligence.118  The Office of Personnel  
Management recruits, hires, and manages federal employees.119  A third 
agency, the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB), hears employee 
appeals.120  Weakening these agencies can therefore indirectly weaken 
staffing across government. 
At the start of the Trump Administration, the PPO employed just 
thirty staff — less than one-third the level of prior administrations.  In 
addition, most of the office’s employees were inexperienced, again in 
contrast to earlier administrations.121  While there may be alternative 
explanations for this understaffing — for example, that the incoming 
Administration did not believe it would win the presidential election — 
the possibility remains that destaffing was a conscious strategy.   
President Trump sought to eliminate the OPM entirely and scatter its 
employees among other agencies.122  When this effort failed, the  
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 118 The PPO recruits and vets candidates for thousands of federal government jobs, including 
those requiring Senate confirmation.  Robert O’Harrow Jr. & Shawn Boburg, Behind the Chaos: 




 119 About, U.S. OFF. OF PERS. MGMT., https://www.opm.gov/about-us [https://perma.cc/X6SS-
7UT6]. 
 120 About MSPB, U.S. MERIT SYS. PROT. BD., https://www.mspb.gov/About/about.htm 
[https://perma.cc/48A7-K29Y]. 
 121 Professor James Pfiffner at George Mason University reports that, in the past, the PPO has 
been staffed by senior officials with relevant experience.  O’Harrow & Boburg, supra note 118.  In 
February 2020, the Administration hired a college senior to serve as the PPO’s director of opera-
tions.  Daniel Lippman & Meridith McGraw, A New Senior Leader at the White House Personnel 
Office: A College Senior, POLITICO (Feb. 25, 2020, 10:55 PM), https://www. 
politico.com/news/2020/02/25/college-senior-white-house-personnel-office-117493 [https://perma.cc/ 
JT8Z-ZU7E]. 
 122 Lisa Rein, Trump Wants to Kill This Federal Agency. Democrats Blasted the Idea., WASH. 
POST (May 21, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/trump-wants-to-kill-this-federal-
agency-democrats-blasted-the-idea/2019/05/21/67f6b978-7b18-11e9-a5b3-34f3edf1351e_story.html 
[https://perma.cc/6BMB-8R6J].  Congress opposed the elimination of the Agency, which would have 
required legislation.  This example demonstrates not only the occasional success of congressional 
backstop authority in checking structural deregulation but also the fact that Presidents stymied by 
Congress in their efforts to shrink the bureaucracy may turn to the alternative strategies laid out in 
this Part to achieve their goal.  
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Administration outsourced OPM’s tasks to other agencies through in-
teragency agreements,123 and an acting head led the OPM for more than 
half of President Trump’s term.124 
Presidents can also hasten staff departures by weakening civil ser-
vice protections.  In 2019, the MSPB was left without a single mem-
ber.125  Before that, the Board had operated with one member, and 
therefore without a quorum, since January 2017.126  President Trump 
did not nominate any new candidates to serve on the Board until 
2018.127  By the end of 2019, thousands of cases were pending before the 
Board.128  Compounding the problem, the Trump Administration took 
the position that the Supreme Court’s opinion in Lucia v. SEC129 makes 
the decisions of the administrative judges who staff the Board reversi-
ble.130  Because there are no Board members in place to cure any pro-
cedural defects in these judges’ appointments, the cases they hear  
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 123 See Adam Mazmanian, What if Congress Doesn’t Want to Move OPM?, FED. COMPUT. WK. 
(May 15, 2019), https://www.fcw.com/articles/2019/05/15/opm-reorg-congress-plans.aspx [https:// 
perma.cc/NTA9-4GYU] (citing the OPM’s acting head Margaret Weichert’s comments that if a 
legislative solution could not be found, OPM could enter into interagency agreements to outsource 
work to the General Services Administration and other agencies). 
 124 See Jessie Bur, Government Personnel Office Abruptly Loses Its Top Official, FED. TIMES 
(Mar. 17, 2020), https://www.federaltimes.com/management/leadership/2020/03/17/government-
personnel-office-abruptly-loses-its-top-official [https://perma.cc/5WFN-2VMY].  A report by the 
National Academy of Public Administration cited the absence of sustained leadership as an imped-
iment to execution of OPM’s mission.  JANET HALE ET AL., NAT’L ACAD. OF PUB. ADMIN., 
ELEVATING HUMAN CAPITAL: REFRAMING THE U.S. OFFICE OF PERSONNEL 




 125 Ben L. Erdreich & Steven L. Katz, Opinion, The Federal Merit System Keeps Our Democracy 
Safe. Trump and the Senate Are Killing Its Guardian., WASH. POST (Feb. 12, 2019), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/the-federal-merit-system-keeps-our-democracy-safe-trump-
and-the-senate-are-killing-its-guardian/2019/02/12/d1984726-2f0e-11e9-8ad3-9a5b113ecd3c_story.html 
[https://perma.cc/GKF4-5JMJ].  President Trump had appointed the sole remaining member of the 
Board to a secondary role as acting general counsel to OPM in late 2018, a step some described as 
creating a conflict of interest between OPM and the Board, which reviews OPM rules.  See id. 
 126 See id. 
 127 Nicole Ogrysko, Trump Names Long-Awaited Second Member to MSPB, FED. NEWS 
NETWORK (Mar. 6, 2018, 6:21 PM), https://federalnewsnetwork.com/all-news/2018/03/trump-
names-long-awaited-second-member-to-mspb [https://perma.cc/EE5Y-Y9LW]. 
 128 Nicole Ogrysko, Lack of Quorum Hits 3-Year Mark at MSPB, with No Clear End in Sight, 
FED. NEWS NETWORK (Jan. 24, 2020, 11:31 AM), https://federalnewsnetwork.com/ 
workforce/2020/01/lack-of-quorum-hits-3-year-mark-at-mspb-with-no-clear-end-in-sight [https:// 
perma.cc/7F3Y-3ZAB]. 
 129 138 S. Ct. 2044 (2018). 
 130 See Eric Katz, New Trump Administration Strategy Leaves Fired Feds Seeking Recourse in 
Indefinite Purgatory, GOV’T EXEC. (Sept. 2, 2020), https://www.govexec.com/ 
workforce/2020/09/new-trump-administration-strategy-leaves-fired-feds-seeking-recourse- 
indefinite-purgatory/168201 [https://perma.cc/Z9SX-LHXW].  In Lucia, the Court held that the 
SEC’s administrative law judges (ALJs) were inferior officers subject to appointment by the Presi-
dent, the courts of law, or the heads of department.  Lucia, 138 S. Ct. at 2049.  Because they had 
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remain open to retrospective challenge.  The decline of the MSPB will, 
at best, create insecurity among federal employees.131  At worst, it will 
allow unlawful thinning of their ranks. 
Manipulating agency staff is an appealing tool of structural deregu-
lation because Presidents can do it quite informally, without much legal 
procedure, and outside of the normal and transparent budget process in 
which Congress sets agency funding levels.  In some cases, these presi-
dential maneuvers will attract public scrutiny, but not always.  Weak-
ening an agency’s staff can be highly effective because it can impair the 
agency’s ability to act across many policy domains simultaneously.  And 
because it is harder to rebuild than to destroy agency capacity, these 
steps can be “sticky” and quite burdensome to reverse. 
B.  Other Resources 
Agencies require other forms of support beyond staffing, including 
office space, technology, and supplies.  The General Services  
Administration (GSA), a little-known but powerful agency, is responsi-
ble for procurement and real estate for the federal government.132  There 
have been some complaints about procurement policy in past admin-
istrations.133  In theory, a President could try to starve agencies of these 
resources or create hurdles to procuring what they need. 
Most important, however, is an agency’s budget.  Much of the budget 
process is highly transparent.  The President proposes an annual budget, 
which Congress considers when appropriating agency funding.  Yet even 
when Congress rejects the President’s budget proposals, he can manip-
ulate agency budgets outside of the normal appropriations process.   
Professor Eloise Pasachoff identifies several “levers” by which the  
President controls agency spending of allocated funds.134  First, OMB 
can limit what portion of their appropriations agencies can spend by 
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not been so appointed, their decisions could be overturned.  Id. at 2055.  The SEC subsequently 
cured the procedural defect by formally appointing all of their ALJs.  See In re: Pending Adminis-
trative Proceedings, Securities Act of 1933 Release No. 10,440, Securities Exchange Act of 1934 
Release No. 82,178, Investment Advisers Act of 1940 Release No. 4816, Investment Company Act 
of 1940 Release No. 32,929, 2017 SEC LEXIS 3724 (Nov. 30, 2017). 
 131 See Erdreich & Katz, supra note 125 (“If federal employees can’t trust that they’ll get jobs 
based on their qualifications or be able to do their work impartially, they may leave government, 
or even decline to pursue federal jobs in the first place.”). 
 132 U.S. GEN. SERVS. ADMIN., 2018 AGENCY FINAL REPORT 14–15 (2018), 
https://www.gsa.gov/cdnstatic/2018-GSA_AFR-508_v2.pdf [https://perma.cc/M76F-GX2S]. 
 133 See Maria Ernita T. Joaquin, Agency Strategy, Strength, and Adaptation: Implementation of 
the Bush Administration’s Competitive Sourcing Policy 174 (July 1, 2007) (Ph.D. dissertation, 
Northern Illinois University) (ProQuest). 
 134 Indeed, one of Pasachoff’s recommendations is that the President exert greater control over 
the Resource Management Offices’ activities through executive orders, “thereby claiming owner-
ship of it,” in order to enhance transparency about their operations.  Eloise Pasachoff, The  
President’s Budget as a Source of Agency Policy Control, 125 YALE L.J. 2182, 2193 (2016).  
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time period or by project.135  OMB may attach conditions to spending 
on particular projects in “apportionment footnotes.”136  Finally, OMB 
may also block requests by an agency to transfer appropriated funds 
between programs (which requires congressional approval).137  These 
behind-the-scenes controls can be used to starve particular programs of 
funds appropriated by Congress. 
Of course, once Congress appropriates money for an agency or par-
ticular agency programs, Presidents generally may not refuse outright to 
spend that money for the specified purpose.  The Congressional Budget 
and Impoundment Control Act of 1974,138 promulgated in the wake of 
perceived agency spending abuse by President Nixon, prohibits refusals 
to spend unless certain conditions are met.139  Nixon was not the first 
President to impound a share of congressional appropriations, but he 
took the practice to new levels, refusing to spend a greater share of al-
located funds than prior Presidents, and with the express aim of termi-
nating programs he did not support and frustrating congressional policy 
goals with which he disagreed.140 
While Congress has tried to curb such practices, Presidents continue 
to push the limits of their authority.141  Where Congress has not limited 
appropriations with adequate specificity, for example, a President may 
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 135 Id. at 2228.  This limitation is consistent with the Antideficiency Act requirement that agen-
cies spread out appropriated funds over time.  See 31 U.S.C. § 1512(a).  
 136 Pasachoff, supra note 134, at 2229.  One example Pasachoff cites is requiring agencies to 
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2229 n.209 (citing SHELLEY LYNNE TOMKIN, INSIDE OMB: POLITICS AND PROCESS IN THE 
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 137 Id. at 2231.  
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 139 Id. § 1012, 88 Stat. at 334 (allowing Presidents to defer spending until the end of a fiscal year 
provided that they submit a special deferral notice to Congress identifying the amount and duration 
of, and reasons for, the proposed deferral). 
 140 See LOUIS FISHER, PRESIDENTIAL SPENDING POWER 175–201 (2015) (discussing  
President Nixon’s impoundment tactics); Nixon Impounds Pollution Funds: Withholds 3-Billion  
Allocated for Treatment of Waste–Cites Inflation Peril, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 11, 1974, at A1.  President 
Nixon claimed that Presidents possess the constitutional authority not to spend congressional ap-
propriations “when the spending of money would mean either increasing prices or increasing taxes 
for all the people.”  See Impoundment: Changes During the Nixon Administration, LAW LIBR.: 
AM. L. & LEGAL INFO., https://law.jrank.org/pages/7517/Impoundment-Changes-During-Nixon-
Administration.html [https://perma.cc/3ED6-EPGN]. 
 141 See infra section III.B, pp. 642–48.  
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have a plausible argument that such monies are fungible.142  And en-
forcement of the Impoundment Control Act is difficult.143 
Presidents may also exploit their discretion to transfer appropriations 
to preferred programs.  Under the Constitution, “[n]o Money shall be 
Drawn from the Treasury, but in Consequence of Appropriations made 
by law.”144  Again, however, Presidents can seek ways around this limi-
tation.  For example, the Trump Administration diverted billions of dol-
lars from Defense Department programs in order to fund construction 
of a border wall between the United States and Mexico.145  This action 
redirected funding from the Department of Defense’s Overseas  
Contingency Operations, from the Army’s budget for tactical and sup-
port vehicles, from the Navy’s combat aircraft and amphibious ships 
budgets, from the Air Force’s aircraft program, and from the National 
Guard’s reserve equipment funds.146  The Ninth Circuit ruled the fund-
ing transfers unconstitutional, but a Supreme Court stay allowed the 
construction to proceed.147  In another example, the Administration di-
verted close to $10 million in funds from the Federal Emergency  
Management Agency (FEMA) to fund U.S. Immigration and Customs 
Enforcement (ICE) operations.148  Major redirections of funds do not 
suffer from some of the same problems of transparency or accountability 
that accompany other forms of structural deregulation.  Nevertheless, 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 142 See, e.g., Zachary Price, Can President Trump Defund the WHO?, AM. CONST. SOC’Y (June 
1, 2020), https://www.acslaw.org/expertforum/can-president-trump-defund-the-who [https://perma. 
cc/M36K-K3LP] (arguing that, because Congress appropriated money in a lump sum for dues pay-
ments to international organizations, the Trump Administration could lawfully cease to pay World 
Health Organization dues).  
 143 See Wm. Bradford Middlekauff, Note, Twisting the President’s Arm: The Impoundment  
Control Act as a Tool for Enforcing the Principle of Appropriation Expenditure, 100 YALE L.J. 209, 
216–17, 220, 223 (1990).  
 144 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 7.  
 145 The Administration was required to notify Congress of this diversion, which it did, observing 
that the diversion was for “higher priority items” related to “Counter-Drug Activity” and was “nec-
essary in the national interest.”  DEP’T OF DEF., NO. FY 20-01 RA, SUPPORT FOR DHS 
COUNTER-DRUG ACTIVITY REPROGRAMMING ACTION (Feb. 13, 2020), https://www. 
documentcloud.org/documents/6776019-FY-20–01-RA-Support-for-DHS-Counter-Drug-
Activity.html [https://perma.cc/2RCW-J8B8]. 
 146 Id.  To do so, the President declared a national emergency at the southern border and argued 
that this justified use of the funds to block drug smuggling corridors.  Proclamation No. 9844, 84 
Fed. Reg. 4949 (Feb. 15, 2019); Fact Sheets: President Donald J. Trump Stands by His Declaration 
of a National Emergency on Our Southern Border, THE WHITE HOUSE (Mar. 15, 2019), 
https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/briefings-statements/president-donald-j-trump-stands- 
declaration-national-emergency-southern-border [https://perma.cc/ANA3-H2U2]. 
 147 See Trump v. Sierra Club, 140 S. Ct. 2620, 2620 (2020). 
 148 Isaac Stanley-Becker, Trump Administration Diverted Nearly $10 Million from FEMA to ICE 





612 HARVARD LAW REVIEW [Vol. 135:585 
redirection can be used to starve programs of resources in ways that are 
time-consuming to reverse. 
There are, in sum, several ways a President can at least temporarily 
deprive agencies of appropriated funds, divert those funds, and create 
obstacles to agencies accessing resources allocated to them.  These ap-
proaches may be more or less transparent, and some may even be sub-
ject to judicial review.  When taken together, however, they demonstrate 
how much discretion the President retains over agency budgets.  That 
discretion can be used not only to bolster preferred agencies and pro-
grams but also to deny disfavored agencies and programs the funds nec-
essary to accomplish their delegated tasks.  Inadequate budgets can op-
erate in tandem with other techniques of structural deregulation, 
undermining agency morale, for example, or weakening agency capacity 
to provide important services.149 
Presidents and their political appointees can also divert existing 
agency resources from core responsibilities by creating busywork to oc-
cupy agency staff.  This is an even subtler form of structural deregula-
tion, one that is hard to track and virtually impossible to challenge.  This 
“overtasking” can sap an agency’s limited resources.  Professor Cass 
Sunstein has argued that the federal government should audit and mit-
igate what he calls “sludge” — paperwork and other burdens that can 
reduce the public’s access to important government goods such as li-
censes and benefits.150  But the government is burdened with “sludge” 
too. 
Agencies must comply with a wide variety of statutory paperwork 
requirements, including, for example, responding to requests for infor-
mation under the Freedom of Information Act.151  They must also pro-
duce reports, analysis, and testimony in response to congressional over-
sight requests.  And they routinely generate information for various 
White House offices — including Legislative Affairs, the National  
Economic Council, the Press Office, and OMB, among others — as 
needed, to support the administration’s pursuit of its legislative and reg-
ulatory agenda, and to explain and defend their policy actions.152  But 
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 149 See Jory Heckman, Ahead of Filing Season, Decade of IRS Budget Cuts “Taking a Toll” on 
Workforce Morale, FED. NEWS NETWORK (Jan. 24, 2020, 1:21 PM), https://www. 
federalnewsnetwork.com/workforce/2020/01/ahead-of-filing-season-decade-of-irs-budget-cuts- 
taking-a-toll-on-workforce-morale [https://perma.cc/NU58-R6XY]. 
 150 See Cass R. Sunstein, Sludge and Ordeals, 16 DUKE L.J. 1843, 1847 (2019). 
 151 See, e.g., David E. Pozen, Freedom of Information Beyond the Freedom of Information Act, 
165 U. PA. L. REV. 1097, 1124 (2017) (noting that FOIA imposes “diversion costs” in that it distracts 
employees from focusing on an agency’s substantive mission). 
 152 See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 710(a) (requiring the Commissioner of the Rehabilitation Services  
Administration to submit reports to the President); id. § 781(a)(3), (8), (b)(1)–(2) (outlining the duties 
of the National Council on Disability to advise and report to the President); H.R. 3126, 111th Cong. 
§ 117(a) (2009) (requiring the Consumer Financial Protection Agency to prepare and submit reports 
to the Congress).  Agencies must also furnish their plans for both short- and long-term regulatory 
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on top of these routine requirements, Presidents and their appointees 
can heap additional burdens on agencies that can overwhelm them and 
distract them from legitimate regulatory work. 
First, moving offices and reassigning personnel, in addition to poten-
tially inducing resignations of key staff, as discussed above, also creates 
busywork for remaining agency staff.  Interfering with agency budgets 
(also mentioned above) likewise consumes scarce agency resources, re-
quiring agency officials to spend time protesting to OMB, other senior 
White House officials, or members of Congress, to have their funds  
restored. 
In addition, the White House can use centralized regulatory over-
sight to impose substantial analytic burdens on agencies that are not 
required by their statutes, and which sometimes appear to conflict with 
them.153  White House review of agency regulatory proposals under  
Executive Order 12,866 and related executive orders can involve re-
peated demands for additional analysis to support an agency’s already-
detailed regulatory impact analysis, in what can feel to agency officials 
like an endless loop of information requests.154  Likewise, the require-
ment that agencies retrospectively review their old rules to evaluate their 
continued relevance and effectiveness, while sensible-sounding on its 
face, in practice can distract agencies from more immediate priorities, 
including statutory and court-imposed deadlines.155  These burdens can 
create significant additional work for agencies, with only questionable 
incremental value. 
There is a robust and longstanding debate about the practical and 
political value of such regulatory review requirements, and it can be 
difficult to distinguish between instances when they exemplify “good 
governance” and when they may cross the line into tools of delay and 
obstruction.  Yet the voluminous literature on the regulatory review pro-
cess, which covers both Democratic and Republican administrations, 
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actions to the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, which annually publishes a Unified 
Agenda of Regulatory and Deregulatory Actions, which lists the planned actions by agency.  See 
About the Unified Agenda, OFF. OF INFO. & REGUL. AFFS., https://www.reginfo.gov/ 
public/jsp/eAgenda/UA_About.myjsp [https://perma.cc/D5PM-Q998].  
 153 For example, under Executive Order 12,866, the EPA must produce a cost-benefit analysis of 
Clean Air Act provisions that the Supreme Court has held prohibit consideration of cost.  Whitman 
v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 471 (2001).  
 154 See, e.g., Lisa Heinzerling, Inside EPA: A Former Insider’s Reflections on the Relationship 
Between the Obama EPA and the Obama White House, 31 PACE ENV’T L. REV. 325, 340, 359, 361 
(2014). 
 155 See, e.g., Press Release, Delaney Parrish, Ctr. for Effective Gov’t, Federal Agencies Release 
Retrospective Reviews: Preliminary Plans Appear Reasonable, But Proof Will Be Final Product 
(May 26, 2011), https://www.foreffectivegov.org/node/11683 [http://perma.cc/T3Z2-ZV8R] (“[T]he 
more agencies look back the less they will be able to look forward.”). 
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makes clear that the line can be crossed.156  In the hands of a determined 
President, centralized review undoubtedly could be used to stymie 
agency action to a sufficient extent that we would consider it evidence 
of structural deregulation. 
A final example of busywork consists of ministerial tasks that appear 
to serve little purpose other than chewing up agency time.  To offer one 
example, during the Trump Administration, Acting Director Mick  
Mulvaney required a new name and seal for the Consumer Financial 
Protection Bureau; the Bureau’s new name was to be the “Bureau for 
Consumer Financial Protection.”157  The Agency already had spent tens 
of millions of dollars promoting its previous acronym.158  Nevertheless, 
Acting Director Mulvaney insisted upon the change and tasked about a 
dozen staffers with serving on a “Name Correction Working Group.”159  
We are not suggesting that an agency name change is always busywork; 
when the General Accounting Office became the Government  
Accountability Office (GAO), there was a rationale, which was to align 
the name of the Agency with the full set of professional tasks it performs, 
which go beyond accounting — and in any event, Congress ordered that 
change.160  But Acting Director Mulvaney’s proffered reason for simply 
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 156 Compare Heinzerling, supra note 154, at 325–27 (criticizing the Office of Information and 
Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) for stalling EPA policymaking), with Cass R. Sunstein, Commentary, 
The Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs: Myths and Realities, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1838, 
1840 (2013) (defending OIRA).  See also Christina Reichert, Debate over OIRA’s Virtues and Vices 
Continues, REGUL. REV. (June 26, 2013), https://www.theregreview.org/2013/06/26/26-reichert-
oira-virtues-vices [https://perma.cc/9Z7Y-8WTR] (summarizing the larger debate). 
 157 See O’Harrow et al., supra note 58. 
 158 Id.  One report projected that the name change could cost the Agency up to $19 million.  
Sylvan Lane, Consumer Bureau Name Change Could Cost Firms $300 Million, THE HILL (Dec. 3, 
2018, 4:44 PM), https://thehill.com/policy/finance/419527-exclusive-consumer-bureau-analysis-says-
name-change-could-cost-firms-300 [https://perma.cc/58HY-JSML]. 
 159 O’Harrow et al., supra note 58.  
 160 See GAO Human Capital Reform Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-271, 118 Stat. 811 (codified 
as amended in scattered sections of the U.S. Code); Government Accountability Office: What’s in a 
Name?, WATCHBLOG (Apr. 4, 2014), https://www.gao.gov/blog/2014/04/04/government- 
accountability-office-whats-in-a-name [https://perma.cc/47AK-WBHR] (explaining the motivation 
behind the name change).  Similarly, early in his presidency, Joe Biden signed an executive order 
establishing his climate change and environmental protection policies broadly, which, among other 
things, directed the Attorney General to consider changing the name of its existing Environment 
and Natural Resources Division to the Environmental Justice and Natural Resources Division.  
Exec. Order No. 14,008, 86 Fed. Reg. 7619, 7631 (Jan. 27, 2021); see also Ellen M. Gilmer, Biden 
Bolsters DOJ Focus on Environmental Justice, Climate (3), BLOOMBERG L. (Jan. 27, 2021, 3:53 
PM), https://www.news.bloomberglaw.com/environment-and-energy/biden-bolsters-doj-focus-on-
environmental-justice-climate [https://perma.cc/6XQU-F7J3] (describing the executive order).  The 
purpose of the request, as the executive order made clear, was to signal the importance of environ-
mental justice to the Administration, which had pledged to prioritize enforcing environmental  
protection laws in minority communities that (as has been empirically shown) have suffered dispro-
portionate environmental harms.  The same executive order also directed the Attorney General to 
consider adding an office “to coordinate environmental justice activities among Department of  
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reordering the words in the CFPB’s name — aligning the Bureau’s 
name more closely with the one used in its authorizing legislation — 
strikes us as more suspect since the statute, in fact, uses both names.161 
Officials at the CFPB during the Trump Administration also com-
plained about being “bogged down with what they considered make-
work” more broadly, including being directed to author detailed memos 
to justify their cases and programs, which took hundreds of hours to 
complete.162  Naturally, some work of this kind is unavoidable in any 
bureaucracy — as anyone who has worked in an agency will attest.  
New administrations are entitled to ask agency staff for explanatory 
memos, certainly.  Yet there is a point at which such exercises, on any 
fair measure, are overkill, and serve no other purpose than chewing up 
time that could otherwise be devoted to statutory tasks.  We 
acknowledge that this determination is something one can assess only 
by taking the full context into account, but it ought to be possible to do 
so.  Such efforts to bog agencies down may occasionally come to light, 
as with the CFPB name change incident, but many other examples 
might evade public scrutiny.  And while assigning busywork may be 
relatively easy for an incoming President to stop doing, the lost time 
cannot be recouped. 
C.  Agency Expertise 
A key premise of our argument, as noted above, is that some ques-
tions assigned by Congress to administrative agencies require expertise 
and technocractic knowledge, which nonexpert political appointees typ-
ically do not possess.  While we recognize that most agency decisions 
are the product of policy preference as well as expertise, the fact remains 
that agencies must make expert judgments of various kinds in order to 
execute statutory commands.  Agencies simply cannot set air pollution 
limits “requisite to protect the public health,” for instance, without the 
support of epidemiologists;163 regulate energy markets to ensure rates 
are “just and reasonable” without detailed economic analyses;164 or ap-
prove new drugs to ensure they are “safe and effective” without evalu-
ating data from clinical trials.165  Moreover, established precedent  
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Justice components and United States Attorneys’ Offices nationwide,” and established an inter-
agency working group on environmental justice and a White House advisory group on environ-
mental justice.  See Exec. Order No. 14,008, 86 Fed. Reg. at 7629–31. 
 161 See O’Harrow et al., supra note 58. 
 162 Id. 
 163 See 42 U.S.C. § 7409(b)(1).  
 164 See 16 U.S.C. § 824d(a).  
 165 See 21 U.S.C. § 393(b)(2)(B).  While critics of delegation may bemoan Congress’s unwilling-
ness to set numerical standards itself in such cases, delegations both broad and narrow are a fact of 
modern governance and one we do not contest here.  
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requires that agencies conform their actions to available evidence.166  
Statutes often explicitly require agencies to perform specific analyses or 
assessments that assume the availability of relevant expertise.167 
As discussed above, manipulating agency staffing levels is an im-
portant tool of presidential control.  So too are steps a President can take 
to undermine the agency expertise that is foundational to the modern 
regulatory enterprise.168  A President is entitled to disagree with experts 
about how to weigh “incommensurables under conditions of uncer-
tainty,”169 and certainly may introduce policy considerations into regu-
latory decisionmaking where a statute so allows,170 but it is fundamen-
tally different to disable the agency’s capacity to reduce uncertainty and 
calibrate the relevant tradeoffs in its assigned domain, especially when 
the agency’s authorizing statute contemplates that the agency will de-
velop and bring to bear scientific and technical expertise.171 
Presidents can undermine expertise by reducing the absolute num-
bers of expert staff below levels necessary to perform the agency’s func-
tions, interfering with expert staff’s ability to collect and use relevant 
information, sidelining experts in the agency decisionmaking process, 
and making it difficult for the agency to access external expertise.   
Perhaps the most prominent example of how Presidents can under-
mine agency capacity by eroding expertise is their treatment of science 
in agencies that rely heavily on scientific data to develop the foundation 
for their rules or policy actions.  Marginalizing agency science can take 
several forms.  First, the staffing cuts described above can be targeted 
to eliminate certain scientific expertise.  Such targeting appears to have 
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 166 Cf. FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 519 (2009) (“It is one thing to set aside 
agency action under the Administrative Procedure Act because of failure to adduce empirical data 
that can readily be obtained. . . .  It is something else to insist upon obtaining the unobtainable.”).  
Presidents should not be able to convert testable propositions into untestable ones simply by drain-
ing agency resources. 
 167 See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1363(a)–(b) (creating the Water Pollution Control Advisory Board to help 
implement the Federal Water Pollution Control Act and provide the Administrator with advice and 
consultation); 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (establishing the interagency decisionmaking and review process for 
environmental impact assessments under the National Environmental Policy Act); id. 
§ 7409(d)(2)(A) (establishing an independent scientific review committee under the Clean Air Act to 
review and revise national ambient air quality standards). 
 168 Agency staff is commonly thought to fall into two categories: political appointees on the one 
hand and career staff on the other.  But the latter category especially is diverse.  As Professors 
Elizabeth Magill and Adrian Vermeule put it: “Agencies [a]re a ‘they,’ not an ‘it.’”  Elizabeth Magill 
& Adrian Vermeule, Allocating Power Within Agencies, 120 YALE L.J. 1032, 1036 (2011) (capitali-
zation omitted).  
 169 Dep’t of Com. v. New York, 139 S. Ct. 2551, 2571 (2019) (noting that while the Secretary of 
Commerce was entitled to weigh “incommensurables under conditions of uncertainty,” he was still 
“required to consider the evidence”). 
 170 See Sierra Club v. Costle, 657 F.2d 298, 330 (D.C. Cir. 1981). 
 171 See, e.g., 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(1)(A) (requiring the Secretaries of Commerce and Interior to 
make endangered species listing decisions “solely on the basis of the best scientific and commercial 
data available”). 
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happened at the EPA, where 700 scientists left the Agency between  
January 2017 and January 2020, and only 350 replacements were hired 
in the same time period.172  In another example of scientific drain, the 
Trump Administration eliminated most of the staff at the Centers for 
Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) who were working on health 
security in China.173  Professors Thomas McGarity and Wendy Wagner 
have called attention to the manipulation of agency science as an aid to 
substantive deregulation, meaning that it plays a role in weakening par-
ticular rules.174  Many of the same techniques they discuss, including 
reassigning agency personnel, also contribute to structural deregulation, 
because of their potentially disabling effect on agency capacity over the 
longer term.175 
Presidents can shift resources away from supporting agency expertise 
to other things.  For example, the Trump Administration diverted re-
sources from science-based programs within the CDC to security and 
disaster-response initiatives.176  They can also diminish resources out-
right.  For example, the Administration directed all agencies to cut the 
number of their advisory committees, which provide expert advice to 
regulators, by one-third — a fairly arbitrary proportion lacking an ade-
quate rationale.177  In addition, the EPA issued a rule barring member-
ship on expert advisory committees for scientists who had received an 
agency grant.178  Although facially neutral, this move had the effect of 
limiting advisory committee membership for academic scientists with 
relevant subject matter expertise (many of whom at one time or another 
received an agency grant) while leaving industry membership  
unaffected.179 
Administration officials can also undermine expertise by dismissing, 
ignoring, or overriding expert views without sufficient process or expla-
nation.  The Trump Administration removed climate change resources 
from agency websites and suppressed climate-related research.180   
President Trump himself dismissed the National Climate Assessment 
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 172 Gowen et al., supra note 63. 
 173 Christopher Sellers et al., An Embattled Landscape Series, Part 2a: Coronavirus and the 
Three-Year Trump Quest to Slash Science at the CDC, ENV’T DATA & GOVERNANCE INITIATIVE 
(Mar. 23, 2020), https://envirodatagov.org/an-embattled-landscape-series-part-2a-coronavirus-and-
the-three-year-trump-quest-to-slash-science-at-the-cdc [https://perma.cc/AX5L-6H63]. 
 174 See Thomas O. McGarity & Wendy E. Wagner, Deregulation Using Stealth “Science”  
Strategies, 68 DUKE L.J. 1719, 1722 (2019).  
 175 See id. at 1747–56.  
 176 Sellers et al., supra note 173.  
 177 Exec. Order No. 13,875, § 1(b), 84 Fed. Reg. 28,711, 28,711 (June 19, 2019). 
 178 See Physicians for Soc. Resp. v. Wheeler, 956 F.3d 634, 638 (D.C. Cir. 2020).  
 179 See id. at 640–41. 
 180 See Press Release, Rep. Don Beyer, Safe Climate Caucus Members Urge Trump to Halt  
“Systematic Effort” to Reduce Public Access to Climate Change Resources (Feb. 28, 2018), 
https://beyer.house.gov/news/documentsingle.aspx?documentid=768 [https://perma.cc/CWT4-FN6Q]. 
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produced by thirteen of his executive agencies, declaring, “I don’t be-
lieve it.”181  He later removed the scientist in charge of overseeing the 
Assessment, the executive director of the Global Change Research  
Program, and replaced him with someone known as a climate change 
skeptic.182  One EPA scientist chose to retire after an Agency spokesper-
son publicly attacked a study the Agency had funded on the long-term 
effects of exposure to soot and smog.183  Another long-serving EPA sci-
entist put it this way: “Since Trump was elected, the palpable sense is 
just that they don’t like what we do.  That’s really the bottom line.”184 
This treatment was not limited to the EPA.  Scientists and experts 
at the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) and the CDC 
faced similar challenges.  During the COVID-19 pandemic, politically 
appointed HHS communications staff sought to review, revise, and di-
lute the CDC’s weekly scientific reports.185  HHS Assistant Secretary 
Michael Caputo’s communications team delayed the publication of var-
ious CDC reports related to the pandemic, including one addressing the 
use and effectiveness of hydroxychloroquine, which had become contro-
versial after the President touted its benefits without evidence.186  It also 
came to light that a CDC report on testing guidance had been released 
to the public over the serious objection of agency scientists.187 
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 181 Emily Holden, Trump on Own Administration’s Climate Report: “I Don’t Believe It”, THE 
GUARDIAN (Nov. 26, 2018, 4:13 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2018/nov/26/trump-
national-climate-assessment-dont-believe [https://perma.cc/T8TY-RKWF]. 
 182 Christopher Flavelle et al., Trump Administration Removes Scientist in Charge of Assessing 
Climate, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 9, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/11/09/climate/michael- 
kuperberg-climate-assessment.html [https://perma.cc/G7B5-ZE4K]; Andrew Freedman et al., 
Trump Administration Official Who Questions Global Warming Will Run Key Climate Program, 
WASH. POST (Nov. 11, 2020, 8:32 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/weather/2020/11/11/ 
climate-science-office-david-legates [https://perma.cc/XSW9-MPPQ].  Meddling with agency sci-
ence and trying to control the public remarks of agency scientists is not limited to the Trump  
Administration.  The George W. Bush White House also reportedly interfered with EPA scientific 
reports on climate change, and the President himself expressed disdain for government research on 
the topic.  See Jody Freeman, The Environmental Protection Agency’s Role in U.S. Climate  
Policy — A Fifty Year Appraisal, 31 DUKE ENV’T L. & POL’Y F. (forthcoming 2021) (manuscript 
at 41–42) (on file with the Harvard Law School Library).  The George H.W. Bush White House was 
also accused of muzzling scientists.  See id. (manuscript at 23). 
 183 Gowen et al., supra note 63. 
 184 Cohen, supra note 50. 
 185 See Dan Diamond, Trump Officials Interfered with CDC Reports on Covid-19, POLITICO 
(Sept. 12, 2020, 11:11 AM), https://www.politico.com/news/2020/09/11/exclusive-trump-officials- 
interfered-with-cdc-reports-on-covid-19-412809 [https://perma.cc/5S33-MQ5E]. 
 186 See id.; see also Annie Karni & Katie Thomas, Trump Says He’s Taking Hydroxychloroquine, 
Prompting Warnings from Health Experts, N.Y. TIMES (May 18, 2020), https://www. 
nytimes.com/2020/05/18/us/politics/trump-hydroxychloroquine-covid-coronavirus.html 
[https://perma.cc/K2DL-QLK9]. 
 187 Apoorva Mandavilli, C.D.C. Testing Guidance Was Published Against Scientists’ Objections, 
N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 19, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/09/17/health/coronavirus-testing-
cdc.html [https://perma.cc/D37D-XR2N]. 
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Presidents might also interfere with agency expertise by diminishing 
an agency’s capacity to collect or produce essential information.  For 
example, a rule finalized in January 2021 prevents the EPA from relying 
on scientific studies unless the data underlying those studies is publicly 
available.188  The rule made no exception for confidential medical rec-
ords, on which many key epidemiological studies supporting the EPA’s 
work rely.189  An administration might also bar agencies from collecting 
information that they require to enforce statutory mandates.  For exam-
ple, in 2017, the OMB blocked an Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission (EEOC) effort to collect employer data on race, ethnicity, 
and gender in order to identify potential discrimination.190  The Trump 
Administration also restricted agency efforts to communicate essential 
information in peer-reviewed publications: in July 2018, political ap-
pointees at the USDA ordered its research agencies, including the  
Economic Research Service, to include a disclaimer on USDA scientist 
peer-reviewed research stating that all findings were “preliminary” and 
“should not be construed to represent any agency determination or pol-
icy.”191  In 2019, after serious criticism from scientists and academics, 
the USDA rescinded this direction.192 
The Trump Administration’s widespread suppression of, and inter-
ference with, agency scientific work is perhaps most starkly reflected in 
a 2018 survey from the EPA Office of Inspector General, in which al-
most 400 EPA science employees reported that they had experienced 
“potential violations of the EPA’s scientific integrity policy.”193  More 
than 250 employees were concerned that a “manager or senior 
leader . . . [had] possibly interfered with science,” and 175 employees 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
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said they had experienced “suppression or delay of release of [a] scientific 
report or information.”194 
Presidents know they can weaken agencies by constraining their 
ability to build the analytic, economic, and technical foundation neces-
sary for policymaking.  Yet it is true that a President might reject ex-
pertise for reasons other than wanting to dismantle the administrative 
state.  There is ample evidence, for example, that President Trump es-
chewed expertise for ideological or temperamental reasons, even when 
embracing it might have helped him to accomplish his substantive de-
regulatory agenda.195  Certainly rules or policies adopted without suffi-
cient expert foundation are more likely to falter upon judicial review.  
However, even if sapping agency expertise stymies particular efforts to 
repeal rules in the short term, it will have a pronounced antiregulatory 
effect in the longer term by undermining the agency’s capacity to prom-
ulgate new regulations and fulfill other statutory tasks. 
D.  Reputation 
When a President or other high-ranking executive officials persis-
tently charge an agency with incompetence, bias, or worse, it can have 
a corrosive effect.  The ensuing harm to reputation can make it incre-
mentally more difficult for the agency to secure funding from Congress, 
influence regulated entities, and even prevail in the courts.196  An 
agency’s reputation is an intangible asset, but one that scholars have 
identified as vital to the agency’s success.  Professors Daniel Carpenter 
and George Krause define organizational reputation “as a set of beliefs 
about an organization’s capacities, intentions, history, and mission that 
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are embedded in a network of multiple audiences.”197  These audi-
ences — including Congress, other agencies, regulated entities, and the 
public more broadly — use reputation as an antidote to cognitive limi-
tations that prevent the efficient processing of large amounts of infor-
mation about the agency.198  Reputation is thus a heuristic, or shortcut, 
to evaluate agency behavior.199 
A positive reputation allows agencies to enjoy autonomy and a “pro-
tective shield” in the face of opposition.200  Agencies with good reputa-
tions are better able to set policy.201  They are also less likely to suffer 
constraints on their appropriations.202  Each of these benefits facilitates 
agency implementation of statutory policy.  While there continues to be 
lively debate between those who favor strong bureaucratic autonomy 
and those who prefer legislative dominance, some autonomy and credi-
bility is essential for agencies to interact effectively with the public.  As 
Professor Carpenter observes in his exhaustive study of the FDA’s rep-
utation and power over time: “Reputations can intimidate or embolden 
the subjects of government and, in so doing, reputations can complicate 
an agency’s tasks or render them facile.”203  More broadly, he argues, 
public confidence in regulatory agencies is a basic precondition for the 
success of the regulatory project.204 
Consider the erosion of the CDC’s reputation during the initial stages 
of the COVID-19 pandemic.  Alleged politicization of the Agency’s sci-
entific work has produced a significant “loss of institutional credibil-
ity.”205  President Trump at one point described the Agency’s head as 
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“confused.”206  The loss of reputation came at a crucial point in the pan-
demic when the public’s confidence in emerging vaccines would strongly 
influence the success of innoculation programs in controlling the disease. 
Establishing a good reputation is difficult for agencies under the best 
of circumstances.  It is even more difficult when that reputation is ac-
tively undermined by an agency’s own administration, and especially by 
the President personally, with his singular bully pulpit.207  As noted 
above, President Reagan declared government to be “the problem,” not 
the solution for the country’s ills.208  Some of President Reagan’s cabinet 
officials, including EPA Administrator Ann Gorsuch, sought to opera-
tionalize that sentiment.  Gorsuch advocated in Congress for drastic 
budget cuts, weakened enforcement, and reduced staff levels to such an 
extent that one former Assistant Administrator complained that she had 
“demolish[ed] the nation’s environmental management capacity.”209  Yet 
simply by relying on rhetoric, Presidents can damage agency  
reputation.210 
Of course, it is appropriate for political leaders to admit and take 
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cheerleaders for inept agencies.211  Yet sustained attacks can do damage 
to an agency’s reputation and morale.  As one Department of Justice 
employee complained: “The President and his appointees say these ter-
rible things about the DOJ, and then the political leadership of the de-
partment doesn’t push back at all.”212 
E.  Distinguishing Structural Deregulation from Good Governance 
We recognize that it can be difficult to distinguish structural dereg-
ulation from so-called “good governance” reforms intended to improve 
the government’s performance, cut costs, or streamline cumbersome 
procedures.  The line is difficult to draw in the abstract, since it depends 
on a number of factors that can be evaluated only in the context of spe-
cific examples.  Nevertheless, we argue that there is both a conceptual 
and practical difference between the two. 
Not all changes to agency staffing or resource levels qualify as struc-
tural deregulation.  Government efficiency is a laudable goal, and nearly 
every President in the last several decades has encouraged the bureau-
cracy to do more with less.  Nor do all assignments of additional bu-
reaucratic responsibility constitute busywork.  And, as noted above, 
presidential criticism of the bureaucracy can be warranted.  Indeed, ac-
countability sometimes demands that “heads roll.”  We do contend, how-
ever, that there is a point at which promoting efficiency shades into pur-
suing disability, assigning legitimate tasks shades into busywork, and 
offering fair critique shades into intentional undermining.  Reasonable 
minds might differ about when this point is reached.  But conceptually, 
and in many cases practically, it is possible to distinguish between efforts 
to reform and efforts to subvert. 
But how can we tell?  Some of the same tools courts have used to 
assess pretext can be helpful in distinguishing instances of likely struc-
tural deregulation from more innocent reforms.  The process we suggest 
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is similar to the judicial test for whether a defendant’s proffered moti-
vations are pretextual.  In such cases, courts rely on contextual evidence 
to elucidate motive.213  Moreover, while the courts are more reticent to 
inquire into hidden motivation in reviewing actions by coordinate 
branches of government, four members of the Supreme Court have sug-
gested that even in such cases “openly available data,”214 including pub-
lic statements by the individuals responsible for government action, are 
relevant to determining the purpose of that action.215  In Department of 
Commerce v. New York,216 for example, the Court relied on extra-record 
evidence to conclude that an agency’s justification for adding a question 
to the census was pretextual.217  The Court explained that, while courts 
would not normally inquire into the mental processes of administrative 
decisionmakers, such an inquiry might be appropriate if there are 
“strong showing[s] of bad faith or improper behavior.”218  In this case, 
the Court continued, extra-record discovery revealed that the  
Secretary’s purported justification for adding the census question was 
not the true rationale.219 
Courts will also examine the fit between an action and its justifica-
tion.  In employment discrimination cases, evidence that a purported 
justification is internally inconsistent or otherwise not believable can 
establish pretext.220  While courts defer to an employer’s business judg-
ments in such cases,221 the Tenth Circuit has held that “[t]here may be 
circumstances in which a claimed business judgment is so idiosyncratic 
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or questionable that a factfinder could reasonably find that it is a pre-
text for illegal discrimination.”222  Similarly, in cases challenging legisla-
tive or executive action, courts look to whether there is a sufficient con-
nection between the explanation an agency offers for its action and the 
decision made.223  In Romer v. Evans,224 for example, the Supreme 
Court found a state constitutional amendment prohibiting all state and 
local protections for persons based on their homosexuality “so discontin-
uous with the reasons offered for it” that it was “inexplicable by any-
thing but animus.”225 
In line with judicial concern about fit between proffered justification 
and the action taken, we imagine three categories of evidence that 
should lead an observer to consider deregulatory motivations for actions 
that appear to weaken an agency’s capacity: evidence from context, ev-
idence of circumvention, and evidence of conflict. 
First, an action’s context can suggest deregulatory rather than good 
governance motives.  Taking context into account might mean consid-
ering whether a group of actions, taken together, establishes a pattern 
that suggests a larger strategy to undermine agency capacity.  Firing one 
inspector general might be justified by the idiosyncratic behavior of that 
official.  Removing multiple IGs within a short time frame, however, 
may indicate a broader effort to disable internal administrative over-
sight mechanisms. 
Evaluating context might also mean considering whether the circum-
stances surrounding an action seem consistent with its proffered justifi-
cation.  Consider the ostensible reason for moving the Bureau of Land 
Management’s (BLM) headquarters from Washington, D.C., to Grand 
Junction, Colorado.  The BLM manages approximately 250 million 
acres of federal public land, mostly in the western United States, and 
the Agency asserted that its headquarters should be geographically 
closer to those lands and the people who use them.226  However, as a 
GAO report subsequently observed, 97% of the BLM’s career staff were 
already located in the field.227  If the reasons offered by an an agency’s 
political leadership can be impeached so easily, it seems fair to call their 
good faith into question. 
Finally, looking to context might involve assessing previous state-
ments by administration officials and preceding events to see if they 
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offer clues to motivation.  For example, if an administration punishes 
an agency employee for decisions or statements made in service of the 
agency’s mission and consistent with their job responsibilities, it is rea-
sonable to ask whether the move is retaliatory.  Likewise, when an ad-
ministration reassigns or relocates economists and scientists who make 
statements or publish findings inconsistent with its official positions, 
those decisions merit closer scrutiny.  When IGs who criticize the  
President are subsequently fired for reasons ostensibly unrelated to their 
public criticism, those firings, too, ought to raise eyebrows.  A persistent 
pattern of such behavior suggests that an administration is seeking to 
do something other than improve the government and might perhaps be 
working to disable it. 
Public statements by Presidents and senior administration leadership 
may also reveal deregulatory motives.  Sometimes the statements are so 
transparent, they leave no room for doubt, as when President Trump 
promised that, when it came to the size of the federal government, he 
would “cut so much your head will spin.”228  Trump’s chief strategist, 
Steven Bannon, announced that the President would select cabinet 
members who would pursue “deconstruction of the administrative 
state.”229  Individual nominees confirmed to lead major federal agencies 
spoke openly of their desires to see those agencies eliminated.  Mick 
Mulvaney, who was appointed Acting Director of the CFPB, stated in 
a congressional hearing that he would like to “get rid of” the Agency.230  
He had earlier called it a “sick, sad joke.”231  Such statements might be 
dismissed as political rhetoric only, not to be taken seriously as policy 
proposals.  But when officials expressing such deep animus toward the 
agencies they run later portray significant reforms as “good government” 
measures, observers are entitled to be skeptical. 
Second, circumventing established procedures for developing pol-
icy — especially procedures requiring consultation with career staff, ex-
perts, and other stakeholders — can be evidence of a deregulatory mo-
tive.  For example, a GAO report concluded that the Department of the 
Interior failed to consult employees in planning to move the Agency’s 
headquarters to Grand Junction.232  Similarly, the EPA initially by-
passed notice-and-comment rulemaking when establishing who could 
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serve as expert advisors, over the objections of many members of the 
Agency’s scientific advisory board.233  We recognize that there may be 
good reasons why agencies sometimes use informal policy instruments, 
like guidance documents, or take internal steps to improve efficiency, 
without soliciting stakeholder feedback.  But a persistent pattern of 
avoiding input specifically for those policy shifts that appear to reduce 
agency capacity or marginalize internal and external expertise may also 
be evidence of a deregulatory purpose. 
Finally, we look for conflict between those agency officials pursuing 
certain reforms and other experts within the administration who raise 
objections to them.  Perfect agreement is unattainable in any admin-
istration, and there will always be internal dissent over the direction of 
agency policy.  Yet when dissent becomes an outcry, or when credible 
experts — especially political allies — question an administration’s mo-
tives, it ought to raise red flags.  Consider the Trump Administration’s 
early efforts to cut the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) budget.234  At his 
confirmation hearing, Treasury Secretary Steven Mnuchin said he was 
“very concerned” about IRS staffing reductions and technology deficits 
and called for increasing the Agency’s budget to enable it to perform its 
assigned duties.235  When members of an administration’s inner circle 
with credible subject matter expertise risk the President’s wrath to sug-
gest that his favored reforms might compromise government capacity, 
we think it appropriate to pay attention. 
Our reliance on context, circumvention, and conflict is not the only 
way to ferret out structural deregulation.  While those categories may 
be imperfect, they provide helpful clues.  The real question is whether, 
considering all of the surrounding evidence, agency reforms that have 
potential to reduce functional capacity appear to have been taken in 
good faith with a purpose other than weakening the agency’s ability to 
perform its legislative tasks. 
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II.  IMPLICATIONS FOR CONSTITUTIONAL, 
ADMINISTRATIVE, AND DEMOCRATIC VALUES 
Structural deregulation is underexplored terrain in the struggle be-
tween the President and Congress for control of the administrative state.  
Presidents increasingly have found ways to make the bureaucracy work 
in service of their domestic and foreign policy aims to burnish their po-
litical reputations.  Even “deregulatory” Presidents target particular ar-
eas of government for deregulation while bolstering and promoting 
agency capacity in other domains they favor. 
This story of “presidential administration,” described by then- 
Professor Kagan two decades ago, overlooks the possibility of structural 
deregulation.  Justice Kagan recounted how President Clinton expanded 
presidential administration by “making the regulatory activity of the ex-
ecutive branch agencies more and more an extension of the President’s 
own policy and political agenda.”236  He did so by exerting control over 
agency agendas237 and through formal directives,238 centralized White 
House review of proposed regulations,239 informal monitoring and in-
fluencing of agencies by White House staff,240 and appropriation of reg-
ulatory action in his public communications.241 
In general, Justice Kagan applauded increased presidential control 
of administration.  She observed that such control made bureaucracy 
“more transparent and responsive to the public, while also better pro-
moting important kinds of regulatory competence and dynamism.”242  
This praise extended even to deregulatory actions.  Citing President 
Reagan’s deregulatory impulses, she noted that they provided “a single, 
coherent direction” characteristic of the President’s relative “energy” as 
compared with an intransigent legislature and in the face of administra-
tive ossification.243  Justice Kagan published her article at the apogee of 
faith in a strong technocratic presidency, and her account of presidential 
administration assumes a good faith chief executive committed to main-
taining the authority and legitimacy of the bureaucracy.244  She argued 
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 236 Kagan, supra note 10, at 2248. 
 237 Id.  
 238 Id. at 2249. 
 239 Id.  
 240 Id. at 2302. 
 241 Id. at 2249.  President Clinton would unveil agency action himself, sometimes even before it 
was finalized, and claim public ownership of that action.  Id. at 2299–301.  
 242 Id. at 2252.  
 243 Id. at 2344–45.  Justice Kagan acknowledged that presidential involvement in administration 
can be problematic.  This concern is especially true when Presidents interfere with administrative 
adjudication, which should be safeguarded from political influence.  Id. at 2363.  
 244 Justice Kagan noted that presidential decisions to reverse technical agency actions are un-
common.  Id. at 2356. 
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that Presidents “have a stake in build[ing] an institutional capacity for 
effective governance.”245 
Structural deregulation complicates Justice Kagan’s narrative by 
showing that not all Presidents are committed to maintaining the insti-
tutional capacity of the bureaucracy.246  A President might embrace 
structural deregulation either as a complement to the more targeted pro-
ject of substantive deregulation (that is, repealing certain rules and pol-
icies), or as a substitute for it, or both.  For example, undermining agency 
capacity through destaffing and resource deprivation can advance the 
project of substantive deregulation by enabling agencies to claim,  
credibly, that they lack the resources necessary to implement or enforce 
statutes.247  Or, structural deregulation might be an alternative to sub-
stantive deregulation when efforts to rescind or weaken regulations  
encounter resistance, whether in the bureaucracy itself or in Congress,248 
or if they become mired in litigation.249 
As we described in Part I and discuss further below, Presidents can 
undermine agency capacity with little formality or transparency in most 
cases.  These features, as well as structural deregulation’s incremental 
nature, make it unlikely that either Congress or the courts will interfere.  
An additional benefit of structural deregulation for a President intent 
on undercutting regulatory action is that it is time-consuming for a suc-
cessor to reverse. 
Structural deregulation flourishes in a climate of extreme “anti- 
administrativism,”250 which characterizes the current political moment, 
when members of Congress, governors, and other influential political 
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 245 Id. at 2355. 
 246 Professor Michael Sant’Ambrogio has accused President Trump of “presidential maladmin-
istration,” pointing to a broad array of actions, including the weakening of congressional controls 
over agency leadership, favoring regulated interests over congressional mandates and public pref-
erences, as well as some of the capacity weakening that we identify here.  See Michael  
Sant’Ambrogio, Presidential Maladministration, 46 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 459, 460 (2020).  
 247 See infra pp. 651–52 and note 382. 
 248 On the potential for internal executive branch resistance, see generally Rebecca Ingber,  
Bureaucratic Resistance and the National Security State, 104 IOWA L. REV. 139 (2018) (charting a 
middle course between fear of a “deep state,” id. at 142, and total embrace of “bureaucratic re-
sistance,” id. at 143, and underscoring the essential role of the civil service in the modern separation 
of powers); Jon D. Michaels, The American Deep State, 93 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1653 (2018) 
(arguing that American bureaucracy presents none of the threats identified in regimes abroad but 
that civil servants perform a salutary role in checking the chief executive); Jennifer Nou, Civil 
Servant Disobedience, 94 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 349 (2019) (offering a taxonomy of resistance and 
identifying the prerequisites for legitimate civil-servant disobedience); Bijal Shah, Civil Servant 
Alarm, 94 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 627 (2019) (arguing that civil-servant resistance should alert  
Congress to potential problems of law execution). 
 249 Of course, as noted above, it is also possible that structural deregulation could work against 
a President’s substantive deregulatory agenda in the short term, by draining agencies of the requi-
site expertise to rescind and weaken existing rules in a legally defensible manner. 
 250 Metzger, supra note 3, at 4.  
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leaders heap scorn upon government and deride civil servants.251  The 
Supreme Court has contributed to this climate too, by embracing an 
expansive view of the President’s power to control agencies and suggest-
ing that, absent such pervasive executive control, the constitutional le-
gitimacy of administrative governance is in doubt.252  At the same time, 
the Court has consistently rebuked agencies for what it views as regula-
tory overreach, faulting them for, among other things, reading their stat-
utory authority expansively and failing to account adequately for cost, 
but almost never finding them to have fallen short through “un-
derreach” — that is by failing to act when their mission arguably de-
mands they do so.253  This combination — indulging broad presidential 
power while suggesting agencies err primarily by overregulating — sows 
fertile ground for structural deregulation to take root. 
However, the same aspects of structural deregulation that make it so 
alluring to a President also make it antithetical to long-established prin-
ciples of constitutional, administrative, and democratic governance.  
First, structural deregulation is in tension with constitutional separation 
of powers principles, including the principle of legislative supremacy 
and the President’s obligation to “take Care that the Laws [are] faith-
fully executed.”254  Second, structural deregulation’s informality and 
opacity conflict with administrative norms favoring process, reason- 
giving, accountability, and transparency.  Third, structural deregula-
tion’s stickiness binds successors in a version of what Professors Daryl 
Levinson and Benjamin Sachs have called “functional political en-
trenchment.”255  The remainder of this Part will address these tensions 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 251 See, e.g., R. Sam Garrett et al., Assessing the Impact of Bureaucracy Bashing by Electoral 
Campaigns, 66 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 228, 229–31, 236–37 (2006); Adam Butler & Ross Gianfortune, 
Bureaucrat-Bashing at the Highest Levels of Government, GOV’T EXEC. (Feb. 27, 2020), 
https://www.govexec.com/workforce/2020/02/govexec-daily-bureaucrat-bashing-high-levels- 
government/163357 [https://perma.cc/D7XB-DZCL]; Ken Thomas, Opinion, The Way We View 
Public Servants in This Country Is a Disgrace, THE HILL (May 10, 2019, 7:30 AM), 
https://thehill.com/opinion/civil-rights/443003-the-way-we-view-public-servants-in-this-country-is-
a-disgrace [https://perma.cc/C473-QDHS]. 
 252 See, e.g., Seila L. LLC v. CFPB, 140 S. Ct. 2183, 2197 (2020) (finding that the for-cause re-
moval protection for the CFPB’s director was an unconstitutional limitation on the President’s 
executive power); Lucia v. SEC, 138 S. Ct. 2044, 2057 (2018) (holding that ALJs at the SEC were 
inferior officers and therefore must be appointed by the President, department heads, or the courts).  
While Lucia was ostensibly about appointment mechanics, its holding will tend to increase presidential 
power over agency adjudications by limiting ALJ independence.  
 253 See e.g., Michigan v. EPA, 576 U.S. 743, 751 (2015) (striking down agency interpretation at 
Chevron Step 2 citing failure to consider cost); Util. Air Regul. Grp. v. EPA, 573 U.S. 302, 320–24 
(2014) (striking down agency legal interpretation at Chevron Step 2, citing major questions canon 
and agency overreach); Norton v. S. Utah Wilderness All., 542 U.S. 55, 63 (2004) (declining to com-
pel agency action unless discrete and mandatory). 
 254 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3. 
 255 Daryl Levinson & Benjamin I. Sachs, Political Entrenchment and Public Law, 125 YALE L.J. 
400, 454–56 (2015) (describing efforts by political incumbents to bind successors without formal rule 
changes).  
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in more detail.  To be clear, our argument applies regardless of how we 
might personally feel about the value of an agency’s work.  As long as 
Congress has created an agency and assigned it regulatory tasks, the 
President should not be able to prevent it from functioning through 
structural deregulation. 
A.  Tensions with the Separation of Powers 
While current constitutional law doctrine seems to allow a President 
to engage in structural deregulation largely unimpeded,256 we think a 
President’s efforts to destroy administrative capacity sit uncomfortably 
with important constitutional values.  First, structural deregulation 
seems to encroach on Congress’s Article I powers in violation of the 
separation of powers.  Congress is constitutionally entitled to create fed-
eral agencies, pass statutes delegating to them a variety of duties, and 
appropriate money to accomplish congressional goals.257  By contrast, 
the Constitution carefully circumscribes the President’s role in lawmak-
ing.258  Presidents are charged with signing or vetoing bills passed by 
both houses of Congress.259  They may also propose legislation for  
Congress’s consideration260 or call Congress into session.261  However, 
the President is not a lawmaker in the conventional sense262 and may 
not dispense with duly enacted laws, even those he finds  
inconvenient.263 
The view that Congress retains the primary lawmaking role contin-
ues to be held by both conservative and liberal jurists.  Justice Gorsuch 
has argued, for example, that failing to enforce the nondelegation doc-
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 256 See infra section III.A, pp. 638–41. 
 257 Because the President is also assigned a constitutional role in legislation, structural deregula-
tion allows a President to invalidate the legislative work of his predecessor or, in cases where legis-
lation was enacted over his own veto, to nullify that veto override through subsequent inaction.  
 258 Zachary S. Price, Enforcement Discretion and Executive Duty, 67 VAND. L. REV. 671, 689 
(2014) (describing the President’s role in proposing legislation and in signing or vetoing bills passed 
by both houses of Congress). 
 259 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7.  
 260 Id. art. II, § 3.  
 261 Id.  
 262 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 587 (1952).  In Youngstown Sheet & 
Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, the Supreme Court flatly rejected “the idea that [the President] is 
to be a lawmaker.”  Id. at 587. 
 263 Price, supra note 258, at 674–75 (grounding the antidispensation principle in the constitutional 
text and historical practice); see also Prioritizing and Deferring Removal of Certain Aliens  
Unlawfully Present in the United States, 38 Op. O.L.C. 39, 46 (2014) (“[T]he Executive cannot, 
under the guise of exercising enforcement discretion, attempt to effectively rewrite the laws to match 
its policy preferences.”).  But see Michael Sant’Ambrogio, The Extra-Legislative Veto, 102 GEO. 
L.J. 351, 401–04 (2014) (supporting presidential refusals to defend challenged statutes in court, ex-
ercise enforcement discretion, and check statutory implementation through centralized regulatory 
review as long as sufficient mechanisms are in place to ensure transparency). 
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trine would “serve only to accelerate the flight of power from the legis-
lative to the executive branch.”264  Similarly, Justices Thomas and 
Rehnquist have asserted that Congress must make the “hard choices” 
about policy.265  Without endorsing these Justices’ apparent embrace of 
a revived nondelegation doctrine, we take such statements as supporting 
the idea that, whatever degree of control the President has or should 
have over agencies, allowing him to thwart their congressionally man-
dated mission would usurp congressional authority. 
Second, structural deregulation is in tension with the President’s 
duty to faithfully execute duly enacted law under the Take Care Clause 
of Article II.266  That clause, which simultaneously prescribes and cir-
cumscribes presidential power, can be read to prohibit presidential un-
dermining of the essential capacities of administrative agencies.  Indeed, 
some have argued that the clause is “not a statement of powers of office, 
but the first, and in many respects most fundamental, legal obligation 
of the president.”267 
The clause’s “simple but delphic terms”268 have been read to limit 
presidential powers in important ways.  Crucially, the Court has inter-
preted the Take Care Clause to impose an affirmative obligation on the 
President to enforce the laws Congress passes.  In the early days of the 
Republic, a Postmaster General refused to honor an Act of Congress 
requiring him to pay a certain sum to a contractor.  The Supreme Court 
found in Kendall v. United States ex rel. Stokes269 that the Take Care 
Clause prevented the President, as head of the executive branch, from 
ignoring duly authorized statutes.270  It therefore held that the outstand-
ing sum must be paid.271  The opinion underscored that the Constitution 
did not grant the President a “dispensing power” — the power to sus-
pend the operation of a statute or rule in the interest of justice.272  The 
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 264 Gundy v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2116, 2142 (2019) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting). 
 265 Indus. Union Dep’t, AFL-CIO v. Am. Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 687 (1980) (Rehnquist, 
J., concurring in the judgment) (“When fundamental policy decisions underlying important legisla-
tion about to be enacted are to be made, the buck stops with Congress and the President insofar as 
he exercises his constitutional role in the legislative process.”); see also Dep’t of Transp. v. Ass’n of 
Am. R.Rs., 575 U.S. 43, 85 (2015) (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment) (criticizing the Court 
for allowing “the Executive to decide which policy goals it wants to pursue”). 
 266 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.  
 267 Philip J. Cooper, The Duty to Take Care: President Obama, Public Administration, and the 
Capacity to Govern, 71 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 7, 8 (2011). 
 268 Goldsmith & Manning, supra note 14, at 1836.  
 269 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 524 (1838). 
 270 See id. at 613. 
 271 Id. 
 272 Id.  This concept would have been more familiar in the 1800s as a former royal prerogative 
of the King of England to exempt individuals from application of the criminal law.  Note, The 
Power of Dispensation in Administrative Law: A Critical Survey, 87 U. PA. L. REV. 201, 203 (1938).  
The concept appears to have originated in Catholicism with the Pope’s power to dispense with 
temporal laws in his edicts.  Id. at 204. 
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Kendall Court stressed that the President had no “power to forbid [the 
laws’] execution.”273  Citing Kendall, Professor Zachary Price argues 
that neither the Take Care Clause specifically nor the Constitution as a 
whole allows the President to categorically suspend particular laws or 
parts of laws.274 
Moreover, the obligation to see that the laws are “faithfully” executed 
implies an obligation to implement legislative edicts dutifully.   
Professors John Manning and Jack Goldsmith note that one of the lead-
ing dictionaries of the Founding era, Dr. Johnson’s, “defines ‘faithfully’ 
to mean ‘strict adherence to duty and allegiance’ and ‘[w]ithout failure 
of performance; honestly; exactly.’”275  While the clause does not specify 
faithfulness “to what,”276 in combination with the Oath Clause, it 
“point[s] toward a general obligation of good faith” and a presidential 
obligation “to ensure that the laws are implemented honestly, effectively, 
and without failure of performance.”277 
Others have described this obligation as a duty to superintend the 
operations of the executive branch.  Emphasizing the responsibility of 
faithful execution, Professor Gillian Metzger describes the duty imposed 
on Presidents by the Take Care Clause as “a duty to supervise.”278  While 
the courts have been largely silent on the existence of such a duty, the 
Supreme Court in Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Company Accounting 
Oversight Board279 did find that the President was subject to a nondele-
gable duty to “active[ly] . . . supervise” the administration.280  Im-
portantly, Metzger’s duty to supervise is meant to ensure effective as 
well as accountable government.281  Metzger leaves to the courts where 
to draw the line between permissible and impermissible presidential in-
volvement in the work of the bureaucracy, but she stresses that presi-
dential engagement always must operate within “proper bounds.”282  
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 273 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) at 613.   
 274 Price, supra note 258, at 675–77, 696.  Nor may agencies themselves decline to implement 
statutes.  See, e.g., Buzbee, supra note 6, at 1579 (“The first and most essential element of agency 
political accountability is rooted in legislative supremacy.”).  
 275 Goldsmith & Manning, supra note 14, at 1857 (alteration in original) (citing 1 SAMUEL 
JOHNSON, A DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (London, J.F. & C. Rivington et al. 
6th ed. 1785)). 
 276 Id. 
 277 Id. at 1857–58.  
 278 Gillian E. Metzger, The Constitutional Duty to Supervise, 124 YALE L.J. 1836, 1877 (2015) 
(“[T]he mandatory character of the Take Care Clause is worth underscoring in its own right.”). 
 279 561 U.S. 477 (2010). 
 280 Id. at 496 (quoting Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681, 712–13 (1997) (Breyer, J., concurring in the 
judgment)); see id. at 478–79 (finding that removal restrictions protecting members of the Public 
Company Accounting Oversight Board were an unconstitutional infringement on presidential au-
thority); see also Metzger, supra note 278, at 1863. 
 281 Metzger, supra note 278, at 1886.  
 282 Id. at 1925.  
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The President operates outside of these bounds, we argue, when he seeks 
systematically to undermine agency capacity. 
Ultimately, the Take Care Clause conveys authority to protect, not 
destroy.  Professor Henry Monaghan associated the clause with such a 
“protective power” to “protect and defend the personnel, property, and 
instrumentalities of the United States from harm,” offering as an exam-
ple the assignment of a U.S. Marshal to protect the life of a federal 
judge.283  Goldsmith and Manning similarly have identified a “comple-
tion power,” which they define as “the President’s authority to prescribe 
incidental details needed to carry into execution a legislative scheme, 
even in the absence of any congressional authorization to complete that 
scheme.”284  Our own view is that the duties to superintend and to pro-
tect assigned to the President in Article II imply a commensurate duty 
not to destroy. 
B.  Tensions with Administrative Law Values 
The Administrative Procedure Act,285 as well as administrative  
jurisprudence and scholarship, emphasizes formality, transparency, ra-
tionality, and accountability as core values.286  We expect government 
agencies to “do things by the book” — operate openly, follow prescribed 
procedures, and give sound reasons for their decisions.  Procedural reg-
ularity and substantive rationality are the basic minimum requirements 
for administrative legitimacy. 
Yet structural deregulation does not reflect such values.  First, it is 
largely informal.  A President invoking the tools of structural deregula-
tion acts unilaterally, without convincing Congress to pass legislation 
altering an agency’s structure or resources.  Presidents also can largely 
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 283 Henry P. Monaghan, The Protective Power of the Presidency, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 11 (1993).  
 284 Jack Goldsmith & John Manning, The President’s Completion Power, 115 YALE L.J. 2280, 
2282 (2006); see also Goldsmith & Manning, supra note 14, at 1837–38 (citing Cunningham v. Nea-
gle, 135 U.S. 1, 67–68 (1890), for the proposition that the Take Care Clause provides “inherent 
presidential authority to take acts necessary to protect the operations of the federal government, 
even in cases in which no statute provides explicit authority to do so”).   
 285 Consider the Act’s restrictions on “arbitrary” or “capricious” decisionmaking, APA § 706(2)(A), 
and its emphasis on the transparency of administrative decisionmaking in §§ 552, 552a, and 552b.  
 286 See, e.g., Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 140 S. Ct. 1891, 1909 (2020) 
(observing that the prohibition on consideration of post hoc agency reasoning serves important 
administrative law values including accountability and contemporaneous reason-giving); Lisa 
Schultz Bressman, Beyond Accountability: Arbitrariness and Legitimacy in the Administrative 
State, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 461, 494–95 (2003) (identifying nonarbitrariness as key to agency legiti-
macy); Kevin M. Stack, An Administrative Jurisprudence: The Rule of Law in the Administrative 
State, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 1985, 1987–89 (2015) (specifying the rule of law’s demands on admin-
istrative government and identifying authorization, notice, justification, coherence, and procedural 
fairness as the most relevant); Cass R. Sunstein & Adrian Vermeule, The Morality of Administrative 
Law, 131 HARV. L. REV. 1924, 1929 (2018) (arguing that administrative law doctrine, as well as 
modern criticisms of that doctrine, can be understood in the context of Professor Lon Fuller’s eight 
elements of a moral system of laws).  
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avoid the public notice-and-comment process that is required to rescind 
agency regulations.  Instead, structural deregulation occurs by executive 
order or, more frequently, as the result of informal communications from 
the White House to agency officials.  Those officials then implement 
policies internally.  Structural deregulation can thus be accomplished 
through internal agency memoranda and orders that require neither 
publication nor explanation. 
A few examples may help to illustrate the point.  Failing to nominate 
agency officers or hire expert staff requires no more than the President 
instructing agency leadership.  Political appointees can demoralize staff 
in myriad informal ways.  They can reassign staff and relocate offices 
with minimal procedure and without public deliberation.287   
Overtasking agencies with busywork may occasionally involve some 
formal direction (for example executive orders imposing on agencies new 
analytic burdens), but it may also occur less formally, as in the example 
of the CFPB name-change task force discussed above.  Finally, reputa-
tional undermining, which tends to take the form of public statements 
from high-ranking officials, is the height of informal action. 
These informal actions may be more or less transparent.  It is not 
possible to hide office relocations, for example.  By contrast, staff de-
moralization might take place entirely within the agency.  Of course, 
even structural changes shielded from public view may be exposed by 
the media.  However, to the extent that these disclosures occur after the 
actions have already produced effects or when the wheels of change are 
already in motion, they provide limited opportunity for public engage-
ment and oversight. 
Informal structural deregulatory actions’ lack of transparency  
undermines two related administrative law values: accountability and 
reason giving.  To the extent that some of these efforts remain hidden, 
voters may have more trouble assessing agency performance than they 
would if deregulatory efforts were undertaken through rule repeals,  
publicly announced policy changes, and the like.  Even if particular 
structural deregulatory moves are publicized, moreover, because such 
decisions are generally less formal, they do not require the articulation 
of reasons that can then be scrutinized in court, by Congress, or by or-
dinary voters. 
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 287 The BLM’s move to Grand Junction, for example, was documented in a so-called “Secretary’s 
Order.”  Sec’y of the Interior, Order No. 3382, Establishment of the Bureau of Land Management’s 
Headquarters in Grand Junction, Colorado (Aug. 10, 2020), https://www.doi.gov/sites/doi.gov/files/ 
elips/documents/so-order-3382-508-compliant.pdf [https://perma.cc/R5NT-ZD25].  As authority for 
the order, the Secretary cited Reorganization Plan No. 3 of 1950, which located general management 
authorities in the Secretary.  See id. § 2. 
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C.  Tensions with Democratic Values 
A final concern about structural deregulation is that its effects can 
be more challenging to undo than the individual regulatory rollbacks 
that characterize substantive deregulation.  It is thus a useful tool for 
Presidents who seek to insulate their policy preferences from reversal by 
successors.  Presidents have an obvious incentive to make their pro-
grams durable.  But this durability fits uncomfortably with the core 
democratic principle that politicians should not be bound to the policies 
of their predecessors.288  Scholars have argued that such entrenchment 
frustrates the will of the present majority.289  It has been described as 
an “intergenerational power grab,”290 or, more poetically, “the dead hand 
problem.”291 
Structural deregulation can be seen as another tool of entrenchment, 
used in this case to ensconce an underresourced bureaucracy rather than 
political actors or particular policies.  Saddling future Presidents with a 
damaged bureaucracy can be even more durable than substantive de-
regulation: there is an established pathway for reinstituting rules and 
policies repealed by a predecessor administration but no clear route to 
rebuilding the staff, resources, expertise, and reputation that enable 
agencies to perform their tasks well.  Remedying structural deregulation 
can be complicated and time-consuming.  Restoring an agency’s work-
force requires a sustained recruiting and hiring process that can itself 
deplete an agency’s resources.292  Experienced employees may be reluc-
tant to return or undergo a competitive process to reclaim their old 
jobs.293  Developing new talent can take time.  Similarly, rebuilding an 
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 288 See, e.g., Julian N. Eule, Temporal Limits on the Legislative Mandate: Entrenchment and 
Retroactivity, 1987 AM. BAR FOUND. RSCH. J. 379, 404–05.  The literature on entrenchment de-
scribes many instruments incumbent politicians can use to insulate their personnel and policies 
against change, mostly in the context of passing legislation.  Daryl Levinson and Benjamin Sachs 
argue that entrenchment strategies are ubiquitous and can be achieved both formally and infor-
mally.  See Levinson & Sachs, supra note 255, at 407.  “[W]e see parties, politicians, and prevailing 
coalitions continually strategizing to lock in their gains, battening down their offices and policies 
against the winds of political change.”  Id. at 402. 
 289 See Michael J. Klarman, Majoritarian Judicial Review: The Entrenchment Problem, 85 GEO. 
L.J. 491, 497 (1997); Christopher Serkin, Public Entrenchment Through Private Law: Binding Local 
Governments, 78 U. CHI. L. REV. 879, 881, 886 (2011).  While most commentators have criticized 
entrenchment, Professors Eric Posner and Adrian Vermeule have deemed legislative entrenchment 
strategies “no more objectionable” than other policy instruments that “shape the legal and institu-
tional environment of future legislation.”  Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Legislative  
Entrenchment: A Reappraisal, 111 YALE L.J. 1665, 1666 (2002).  But cf. Levinson & Sachs, supra 
note 255, at 457 n.234 (noting that Posner and Vermeule are outliers in their defense of entrenchment). 
 290 See Serkin, supra note 289, at 945.  
 291 See, e.g., Klarman, supra note 289, at 497–98 (discussing the question of legislative entrench-
ment and proposing an “anti-entrenchment” theory of judicial review). 
 292 See U.S. GEN. ACCT. OFF., GGD-90-105, FEDERAL RECRUITING AND HIRING 21 (1990). 
 293 Under existing rules, the federal government may rehire former employees noncompetitively 
at the same grade level.  However, agencies must still expend resources on the reinstatement process 
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agency’s reputation is a slow process that relies on trust and requires 
repairing relationships.  Structural deregulation thus forces an incoming 
administration to add the task of rebuilding to that of governance. 
D.  Responding to Critics 
At first blush, critics of the administrative state might be skeptical 
of our argument that structural deregulation conflicts with core consti-
tutional, administrative, and democratic principles.  As noted in the  
Introduction, these critics, including several members of the contempo-
rary Supreme Court, view agencies as undemocratic and unaccountable, 
and they worry that a robust administrative state contravenes the  
system of checks and balances designed to protect the people against 
arbitrary power.294  From this perspective, shielding agencies from pres-
idential control, even to protect against the risk of administrative dis-
mantling, only exacerbates the problem of unchecked agency power.  
The appropriate check on presidential mismanagement of the bureau-
cracy, these critics might argue, is political.295 
We do not agree with the strongest criticisms advanced by the skep-
tics, believing that agencies, generally, are amply constrained by both 
political and legal oversight and internal safeguards.  Thus, we do not 
support the revival of the nondelegation doctrine, or subscribe to a for-
malist understanding of the appointment and removal power, or wish to 
inter the Chevron doctrine. 
In any event though, our argument does not depend on these debates.  
Our point is simply that agencies have two political masters: Congress 
and the President.  The proper remedy for concerns about the value of 
administrative agencies is legislative.  If critics cannot muster sufficient 
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perma.cc/K8UQ-33W4]. 
 294 See Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Acct. Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 499 (2010) (“The growth 
of the Executive Branch, which now wields vast power and touches almost every aspect of daily 
life, heightens the concern that it may slip from the Executive’s control, and thus from that of the 
people.”). 
 295 See Seila L. LLC v. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, 140 S. Ct. 2183, 2203 (2020) (“The resulting 
constitutional strategy is straightforward: divide power everywhere except for the Presidency, and 
render the President directly accountable to the people through regular elections.”); Motor Vehicle 
Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 59 (1983) (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring 
in part and dissenting in part) (footnote omitted) (“A change in administration brought about by the 
people casting their votes is a perfectly reasonable basis for an executive agency’s reappraisal of the 
costs and benefits of its programs and regulations.  As long as the agency remains within the bounds 
established by Congress, it is entitled to assess administrative records and evaluate priorities in light 
of the philosophy of the administration.”).  Such concerns might be heightened for defenders of a 
“unitary” conception of executive power, in which the President is seen as having sole control over 
the executive branch.  See generally STEVEN G. CALABRESI & CHRISTOPHER S. YOO, THE 
UNITARY EXECUTIVE: PRESIDENTIAL POWER FROM WASHINGTON TO BUSH (2008) (under-
taking historical and legal survey of unitary executive theory). 
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support in Congress to repeal the statutes creating agencies or assigning 
them particular tasks, the President should not be able to accomplish 
the same goal through structural deregulation. 
Even Justices skeptical of the administrative bureaucracy concede 
that the Constitution designates Congress as the lawmaking body.  An 
agency may be “entitled to . . . evaluate priorities in light of the philos-
ophy of the administration,” but it must do so “within the bounds estab-
lished by Congress.”296  To the extent structural deregulation thwarts 
this core element of constitutional design by frustrating agency imple-
mentation of statutory mandates, it must be confronted. 
Additionally, at the most basic level, relying on electoral accounta-
bility to remedy the excesses of the President seems wholly inadequate 
when those excesses — by muzzling internal dissent, sidelining experts, 
relying on unconfirmed “acting” officials, and improperly redirecting ap-
propriated funds — weaken the very mechanisms by which he might be 
held accountable.  Because structural deregulation is often opaque, it 
may be all too easy for Presidents to evade blame for its costs.  There is 
something especially pernicious about a President doing his utmost to 
debilitate agencies and then faulting them for being ineffectual while 
taking no responsibility for their deficiencies.  In the face of structural 
deregulation, therefore, it is no answer for critics of the administrative 
state to maintain that presidential control is the answer to administra-
tive tyranny.  That formulation overlooks the destructive potential of 
presidential control. 
III.  PUBLIC LAW RESPONSES TO STRUCTURAL DEREGULATION 
This Part argues that public law as a whole is ill-equipped to respond 
to the challenges posed by structural deregulation because courts are 
reluctant to oversee interbranch interactions, Presidents have grown 
adept at circumventing statutory limitations on executive overreach, 
and administrative law has a blind spot when it comes to internal 
agency action. 
The Constitution, statutory law, and administrative law, for the most 
part, assume that the President will act in good faith in managing agen-
cies.  And the legislative and judicial branches of government have been 
reluctant to interfere with executive management for fear of  
overstepping their constitutional roles.  The judiciary in particular has 
also exhibited concern about its relative competence to decide manage-
rial questions.  The result is a legal blind spot when it comes to potential 
presidential undermining of the bureaucracy. 
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 296 State Farm, 463 U.S. at 59 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
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A.  The Constitutional Blind Spot 
As discussed in the previous Part, Presidents who engage in struc-
tural deregulation act at odds with the principle of legislative supremacy  
and arguably betray the President’s duty of faithful execution under the 
Take Care Clause — at least in the most egregious cases.  Yet we think 
it highly unlikely that courts would find any specific instance of struc-
tural deregulation to be a constitutional violation.  They might even 
refuse to hear such a challenge. 
One problem is that it is hard to identify precisely when agency in-
capacitation has gone “too far.”  When does priority in execution shade 
into nullification?  Courts and commentators have wrestled with this 
line in the context of nonenforcement.297  The Supreme Court has con-
firmed the executive’s broad discretion to select from among competing 
enforcement priorities.298  While federal courts have specified that this 
discretion is not unlimited,299 and that the executive branch may not 
nullify statutory commands through inaction,300 courts remain reluctant 
to interfere with executive enforcement discretion.301  Using structural 
deregulation to nullify statutory commands should raise concerns akin 
to those raised by blanket nonenforcement decisions.  But we think 
courts would be similarly reluctant to intervene. 
Similarly, it is far from clear what precisely the Take Care Clause 
requires a President to do to maintain a requisite level of bureaucratic 
infrastructure.302  How much undermining is too much?  What test 
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 297 Articles discussing the problem of nonenforcement include Patricia L. Bellia, Faithful  
Execution and Enforcement Discretion, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 1753, 1757 (2016) (identifying cases of 
categorical enforcement discretion as those most likely to conflict with a good-faith interpretation 
of the underlying statute); Aaron L. Nielson, How Agencies Choose Whether to Enforce the Law: A 
Preliminary Investigation, 93 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1517, 1520–21 (2018) (distinguishing nonen-
forcement that is consistent with statutory purpose from nonenforcement designed to achieve ends 
that fall outside an agency’s statutory authority); and Price, supra note 258, at 674 (concluding that 
executive enforcement discretion is limited and defeasible).  
 298 Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 837–38 (1985) (establishing a presumption of unreviewability 
for agency decisions not to take enforcement action).  
 299 See id. at 833 (“Congress did not set agencies free to disregard legislative direction in the 
statutory scheme that the agency administers.”); Ass’n of Civilian Technicians v. Fed. Lab. Rels. 
Auth., 283 F.3d 339, 344 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (recognizing the exception to enforcement discretion for 
policies of nonenforcement); Adams v. Richardson, 480 F.2d 1159, 1161 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (refusing to 
defer to an agency’s adoption of general nonenforcement policy); see also Jentry Lanza, Note, 
Agency Underenforcement as Reviewable Abdication, 112 NW. U. L. REV. 1171, 1175–76 (2018) 
(suggesting that “severe underenforcement” is an abdication of executive duty).  
 300 See infra section III.C.3, pp. 651–52.  
 301 See Deacon, supra note 5, at 804 (observing that it is difficult for plaintiffs to prove that a 
pattern of nonenforcement exists). 
 302 We recognize that the Take Care Clause has also been read to prohibit limitations on and 
interference with the President’s ordering of the executive branch.  See, e.g., Free Enter. Fund v. 
Pub. Co. Acct. Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 492–93 (2010) (concluding that the President could not 
satisfy his obligations under the Take Care Clause if the double removal protections of the Board 
were left in place); Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 122 (1926) (observing that the power to 
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might the Court use?  One commentator suggests that the President 
must do “what is necessary to ensure that the executive branch has the 
capacity to implement and administer the policies created by legislation, 
administrative rules, or presidential directives.”303  How might that 
amorphous standard be operationalized concretely by a reviewing court? 
We expect that several sitting Supreme Court Justices would be ex-
tremely skeptical of any litigant advancing such a standard, and that a 
majority of the Court would resist adopting a test that would be so hard 
to administer in practice. 
Courts might also dismiss challenges to structural deregulation for 
prudential reasons.  Challengers would first struggle to establish consti-
tutional or prudential standing.304  The Supreme Court has found that 
“programmatic” challenges to government action raise “obvious difficul-
ties insofar as proof of causation or redressability is concerned.”305   
Challenges to the government inaction that produces structural deregu-
lation, such as failures to appoint, would seem to exacerbate these con-
cerns, especially in the absence of a statutory procedural right to chal-
lenge these choices.  Even where structural deregulation presents as 
action, as in the case of policy changes that deprive an agency of expert 
input, it can be hard to link those changes to specific concrete injuries 
that plaintiffs will suffer.306 
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remove executive branch officials is crucial to the President’s ability to take care that the laws are 
faithfully executed); see also Goldsmith & Manning, supra note 14, at 1839–53 (compiling examples 
from the case law).  The clause has also been invoked to defend executive branch orders against 
legal challenge by limiting private individuals’ standing to seek judicial review of particular ad-
ministrative arrangements or decisions.  See Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 577 (1992) 
(quoting U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3) (opining that permitting members of the public to enforce an 
undifferentiated public interest would be in tension with the President’s duty to “take Care that the 
Laws be faithfully executed”); Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 761 (1984) (same).  And it has been 
used to defend prosecutorial discretion by executive branch officials.  See United States v.  
Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 464 (1996); Heckler, 470 U.S. at 832.  But these protections are consistent 
with our argument that the clause implies a duty to preserve and protect administrative capacity. 
 303 Cooper, supra note 212, at 7. 
 304 See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560. 
 305 Id. at 568 (plurality opinion); see also id. at 571 (arguing that the plaintiffs had failed to prove 
that eliminating the fraction of funding provided by the agencies would cause the projects at issue 
to “either be suspended, or [to] do less harm to listed species”); Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rts. Org., 
426 U.S. 26, 42–43 (1976) (finding it “purely speculative whether the denials of service specified in 
the complaint fairly can be traced to [the challenged IRS revenue ruling] or instead result from 
decisions made by the hospitals without regard to the tax implications”); Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 
U.S. 614, 618 (1973). 
 306 The Court clarified in Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540 (2016), that procedural injury 
in itself can sometimes satisfy the injury-in-fact requirement, so long as the particular procedural 
violation entails “a degree of risk sufficient to meet the concreteness requirement.”  Id. at 1550. 
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Even if plaintiffs could establish the core elements of Article III 
standing, courts may decline to hear challenges to structural deregula-
tion on other prudential grounds.307  The courts grant “widest latitude” 
to the government “in the ‘dispatch of its own internal affairs.’”308  
Thus, in Allen v. Wright,309 the Supreme Court denied standing to par-
ents of Black children challenging the IRS’s alleged grant of tax exemp-
tions to racially discriminatory private schools.310  In declaring that the 
plaintiffs lacked standing, the Court held that “[t]he Constitution . . . as-
signs to the Executive Branch, and not to the Judicial Branch, the duty 
to ‘take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.’”311  The Supreme 
Court has called into question at least some aspects of prudential stand-
ing doctrine, leaving its contours in doubt.312  Nevertheless, a court con-
fronted with a Take Care challenge alleging improper maintenance of 
agency capacity may well follow Allen’s lead and decline to hear the 
case out of deference to executive managerial discretion.313 
And even if these hurdles might be overcome,314 the courts still may 
invoke the political question doctrine to bar challenges to structural de-
regulation.  That doctrine cautions courts to avoid interference in ques-
tions “best suited for resolution by the political branches.”315  Executive 
branch undermining of agency capacity may be precisely the sort of 
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 307 Federal courts have historically adopted an additional “prudential” test for standing, asking 
for example whether the grievance is more appropriately resolved by another branch of government 
or whether the harms suffered by plaintiffs alleging statutory violations are within the “zone of 
interests” that the statute sought to address.  Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, 
Inc., 572 U.S. 118, 126 (2014). 
 308 Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 761 (1984) (quoting Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 378–79 (1976)). 
 309 468 U.S. 737. 
 310 Id. at 739–40. 
 311 Id. at 761 (quoting U.S. CONST. art II, § 3).  Although Justice Scalia’s opinion for the Court 
in Lexmark International framed the prudential inquiry as primarily or exclusively an exercise in 
statutory interpretation, it is unclear how that opinion will affect the other prongs of the prudential 
analysis, if at all.  See Ernest A. Young, Prudential Standing After Lexmark International, Inc. v. 
Static Control Components, Inc., 10 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y 149, 152–53 (2014). 
 312 See Lexmark Int’l, 572 U.S. at 125–28. 
 313 Goldsmith & Manning, supra note 14, at 1847 (arguing the Supreme Court has understood 
the Take Care Clause as creating “exclusive presidential authority to assure government officials’ 
fidelity to law”).  
 314 Some have argued, for example, that members of Congress might have standing to challenge 
presidential nonenforcement.  See Bethany R. Pickett, Note, Will the Real Lawmakers Please Stand 
Up: Congressional Standing in Instances of Presidential Nonenforcement, 110 NW. U. L. REV. 439, 
452–61 (2016). 
 315 Li-Shou v. United States, 777 F.3d 175, 180 (4th Cir. 2015) (citing Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 
210–11 (1962)).  Two of the key factors in this analysis are whether an issue has been textually 
committed to a coordinate branch of government and whether “judicially . . . manageable stand-
ards” for resolution of the matter exist.  Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Clinton, 566 U.S. 189, 195 
(2012) (quoting Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224, 228 (1993)) (emphasizing these two factors in 
finding that a citizenship challenge was justiciable).  For the full list of six factors that govern 
political question analysis, see Baker, 369 U.S. at 217. 
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question courts feel ill-equipped to address unless the interference in-
volves a straightforward question of statutory interpretation.316 
B.  Statutory Constraints on Structural Deregulation 
Existing statutes creating agencies or specifying their structures offer 
few avenues for challenging structural deregulation.  To argue success-
fully that structural deregulation violates a statute, challengers must 
point to specific statutory provisions that conflict with particular dereg-
ulatory moves.  However, current statutes that delegate substantive, af-
firmative responsibilities for agencies tend to outline agency structure 
and resources in highly general terms. 
More promising are suits under “trans-substantive statutes,” which 
are not agency specific but instead establish procedural requirements 
that apply across the administrative state.317  However, even these stat-
utes cannot reach all of the categories of structural deregulation we iden-
tify above.  There is no statute prohibiting reputational undermining of 
agencies by the President, for example, nor would such restrictions be 
consistent with the First Amendment guarantee of free speech.318  Only 
removing the speaker from office through the political process can blunt 
the force of such criticisms — an admittedly extreme remedy for a  
President disparaging government bureaucrats. 
1.  Substantive Statutes. — As discussed above, courts are reluctant 
to intervene in the day-to-day resource-allocation decisions agencies 
make in the course of implementing statutes.  Courts normally afford 
agencies significant deference in cases where plaintiffs challenge agency 
inaction,319 for example, or the exercise of enforcement discretion.320  In 
theory, there are limits — the Supreme Court has expressed skepticism 
about cases that demonstrate an agency’s “abdication of its statutory 
responsibilities”321 — but in practice, there are few. 
Courts would be readier to intervene if structural deregulation vio-
lated discrete statutory provisions.  However, Congress does not typi-
cally specify precise agency staffing and resource levels in the so-called 
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 316 See, e.g., Population Inst. v. McPherson, 797 F.2d 1062, 1070 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (finding the 
question of whether the Administrator of USAID withheld program funds in violation of statutory 
earmark to be justiciable).  
 317 This section will deal with both substantive and procedural statutes but leave discussion of 
the Administrative Procedure Act for the following section on potential administrative law remedies. 
 318 Moreover, Presidents enjoy broad immunity from suit for actions related to their official  
duties.  See Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 755–56 (1982) (recognizing absolute presidential 
immunity from damages liability for actions within even the “outer perimeter” of his official respon-
sibility, id. at 756).  
 319 See, e.g., Norton v. S. Utah Wilderness All., 542 U.S. 55, 66–67 (2004). 
 320 See, e.g., Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 837–38 (1985). 
 321 Am. Horse Prot. Ass’n v. Lyng, 812 F.2d 1, 4 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (quoting Heckler, 470 U.S. at 
833 n.4). 
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enabling acts creating particular agencies.  These statutes do specify an 
agency’s leadership structure by either prescribing that the agency shall 
be headed by a single secretary or creating a multimember commis-
sion.322  They may also create subsidiary leadership positions within the 
agency.323  But when it comes to general staffing, agency enabling acts 
are largely silent.  Instead, agency heads are delegated authority to hire 
additional staff as they deem necessary.324 
Occasionally a statute will offer more detail.  For example, the  
Department of Energy Organization Act of 1977325 (DOE Act) limits the 
number of staff positions that can be exempt from civil service laws to 
311.326  It does not, however, specify the total or minimum number of 
staff in the department.  Statutes might also reference, either directly or 
obliquely, the type of employees that should be hired.  The DOE Act 
references “scientific, engineering, professional, and administrative per-
sonnel,” for example, in the same section on exempt-staff provisions.327  
While the provision does not explicitly require that scientific and engi-
neering professionals be hired, it could be read as anticipating that they 
will be part of the department’s staff. 
Most statutes are similarly vague when it comes to the number and 
location of an agency’s offices.  A few specify the location of an agency’s 
headquarters.  The Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938,328 for example, 
establishes that “[t]he principal office of the Administrator shall be in 
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 322 See, e.g., Department of Transportation Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-670, § 3, 80 Stat. 931, 931 
(codified as amended at 49 U.S.C. § 102(b)); Federal Trade Commission Act of 1914, Pub. L. No. 63-
203, § 1, 38 Stat. 717, 717–18 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 41). 
 323 See, e.g., Budget and Accounting Act of 1921, Pub. L. No. 67-13, § 207, 40 Stat. 20, 22 (cre-
ating the Bureau of the Budget in the Treasury Department as well as a Director and an Assistant 
Director); Department of Transportation Act § 3(b)–(c) (creating an Under Secretary of the  
Department, four Assistant Secretaries and a General Counsel); Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform 
and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 1011(b)(5), 124 Stat. 1376, 1964 (2010) (codi-
fied as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 5491(b)(5)) (establishing a Deputy Director of the new CFPB).  
 324 Typical is the authority granted to the Secretary of Energy in the Department of Energy 
Organization Act of 1977 (DOE Act), Pub. L. No. 95-91, § 621(a), 91 Stat. 565, 596 (codified as 
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 7231).  That Act allows the Secretary to “appoint and fix the compensation 
of such officers and employees, including attorneys, as may be necessary to carry out [his] functions.”  
Id.  Similarly, the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 authorizes an Administrator of the Wage and 
Hour Division of the Department of Labor to “appoint such employees as he deems necessary to 
carry out his functions and duties under this chapter.”  29 U.S.C. § 204(b).  The Department of 
Transportation Act of 1966 empowers Department leadership “to select, appoint, employ, and fix 
the compensation of such officers and employees, including investigators, attorneys, and hearing 
examiners, as are necessary to carry out the provisions” of the Act “and to prescribe their authority 
and duties.”  § 9(a), 80 Stat. at 944. 
 325 Pub. L. No. 95-91, 91 Stat. 565 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.). 
 326 42 U.S.C. § 7231(b)(1). 
 327 Id.  
 328 29 U.S.C. §§ 201–219. 
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the District of Columbia.”329  The Mine Safety and Health Review  
Commission’s enabling act also places its headquarters in the District.330 
Additionally, annual appropriations bills generally do not impose 
specific requirements on agencies for staffing or resources.  Amounts for 
salaries and expenses are instead typically provided in a lump sum.   
Appropriations may be directed specifically to certain administrative 
projects — for example modernizing an agency’s infrastructure technol-
ogy — though again, typically without specifying particular staffing or 
resource quantities.331  Because appropriations language is so general, it 
would be difficult to base a suit challenging the elimination of a given 
number of staff positions, for example, on congressional intent (as em-
bodied in appropriations) to maintain staffing levels. 
2.  Non-APA Procedural Statutes. — Challenging structural deregu-
lation under procedural statutes is a piecemeal affair, with the relative 
odds of success dependent on the precise action taken and the particular 
statute at issue.  Sometimes statutes enlarge the scope of agency author-
ity to manage their own affairs.  The Federal Housekeeping Statute,332 
for example, the modern version of which was passed in 1966, gives the 
head of an executive department authority to “prescribe regulations for 
the government of his department, the conduct of its employees, the dis-
tribution and performance of its business, and the custody, use, and 
preservation of its records, papers, and property.”333  Other statutes, 
however, constrain the ability of the President and his political appoin-
tees to interfere with agency operations.  These statutes offer possible 
avenues to challenge structural deregulation.  However, their scope is 
limited, and entrepreneurial chief executives increasingly have identified 
ways to sidestep their strictures. 
(a)  Civil Service Protections. — Notably, many of the statutes gov-
erning staffing of the federal executive branch emerged in response to 
perceived presidential abuses of discretion.  Congress passed the  
Pendleton Act, the dominant statute providing civil servants with salary 
and job protection, to curb the “spoils system” — perfected under  
President Jackson and continued after the Civil War — under which 
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 329 Id. § 204(c).  The Dodd-Frank Act also places the CFPB’s principal office in the District of 
Columbia.  12 U.S.C. § 5491(e). 
 330 30 U.S.C. § 823a (“The principal office of the Commission shall be in the District of Columbia.”).  
 331 See Further Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2020, Pub. L. No. 116-94, 133 Stat. 2534, 2550 
(2019) (appropriating $25 million for modernization of Department of Labor centralized infrastruc-
ture technology investments).  
 332 5 U.S.C. § 301. 
 333 Id.  The EPA recently invoked this statute as legal justification for its final rule limiting the 
use of scientific studies in agency rulemaking.  Strengthening Transparency in Pivotal Science  
Underlying Significant Regulatory Actions and Influential Scientific Information, 86 Fed. Reg. 469, 
471 (Jan. 6, 2021) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 30). 
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Presidents would reward their allies by placing them in plum adminis-
trative posts.334 
The Pendleton Act established protections for civil service employees 
in the federal government.335  The U.S. Civil Service Commission orig-
inally oversaw the law’s enforcement.  Today, several newer agencies 
perform the same role.  These include the Office of Personnel  
Management, the Merit Systems Protection Board, the Equal  
Employment Opportunity Commission, the Federal Labor Relations 
Authority, and the Office of Special Counsel.336  The MSPB and EEOC 
hear appeals in unlawful termination cases and thus stand as bulwarks 
against wrongful termination of federal employees.337 
Therefore, civil service laws can be used to challenge agency staff 
terminations.  But the structural deregulatory mechanisms identified in 
Part I largely circumvent these protections.  Cutting staff through attri-
tion relies on voluntary or incentivized retirements rather than termina-
tions.  Hiring freezes do not run afoul of the Pendleton Act, nor do office 
relocations that lead federal employees to quit en masse.338  In addition, 
Presidents have found novel ways to circumvent the protections af-
forded by these laws, for example, by reclassifying federal employees.  
President Carter supported the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978339 in 
part because it created a Senior Executive Service whose members were 
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 334 See Pendleton Act (1883), OUR DOCUMENTS, https://www. 
ourdocuments.gov/doc.php?flash=false&doc=48 [https://perma.cc/4ZSJ-Z325].  The immediate im-
petus for the Act was the assassination of President Garfield by a disgruntled and deluded federal 
job seeker who believed the President owed him a job in the administration in exchange for alleged 
help provided to his election campaign.  See Gilbert King, The Stalking of the President, 
SMITHSONIAN MAG. (Jan. 17, 2012), https://www.smithsonianmag.com/history/the-stalking-of-
the-president-20724161 [https://perma.cc/GQ7Z-4RFC]. 
 335 Pub. L. No. 47-27, § 2, 22 Stat. 403, 403–04 (1883).  The Pendleton Act has been updated 
several times, notably by the Civil Service Reform Act in 1978.  Pub. L. No. 95-454, 92 Stat. 1111. 
 336 Andrew Glass, Pendleton Act Inaugurates U.S. Civil Service System, Jan. 16, 1883, 
POLITICO (Jan. 16, 2018, 12:00 AM), https://politico.com/story/2018/01/16/pendleton-act-inaugu-
rates-us-civil-service-system-jan-16-1883-340488 [https://perma.cc/H27K-5S6N]; see also U.S. 
GEN. ACCT. OFF., FPCD-80-38, CIVIL SERVICE REFORM — WHERE IT STANDS TODAY 2–3 
(1980). 
 337 See Policy, Data, Oversight: Employee Relations, U.S. OFF. OF PERS. MGMT., 
https://www.opm.gov/policy-data-oversight/employee-relations/employee-rights-appeals/#url= 
EmployeeCoverage [https://perma.cc/2E8F-FKFL]. 
 338 Former White House Chief of Staff Mick Mulvaney reportedly cheered the Department of 
Agriculture’s move to Kansas City as a method for thinning the Agency’s workforce, noting: “[I]t’s 
nearly impossible to fire a federal worker.  I know that because a lot of them work for me, and I’ve 
tried.  You can’t do it.”  Paul Bedard, Mulvaney Cheers for More Federal Workers to Quit,  
“Wonderful Way” to Drain Swamp, WASH. EXAM’R (Aug. 3, 2019, 8:10 AM), https:// 
washingtonexaminer.com/washington-secrets/mulvaney-cheers-for-more-federal-workers-to-quit-
wonderful-way-to-drain-swamp [https://perma.cc/LN3F-BAC9]. 
 339 Pub. L. No. 95-454, 92 Stat. 1111. 
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subject to fewer job protections than the rest of the civil service.340   
President Reagan expanded the number of noncareer political appoin-
tees within agencies in an effort to exert more control over agency  
decisionmaking.341 
President Trump issued an executive order in October 2020 purport-
ing to create a new category of federal employees with no protection 
from adverse personnel actions.342  Citing the need for the President to 
“have appropriate management oversight,” the executive order man-
dated that the new “Schedule F” employees would be exempt from com-
petitive service requirements and preremoval procedural protections.343  
The order covered all federal civil service employees in “positions of a 
confidential, policy-determining, policy-making, or policy-advocating 
character that are not normally subject to change as a result of a  
Presidential transition.”344  President Biden revoked the order, but it 
illustrates yet another way that a determined President can try to exert 
greater control over the civil service.345 
(b)  The Federal Vacancies Reform Act. — The Federal Vacancies 
Reform Act similarly tries to restrict presidential authority over agency 
personnel.  It does so by limiting the amount of time that Presidents can 
staff vacant agency leadership posts with acting officials. 
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 340 See Mark W. Huddleston, The Carter Civil Service Reforms: Some Implications for Political 
Theory and Public Administration, 96 POL. SCI. Q. 607, 617–18 (1981–1982); Stuart E. Eizenstat, 
Jimmy Carter and Civil Service Reform 6 (Ctr. for the Study of the Admin. State, Working Paper 
No. 19-16, 2019).  The Act also consolidated authority over federal personnel in the OPM, giving 
the President greater oversight over functions previously exercised by the bipartisan Civil Service 
Commission.  See Huddleston, supra, at 607. 
 341 See Steven D. Stehr, Top Bureaucrats and the Distribution of Influence in Reagan’s Executive 
Branch, 57 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 75, 75 (1997); see also Political Appointees in Federal Agencies: 
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Civ. Serv. of the H. Comm. on Post Off. & Civ. Serv., 101st Cong. 
5 (1989) (summary of statement of Bernard L. Ungar, director of federal human resource manage-
ment issues, United States General Accounting Office) (providing data on the increases in noncareer 
staff).  
 342 Exec. Order No. 13,957, 85 Fed. Reg. 67,631 (Oct. 21, 2020).  
 343 Id. at 67,631; see id. at 67,632. 
 344 Id. at 67,632.  The order was immediately challenged, see Complaint at 2, Nat’l Treasury 
Emps. Union v. Trump, No. 20-3078 (D.D.C. Oct. 26, 2020) (citing law’s limitation of exemptions 
from civil service to cases when exemption is “necessary” or “as conditions of good administration 
warrant” (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 3302)), and the incoming Biden Administration repealed it as one of 
its first acts in office, see Exec. Order No. 14,003, 86 Fed. Reg. 7,231 (Jan. 22, 2021). 
 345 Cf. Erich Wagner, The Legal Theories at the Heart of Trump’s Order Politicizing the Civil 
Service, GOV’T EXEC. (Nov. 3, 2020), https://www.govexec.com/management/2020/11/legal- 
theories-heart-trumps-order-politicizing-civil-service/169765 [https://perma.cc/C588-RTHK] (not-
ing that President Trump undid more than a century of civil service law “with the stroke of a pen,” 
resulting in “swift and nearly unanimous” backlash).  
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Early versions of the Act specified time limits for acting officials that 
Congress hoped would induce Presidents to nominate replacements ex-
peditiously.346  However, Presidents continued to make broad use of act-
ing officials.347  Moreover, the Department of Justice opined after the 
passage of the 1988 amendments to the Act that agency heads possessed 
independent authority to fill offices temporarily.348 
In the 1998 Federal Vacancies Reform Act, Congress again sought to 
specify the manner in which temporary executive branch appointments 
could be made.349  The Act’s legislative history underscores Congress’s 
view that “[t]he selection of officers is not a presidential power,”350 and 
that the President “lacks any inherent appointment authority for gov-
ernment officers” beyond the nomination duties specified in the  
Constitution.351 
There are three problems with congressional efforts to limit presi-
dential power to appoint acting agency officials.  First, the White House 
has asserted that Presidents are not bound by the 1998 Act’s efforts to 
constrain it, at least where an agency’s specific statutes contain conflict-
ing provisions.352  Second, Presidents have tried to circumvent the Act’s 
limitations by having agency heads delegate responsibilities to subordi-
nates before vacating their offices.353  Finally, the Act permits acting 
officials to stay in their roles for long periods,354 and Presidents often 
wait until near the end of that period to send a nomination to the  
Senate.355 
 (c)  The Impoundment Control Act of 1974. — The Impoundment 
Control Act, too, was passed in response to executive excess.  The Act 
sought “to resolve disagreement between the Executive and Legislative 
branches over which has ultimate control of government program and 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 346 An early version of the Act limited acting officials to ten day periods in many cases.  See 
O’Connell, supra note 80, at 626 (citing Act of July 23, 1868, ch. 227, 15 Stat. 168).  Amendments 
in 1988 extended that period and offered even longer extensions if the President submitted a nomi-
nee for Senate consideration.  S. REP. NO. 105-250, at 4 (1998). 
 347 O’Connell, supra note 80, at 626.  
 348 Id.; see also S. REP. NO. 105-250, at 4. 
 349 See S. REP. NO. 105-250, at 4. 
 350 Id. at 4. 
 351 Id. at 5.  
 352 See O’Connell, supra note 80, at 667–71 (examining the cases of the CFPB and the  
Department of Justice).  
 353 See id. at 635 (“Presidents can strategically use delegation to keep their preferred officials in 
control of certain administrative functions long past the Vacancies Act’s time limits.”); Nina A. 
Mendelson, The Permissibility of Acting Officials: May the President Work Around Senate  
Confirmation?, 72 ADMIN. L. REV. 533, 560 (2020) (observing that Congress sought to eliminate 
delegation as a tool of circumvention in the 1998 Act).  
 354 While the statute limits acting officials to 210 days in office in most cases, the clock starts 
over in the case of a failed nomination for the position.  O’Connell, supra note 80, at 630–31.  
 355 See id. at 724. 
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fiscal spending policies.”356  President Nixon had refused to spend large 
amounts of funds appropriated by Congress, and he did so in a way that 
weakened legislative programs with which President Nixon disa-
greed.357  The Act obligates Presidents to spend money appropriated by 
Congress for particular purposes.358  If a President plans to withhold 
spending on a permanent basis, he must notify Congress and must re-
ceive approval for that withholding from both Houses within forty-five 
days.359  If he fails to do so, that failure is subject to challenge in court.360 
The Impoundment Control Act did stop the kind of egregious with-
holding seen during the Nixon Administration.  However, while the Act 
prohibits refusals to spend, it does not affect the reprogramming of ap-
propriated funds within a single account.  As discussed above, the  
President can exert control over agency reprogramming because OMB 
acts as a gatekeeper between the agency and the relevant congressional 
committee that must approve any such requests.361 
* * * 
In sum, statutes designed to limit presidential flexibility to remove 
civil servants and replace them with loyalists, to fill vacancies with act-
ing officials rather than submit nominees for Senate confirmation, and 
to hijack appropriated agency funds have been only partially successful.  
As the next section will show, the APA has similarly failed to constrain 
presidential discretion to unmake the bureaucracy.  
C.  The Administrative Law Blind Spot 
Administrative law also offers an unsatisfying response to structural 
deregulation.  The APA, sometimes referred to as the “statutory consti-
tution of administrative government,”362 does not lend itself to challeng-
ing structural deregulation.  This incompatibility is in part due to the 
language and exclusions of the Act itself, and in part due to the judicial 
gloss given to its provisions over time.   
The first problem with using the APA to challenge structural dereg-
ulation is that the Act is generally understood not to apply directly to 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 356 Dabney v. Reagan, 542 F. Supp. 756, 760 (S.D.N.Y. 1982). 
 357 Peter E. Quint, The Separation of Powers Under Nixon: Reflections on Constitutional  
Liberties and the Rule of Law, 1981 DUKE L.J. 1, 14–15.  
 358 See 31 U.S.C. § 1402.  
 359 Id.  Either House of Congress may also pass a resolution disapproving of any temporary 
impoundments, in which case the monies must be spent as specified by statute.  Id. § 1403.  
 360 In Dabney v. Reagan, 542 F. Supp. 756, for example, the court ordered President Reagan to 
spend money that Congress had allocated to the Solar Energy and Energy Conservation Bank after 
the President declined to do so.  Abner J. Mikva, Deregulating Through the Back Door: The Hard 
Way to Fight a Revolution, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 521, 526 (1990) (citing Dabney, 542 F. Supp. at 768).  
 361 Pasachoff, supra note 134, at 2231 (identifying this lever as a way for Presidents to control 
agencies).  
 362 Gillian Metzger, Columbia L. Sch., The Administrative Procedure Act: An Introduction 
1 (2017), https://prrac.org/pdf/APA.summary.ProfMetzger.pdf [https://perma.cc/2NBU-SV5E]. 
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the President.  However, even where agencies, rather than the President, 
take the ultimate actions we characterize as structural deregulation, the 
APA is unlikely to provide an effective remedy.  This incapacity is, first, 
because the Act largely shields an agency’s managerial decisions from 
public scrutiny, and, second, because courts are reluctant to police 
agency inaction and delay.  Moreover, because courts frequently accept 
an agency’s claim of scarce resources as justification for the failure to 
perform statutorily mandated actions by specified deadlines, structural 
deregulation (for example, depriving an agency of resources) can rein-
force substantive deregulation (for example, failing to meet congres-
sional deadlines for issuing rules), perpetually. 
1.  Presidential Action. — In Franklin v. Massachusetts,363 the  
Supreme Court held that presidential actions are not “agency action” 
under the APA.364  Thus, presidential actions, such as executive orders, 
are unreviewable for consistency with the APA’s procedural and sub-
stantive requirements.365  The same is true of appointments and removal 
decisions.  Such actions may still be challenged as inconsistent with the 
Constitution or with substantive and procedural requirements in other 
statutes.  As discussed above, however, statutory claims may be difficult 
to make because agency-enabling acts typically outline agency struc-
tures only in general terms. 
The exemption of presidential action from any of the APA’s require-
ments of regularity or procedure has another important consequence for 
structural deregulation: it facilitates presidential imposition of increas-
ingly burdensome obligations on an already-stressed bureaucracy.  
Every President since Reagan has imposed some version of cost-benefit 
analysis on agencies to facilitate centralized review and coordination of 
federal administrative action.366  Other Executive-created agency bur-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 363 505 U.S. 788 (1992). 
 364 Id. at 796.  Franklin concerned the decennial census and its effects on the allocation of con-
gressional representatives to the states.  Massachusetts challenged the census’s method of allocating 
overseas military personnel among the states as arbitrary and capricious under the APA.  Id. at 
790–91.  While the Secretary of Commerce oversees the census count and recommends apportion-
ment of representatives, ultimately the President submits a statement to Congress entitling states to 
a particular number of representatives.  Id. at 792.  Because the Secretary’s action had no effect 
until the President issued his statement, and because the Secretary’s calculations generated no ad-
ministrative record and were not made public, the Court deemed the relevant final action “presi-
dential” and therefore unreviewable.  Id. at 796–800.  The Court’s decision was relatively terse, and 
some have suggested that it is time to rethink its holding.  See Kathryn E. Kovacs,  
Constraining the Statutory President, 98 WASH. U. L. REV. 63, 68 (2020).   
 365 However, agency action taken pursuant to such orders is subject to challenge so long as it 
meets the APA’s other criteria for reviewability.  
 366 See Rena Steinzor, The Case for Abolishing Centralized White House Regulatory Review, 1 
MICH. J. ENV’T & ADMIN. L. 209, 238–68 (2012). 
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dens include required analyses of the effects of proposed rules on feder-
alism,367 environmental health and safety risks for children,368 energy 
supply,369 and environmental justice.370  As noted above, while many of 
these requirements are entirely salutary, Presidents determined to do so 
can abuse the regulatory review process to demand round after round 
of additional analysis, overload agencies, and bury them in “sludge.”371 
 2.  Excluding Managerial Decisions from Public Participation and 
Disclosure. — Administrative law shields most internal agency manage-
ment decisions from public participation and even from public scrutiny.  
The APA requires that agencies give notice to the public of most pro-
posed regulations and that members of the public have the opportunity 
to comment on those proposals before a final rule issues.372  However, 
“rules of agency organization, procedure, or practice” are exempt from 
these requirements.373  There are few cases applying this exemption to 
organizational rules as opposed to rules of practice and procedure.  But 
it seems clear that internal organizational rules affecting, for example, 
personnel policies and resource distribution would not be subject to pub-
lic scrutiny.  Thus internal agency decisions about how to allocate re-
sources, where to place employees, where to locate offices, how to spend 
funds, and how to review allegations of wrongdoing are not subject to 
public input under the APA. 
The EPA recently claimed this exemption for its rule limiting the 
scientific studies the Agency could rely on in its rulemaking.374  While 
framed as a transparency measure, this rule would have the effect of 
limiting agency reliance on important peer-reviewed studies due to their 
use of health data with personal identifiers, which is shielded from dis-
closure by public health privacy laws.375  While claiming an exemption 
from the requirements of APA § 553, however, the Agency voluntarily 
engaged in a notice-and-comment process.376  The purpose of identifying 
the rule as procedural seems to have been, instead, to locate the author-
ity for its promulgation in the Federal Housekeeping Statute at 5 U.S.C. 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 367 See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 12,612, 52 Fed. Reg. 41,685 (Oct. 30, 1987). 
 368 See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 13,045, 62 Fed. Reg. 19,885 (Apr. 23, 1997).  
 369 See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 13,211, 66 Fed. Reg. 28,355 (May 22, 2001).  
 370 See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 12,898, 59 Fed. Reg. 7,629 (Feb. 16, 1994). 
 371 See Heinzerling, supra note 154, at 326, 365. 
 372 See 5 U.S.C. § 553.  
 373 Id. § 553(b)(3)(A).  
 374 Strengthening Transparency in Pivotal Science Underlying Significant Regulatory Actions 
and Influential Scientific Information, 86 Fed. Reg. 469, 472 (Jan. 6, 2021) (to be codified at 40 
C.F.R. pt. 30). 
 375 See Lisa Friedman, A Plan Made to Shield Big Tobacco from Facts Is Now E.P.A. Policy, 
N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 4, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/01/04/climate/trump-epa-science.html 
[https://perma.cc/FD9T-PVUS]. 
 376 Strengthening Transparency in Pivotal Science Underlying Significant Regulatory Actions 
and Influential Scientific Information, 86 Fed. Reg. at 472. 
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§ 301.  Thus the procedural exemption can be helpful to an agency seek-
ing to expand its policymaking authority as well as one seeking to cir-
cumvent public process. 
The public may not even be aware of changes affecting internal 
agency management.  An agency must publish in the Federal Register 
basic information such as its locations and key employee contacts, along 
with “statements of the general course and method by which its  
functions are channeled and determined, including the nature and re-
quirements of all formal and informal procedures.”377  More detailed 
information about the agency’s internal operations is shielded, however, 
even from document requests under the Freedom of Information Act, 
by an exception for matters “related solely to the internal personnel rules 
and practices of an agency.”378 
Thus, even where an agency documents policies such as a hiring 
freeze or the decision to shift personnel from one area of agency opera-
tions to another, it can be hard for the public to access that information.  
The most reliable method of public information about these decisions 
may be leaks from the individuals involved, and indeed media accounts 
suggest this is the primary means by which structural deregulatory ac-
tions come to public attention.379 
3.  Judicial Review of Inaction and Delay. — Federal court jurispru-
dence on review of agency inaction and delay also shows the limitations 
of the APA for challenging structural deregulation.  Many structural de-
regulation efforts present as a failure to act, including failures to hire, 
failures to procure, failures to investigate alleged managerial or opera-
tional shortcomings, and refusals to spend.  Agency inaction and delay 
are difficult to challenge under the APA.  The courts have been consist-
ently deferential to agency inaction,380 and plaintiffs win only truly egre-
gious cases of agency delay.381 
Moreover, by exacerbating resource scarcity, structural deregulation 
can produce judicial deference to instances of substantive deregulation 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 377 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(1)(A)–(B).  
 378 Id. § 552(b)(2).  
 379 See, e.g., Ken Dilanian, Under Trump, More Leaks — And More Leak Investigations, NBC 
NEWS (Apr. 8, 2019, 3:14 PM), https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/justice-department/under-trump-
more-leaks-more-leak-investigations-n992121 [https://perma.cc/LTG9-C77C]. 
 380 See, e.g., Norton v. S. Utah Wilderness All., 542 U.S. 55, 64 (2004) (finding that APA claims 
could proceed only “where a plaintiff asserts that an agency failed to take a discrete agency action 
that it is required to take,” which excluded “broad programmatic attack[s]” (emphasis omitted)).   
 381 See Michael D. Sant’Ambrogio, Agency Delays: How a Principal-Agent Approach Can Inform 
Judicial and Executive Branch Review of Agency Foot-Dragging, 79 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1381, 
1404–14 (2011) (surveying cases suggesting that the Supreme Court has a “presumption against 
reviewability of [agency] inaction” for several kinds of actions, id. at 1409, including decisions about 
enforcement, and that the Court has never interpreted “action . . . unreasonably delayed” as used 
in the APA, id. at 1411).  
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that take the form of agency inaction or delay.382  As the Supreme Court 
emphasized in Massachusetts v. EPA,383 “an agency has broad discretion 
to choose how best to marshal its limited resources and personnel to 
carry out its delegated responsibilities.”384 
Jurisprudence on review of agency inaction and delay therefore 
throws up a double barrier to confronting structural deregulation.  First, 
it is difficult to challenge structural deregulation itself where it takes the 
form of inaction or delay.  Second, structural deregulation can make it 
more difficult to challenge failures to promulgate substantive rules or to 
take enforcement action by worsening the problem of agency resource 
scarcity. 
IV.  EXECUTIVE AND CONGRESSIONAL REMEDIES 
Structural deregulation in its most extreme form is far-reaching, 
comprehensive, and radical.385  Yet its insidiousness lies in its incremen-
tal nature.  In this Part, we briefly describe some short-term measures 
an incoming President might take to rebuild agency capacity, and then 
turn to tools Congress might use to guard against structural deregulation 
over the longer term.  Congress could adopt provisions to force greater 
transparency, impose constraints on agency managerial decisions, or ex-
ert greater budgetary controls.  Yet we readily concede that such 
measures also come with significant downsides and may create more 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 382 Professor Eric Biber has written persuasively that at the core of the federal courts’ deference 
to agency inaction is their recognition that agencies do not have the resources to implement their 
statutory responsibilities to anything like the fullest extent.  See Eric Biber, The Importance of 
Resource Allocation in Administrative Law, 60 ADMIN L. REV. 1, 17 (2008) [hereinafter Biber, 
Resource Allocation] (“[T]he analysis of whether an agency must act . . . often turns on whether the 
courts have concluded that the case involves important resource allocation issues.”); see also Eric 
Biber, Two Sides of the Same Coin: Judicial Review of Administrative Agency Action and Inaction, 
26 VA. ENV’T L.J. 461, 467–68 (2008) [hereinafter Biber, Two Sides of the Same Coin] (“An agency’s 
decision about how to allocate its resources among competing priorities is at the core of the policy-
making discretion that the executive branch of government and any administrative agency must 
have.”).  Biber understands court decisions on agency inaction as balancing deference to agency 
resource-allocation decisions with the courts’ constitutional duty to ensure agencies adhere to their 
statutory mandates.  Biber, Resource Allocation, supra, at 4.  In this balancing test, Biber continues: 
“[R]esource allocation is sometimes outcome-determinative.”  Id.  
 383 549 U.S. 497 (2007). 
 384 Id. at 527.  Courts have not been specific about the precise meaning of “resource.”  This 
vagueness can be problematic, especially where agencies are able to strategically invoke the “talis-
manic” idea of “limited resources” to justify failures to execute statutory responsibilities.  See Biber, 
Resource Allocation, supra note 382, at 27; see also Biber, Two Sides of the Same Coin, supra note 
382, at 468–69. 
 385 See, e.g., Lisa Rein et al., Trump’s Historic Assault on the Civil Service Was Four Years in the 
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problems than they solve.  Congress might also play a more active over-
sight role with the aim of checking presidential overreach.  Such over-
sight is more likely to occur in periods of divided government, and we 
are mindful that the hyperpartisanship and dysfunction in the contem-
porary Congress makes meaningful oversight hard to conduct. 
A.  Short-Term Rebuilding 
After a period of structural deregulation, a new President cannot re-
store agency capacity with the stroke of a pen; he must do it brick by 
brick.386  The immediate task is to rebuild and strengthen agencies to 
ensure they are adequately staffed, sufficiently resourced, and appropri-
ately empowered to fulfill their statutory tasks.  In some instances, it 
will be obvious which agencies require bolstering.  To the extent their 
condition may not be clear, independent assessments by nonpartisan 
agencies like the GAO, or the National Academy of Public  
Administration, can suggest areas of greatest need.387 
During the presidential transition period, an incoming administra-
tion is authorized to consult with agency officals, and it normally works 
with senior civil service at each agency to identify priorities for restoring 
budget, staffing, and the like.388  In instances where agencies have been 
badly weakened, the incoming team can draw up plans to move swiftly 
to shore up staff.  The White House would take steps to rebuild both 
internal and external expertise by, for example, staffing key expert posi-
tions that had been eliminated or left unfilled by the prior administra-
tion; restoring reassigned or relocated officials to their prior jobs if doing 
so would advance the agency’s mission; and reestablishing or strength-
ening statutorily mandated advisory committees.389  To support this 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 386 See Nicholas Confessore, Mick Mulvaney’s Master Class in Destroying a Bureaucracy from 
Within, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Apr. 16, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/16/magazine/ 
consumer-financial-protection-bureau-trump.html [https://perma.cc/4CVN-4SM3] (chronicling the 
example of Acting Director Mick Mulvaney weakening the CFPB “brick by brick”); see also  
Catherine Rampell, Opinion, How Mick Mulvaney Is Dismantling a Federal Agency, WASH. POST 
(Jan. 25, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/mick-mulvaney-cant-legally-kill-the-
cfpb-so-hes-starving-it-instead/2018/01/25/4481d2ce-0216-11e8-8acf-ad2991367d9d_story.html 
[https://perma.cc/B5Y8-LBES]. 
 387 See, e.g., U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-10-205, ENVIRONMENTAL HEALTH: 
HIGH-LEVEL STRATEGY AND LEADERSHIP NEEDED TO CONTINUE PROGRESS TOWARD 
PROTECTING CHILDREN FROM ENVIRONMENTAL THREATS 34 (2010) (concluding that the 
EPA’s Children’s Health programs are underfunded and understaffed). 
 388 See, e.g., MARTHA JOYNT KUMAR, BEFORE THE OATH: HOW GEORGE W. BUSH AND 
BARACK OBAMA MANAGED A TRANSFER OF POWER 113–15 (2015) (describing the role and 
work of agency review teams); P’SHIP FOR PUB. SERV. & BOS. CONSULTING GRP., 
PRESIDENTIAL TRANSITION GUIDE 143–56 (2020), https://presidentialtransition.org/wp- 
content/uploads/sites/6/2018/01/Presidential-Transition-Guide-2020.pdf [https://perma.cc/6ZW2-
2S77] (same). 
 389 For example, to restaff agencies like the State Department and the Defense Department, 
which were badly weakened by President Trump’s staff attrition and erosion policies, President 
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work, it would be necessary to properly staff and equip the key person-
nel agencies, such as the Office of Personnel Management and Office of 
Federal Procurement Policy, something Presidents from both parties 
have failed to do in the past.390  An incoming administration might also 
prioritize appointing internal agency watchdogs such as IGs,391 who, 
while not critical to an agency’s regulatory capacity per se, help to pro-
mote transparency and accountability.392 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
Biden moved quickly in 2021 to fill subcabinet positions that do not require Senate confirmation.  
See Nahal Toosi et al., Anticipating Senate Bottlenecks, Biden Races to Fill Agency Jobs, POLITICO 
(Dec. 2, 2020, 4:30 AM), https://www.politico.com/news/2020/12/02/biden-nominations-transition-
442046 [https://perma.cc/KQK4-UFS3]. 
 390 See Cooper, supra note 212, at 12–13 (discussing the Obama Administration’s delay in filling 
these key posts).  Anne O’Connell emphasizes that “[s]tability in the [White House Presidential 
Personnel Office] is critical to agency staffing.”  ANNE JOSEPH O’CONNELL, CTR. FOR AM. 
PROGRESS, WAITING FOR LEADERSHIP: PRESIDENT OBAMA’S RECORD IN STAFFING KEY 
AGENCY POSITIONS AND HOW TO IMPROVE THE APPOINTMENTS PROCESS 4 (2010). 
 391 Approximately thirty IGs, generally those associated with the larger government agencies, 
must be nominated by the President before they can be confirmed by the Senate.  See KATHRYN 
FRANCIS, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R45450, STATUTORY INSPECTORS GENERAL IN THE 
FEDERAL GOVERNMENT: A PRIMER 11, 12 tbl.5 (2019) (reporting that thirty-six IGs must be 
nominated by the President and confirmed by the Senate, and that thirty-three of these are estab-
lishment IGs).  Toward the end of the Trump Administration, fifteen IG positions were vacant.  See 
COUNCIL OF THE INSPECTORS GEN. ON INTEGRITY & EFFICIENCY, PRESIDENTIAL 
TRANSITION HANDBOOK 17 (2020), https://www.ignet.gov/sites/default/files/files/CIGIE-
Presidential-Transition-Handbook.pdf [https://perma.cc/6ZUP-DP8S].  Of these, four were await-
ing a presidential nomination and three were awaiting nomination by an agency head.  Of the 
vacant positions with candidates pending confirmation, all but one were nominated in 2020, even 
though seven of the offices were vacated in 2019 or earlier.  See Bill Theobald, Federal Waste 
Watchdogs, Undermined by Trump, Get Some GOP Backing, THE FULCRUM (June 25, 2020), 
https://thefulcrum.us/inspector-general-trump-gop [https://perma.cc/C32D-24ZN].  For example, 
the CIA IG position became vacant in 2015, but the President did not nominate a replacement until 
April 2020.  See Julian E. Barnes, Senate Questions C.I.A. Watchdog Nominee over Independence, 
N.Y. TIMES (June 24, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/24/us/politics/cia-watchdog-peter-
thomson.html [https://perma.cc/A46E-TYK6].  Earlier, the State Department IG slot was vacant 
for over five years, from 2008 until a permanent replacement was confirmed in 2013.  See Joseph 
E. Schmitz, Opinion, Obama’s Inspector General Negligence, WALL ST. J. (June 4, 2013, 7:02 PM), 
https://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887324063304578520952503319368.html [https:// 
perma.cc/TBJ9-9LQQ]; Domani Spero, Senate Confirms Steve Linick; State Dept Finally Gets an 
Inspector General After 2,066 Days, DIPLOPUNDIT (Sept. 30, 2013), https:// 
diplopundit.net/2013/09/30/senate-confirms-steve-linick-state-dept-finally-gets-an-inspector- 
general-after-2066-days [https://perma.cc/PZB5-2BG3]. 
 392 IGs are one of the primary avenues by which Congress oversees agencies; they are internal 
watchdogs who investigate agency waste, fraud, and other misconduct.  IGs are independent by 
design.  They choose which matters to audit and investigate without agency interference, and report 
their findings to both the agency and Congress.  Both Metzger and Professor Neal Katyal have 
highlighted the role of IGs in the “administrative” separation of powers — the system of internal 
checks and balances within the executive branch.  See Gillian E. Metzger, The Interdependent 
Relationship Between Internal and External Separation of Powers, 59 EMORY L.J. 423, 429–30 
(2009); Neal Kumar Katyal, Internal Separation of Powers: Checking Today’s Most Dangerous 
Branch from Within, 115 YALE L.J. 2314, 2347 (2006); see also Pozen, supra note 151, at 1143 & 
n.270 (citing IGs as one of several important checks on government misbehavior); Where Are All 
the Watchdogs? Addressing Inspector General Vacancies: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Oversight 
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In addition, an incoming President’s first annual budget could pro-
pose that Congress refund agencies that have suffered significant budget 
reductions, or which have had their allocated funds reassigned in the 
prior administration.393  The President’s budget is developed by the 
OMB in collaboration with federal agencies; among other things, it  
establishes the administration’s priorities for federal programs and reg-
ulatory policies.394  While just the first step in a long congressional ap-
propriations process, the budget presents an early opportunity for a new 
administration to signal — to Congress, the agencies, and the public — 
that it plans to remediate structural deregulation by rebuilding agency 
capacity.395 
While the President nominates and awaits confirmation of new 
agency leadership, he can direct senior acting officials to cancel or sus-
pend time-consuming busy work and refocus agencies on their statutory 
priorities.  Presidents can do this informally, but they can also announce 
their intentions more publicly, through memos from the Chief of Staff, 
or executive orders and presidential memoranda directing agencies to 
take certain actions.  Presidents can also prioritize certain regulatory 
matters by specific deadlines.396 
Finally, in order to help reverse the damaging effects of reputational 
undermining, an incoming President could set a tone of treating agency 
personnel with respect,397 and appoint senior agency leaders who both 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
& Gov’t Reform, 112th Cong. 2 (2012), https://oversight.house.gov/sites/democrats. 
oversight.house.gov/files/documents/5-10-12-Wiens-Testimony.pdf [https://perma.cc/DZG7-AGVG] 
(statement of Jake Wiens, Investigator, Project on Government Oversight). 
 393 For example, President Biden’s first budget proposed substantial funding increases for many 
agencies that had suffered reductions during the prior administration, including the Education  
Department, Health and Human Services Department, and Environmental Protection Agency.  
Tony Romm, Biden Seeks Huge Funding Increases for Education, Health Care and Environmental 
Protection in First Budget Request to Congress, WASH. POST (Apr. 9, 2021, 5:17 PM), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/us-policy/2021/04/09/biden-2022-budget [https://perma.cc/RF8D-
H3YV]. 
 394 See Pasachoff, supra note 134, at 2194 (describing the role that the office plays in developing 
the President’s budget). 
 395 For an overview of the budget process, see CTR. ON BUDGET & POL’Y PRIORITIES, 
POLICY BASICS: INTRODUCTION TO THE FEDERAL BUDGET PROCESS (2020), 
https://www.cbpp.org/research/introduction-to-the-federal-budget-process [https://perma.cc/ 
FM6C-W4L2]. 
 396 For example, President Biden’s “Executive Order on Protecting Public Health and the  
Environment and Restoring Science to Tackle the Climate Crisis” tasked EPA and other agencies 
with a variety of substantive policy tasks, and included deadlines for action.  Exec. Order No. 
13,990, 86 Fed. Reg. 7,037 (Jan. 20, 2021). 
 397 See, for example, President Biden’s commitment in a letter to a member of Congress during 
the campaign that he would treat federal workers with “the utmost dignity and respect.”  Eric Katz, 
Biden Promises Pay Raises for Feds, Vows to Rely on Civil Servants’ Expertise, GOV’T EXEC. 
(Mar. 2, 2020), https://www.govexec.com/workforce/2020/03/biden-promises-pay-raises-feds-vows-
rely-civil-servants-expertise/163451 [https://perma.cc/N4EB-DBHZ]; see also Eric Katz, The Rival: 
Rebuilding the Bureaucracy, GOV’T EXEC. (Sept. 21, 2020), https://www.govexec.com/ 
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possess, and are seen to possess, relevant expertise and experience.398  
Those leaders, in turn, could make an effort to revitalize demoralized 
career staff by rallying them around the agency’s mission.399  Such steps 
may sound basic, or even quaint, but they are essential to rebuilding 
morale and integrity.400 
B.  Longer-Term Measures to Fortify Agency Capacity 
Thus far we have described the things an incoming Chief Executive 
can do relatively quickly and unilaterally to rebuild agency capacity af-
ter a period of structural deregulation.  But what might be done proac-
tively to guard against it?  The key actor here must be Congress, which 
has the power to structure, empower, fund, and oversee administrative 
agencies, and to push back against presidential overreach.  Below, we 
discuss steps Congress might take to limit presidential discretion over 
the administrative state ex ante, or conduct oversight ex post, to shore 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
management/2020/09/rival-rebuilding-bureaucracy/168571 [https://perma.cc/NFM3-WJGX] (dis-
cussing President Biden’s plans for ethics reforms).  President Biden took immediate steps to restore 
civil service protections, issuing an “Executive Order on Protecting the Federal Workforce”  
revoking President Trump’s executive order creating a new Schedule F service category exempting 
employees offering policy advice from service job protections; the order also revoked measures de-
signed to limit union activity and make it easier to fire federal employees.  See Exec. Order No. 
14,003, 86 Fed. Reg. 7,231 (Jan. 22, 2021); Elaine Knutt, Role Reversal: Biden Rolls Back Trump’s 
Civil Service Directives, GLOB. GOV’T F. (Jan. 27, 2021), https://www. 
globalgovernmentforum.com/round-up-biden-moves-support-federal-workers [https://perma.cc/ 
J699-CH2N].  The order also stated the President’s commitment to pursue a higher minimum wage 
of $15 per hour for federal employees.  Id. 
 398 Several of President Trump’s cabinet appointees were criticized for, among other things, lack-
ing expertise and being opposed to their agency’s mission.  See Paul Waldman, Opinion, Donald 
Trump Has Assembled the Worst Cabinet in American History, WASH. POST (Jan. 19, 2017), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/plum-line/wp/2017/01/19/donald-trump-has-assembled-
the-worst-cabinet-in-american-history [https://perma.cc/GDF4-3JFT].  These appointees were seen 
as disrupters, however, by the President and his allies.  See Heidi M. Przybyla, Trump’s Cabinet Is 
His Team of Disrupters at Agencies They’ve Battled, USA TODAY (Jan. 12, 2017, 10:28 AM), 
https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2017/01/12/some-trump-cabinet-picks-skeptical-
their-agencies-missions/96417756 [https://perma.cc/HP26-PKT5].  Other Presidents have been 
faulted for not prioritizing competence in their senior political appointments.  See, e.g., Donald P. 
Moynihan & Alasdair S. Roberts, The Triumph of Loyalty over Competence: The Bush  
Administration and the Exhaustion of the Politicized Presidency, 70 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 572, 574–
75 (2010) (criticizing the Bush Administration’s appointees for their lack of experience). 
 399 See, e.g., Scott Gottlieb, Comm’r, U.S. Food & Drug Admin., First Remarks to FDA Staff 
(May 15, 2017), https://www.fda.gov/news-events/speeches-fda-officials/first-remarks-fda-staff-
05152017 [https://perma.cc/7RJM-6WVV].  While the State Department is not a regulatory agency, 
the remarks of Secretary of State Antony Blinken to State Department employees also provide a 
good example of how incoming agency heads can seek to rally disheartened career staff.  See Antony 
J. Blinken, Sec’y of State, First Remarks to State Department Employees (Jan. 27, 2021), 
https://www.state.gov/secretary-antony-j-blinken-to-state-department-employees [https://perma.cc/ 
J37P-75CC]. 
 400 Cf. Matthew C. Stephenson, The Qualities of Public Servants Determine the Quality of Public 
Service, 2019 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1177, 1197–204 (discussing both the direct, tangible factors and 
indirect, intangible factors that influence civil service morale and prestige).  
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up agency capacity.  We hasten to add that these measures, while imag-
inable, likely would face numerous political and practical hurdles to 
adoption.  They could also contribute to bureaucratic ossification, and 
politicize agency decisionmaking to a greater extent, by involving  
Congress too extensively in day-to-day management. 
1.  Limiting Ex Ante the President’s Discretion to Manage. — In the 
past, in the wake of presidential abuses, Congress has sought to insulate 
administrative personnel, funding, and oversight from presidential in-
terference.  A Congress that was so inclined could build on these prece-
dents.  For example, Congress could require minimum staffing levels 
and specify staff composition to a greater extent in legislation.  As noted 
above, authorizing acts do not typically include information about 
agency staffing beyond leadership structure.  While we recognize that 
higher numbers of staff do not guarantee agency competence or effec-
tiveness, it may be worthwhile for Congress to designate certain mini-
mum thresholds below which an agency’s capacity to accomplish its 
mission would be assumed to be compromised, and to require that, if 
staffing levels fall below that threshold, the agency do something to en-
hance transparency, such as report to Congress or submit its staffing 
plan for public comment.  There are obvious downsides to this idea, 
however — it would be time- and resource-intensive for Congress to 
stay abreast of agency staffing at this level of detail, and presumably 
Congress would have to update the numbers over time.  Such specifica-
tions could also backfire: administrations might treat the minimum 
thresholds as ceilings rather than floors, refusing to add staff even if the 
agency workload required it.401 
Congress could also impose transparency-enhancing requirements on 
agency decisions to manipulate staff.  As an example, the Department 
of Energy Act of 1978 – Civilian Applications402 (DOECA) mandates 
that the Secretary of Energy transmit any proposal to terminate or 
change the activities of the national laboratories to the House  
Committee on Science and Technology and wait thirty days before  
implementing those changes.403  Congress could follow this model and 
require agencies to report to the relevant oversight committees before 
relocating their offices or reassigning certain categories of agency staff, 
such as scientists.404  Such measures, like minimum staffing thresholds, 
have significant downsides.  They could slow and encumber legitimate 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 401 On anchoring generally, see Adrian Furnham & Hua Chu Boo, A Literature Review of the 
Anchoring Effect, 40 J. SOCIO-ECON. 35 (2011), which surveys the robust literature on anchoring 
effects.  
 402 Pub. L. No. 95-238, 92 Stat. 47 (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.). 
 403 Id. § 104(c) (42 U.S.C. § 7257 note). 
 404 On the benefits and costs of relocating agencies or agency offices, see Jeff Neal, Commentary, 
Move Agency Headquarters Out of DC? Only if You Want Them to Fail, FED. NEWS NETWORK 
(Oct. 31, 2019, 10:03 AM), https://federalnewsnetwork.com/commentary/2019/10/move-agency-
headquarters-out-of-dc-only-if-you-want-them-to-fail [https://perma.cc/L5ET-WHEH]. 
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agency reorganization efforts.  Rather than promote good governance, 
they might create new opportunities for political interference by mem-
bers of Congress in decisions that are better left to the agencies. 
Still, such transparency requirements have undeniable benefits and 
will tend to increase accountability.  Agency leadership may think twice 
if they have to publicize decisions that could undermine staff.  And even 
if agency heads persevere, members of Congress will be in a better po-
sition to take corrective measures, by either pressuring the agency to 
refrain or reversing its decision, if necessary, through an appropriations 
rider or separate legislation.  Of course the success of reporting require-
ments presumes that Congress will perform its oversight function dili-
gently — a significant assumption that may be wrong, especially during 
periods of one-party rule.  Nevertheless, transparency requirements at a 
minimum give internal staff additional leverage and signal to the public 
that something may be amiss. 
Another possibility is that Congress adopt explicit reorganization au-
thority, defining and limiting it, for department heads.405  Currently, this 
authority varies considerably by agency.  Some department heads have 
plenary power to reorganize their departments or transfer personnel and 
funds between programs.406  Others may rely on their more nebulous or 
indirect authority to prescribe regulations governing internal  
department affairs to effect reorganizations.407  By speaking directly to 
reorganization authority, Congress can avoid either agency or judicial 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 405 For an analogous proposal in the context of the dispensation and suspension powers, see 
Zachary S. Price, Funding Restrictions and Separation of Powers, 71 VAND. L. REV. 357, 417–20 
(2018). 
 406 See, e.g., 6 U.S.C. § 452(a)(2) (giving the Secretary of Homeland Security authority to “allocate 
or reallocate functions among the officers” and to “consolidate, alter, or discontinue organizational 
units within the Department” sixty days after providing notice to the relevant congressional com-
mittees along with an explanation of the rationale for the action); 43 U.S.C. § 1451 note (granting 
the Secretary of the Interior authority to “effect such transfers within the Department of the Interior 
of any of the records, property, personnel, and unexpended balances (available or to be made avail-
able) of appropriations, allocations, and other funds of such Department”).  While agencies are 
generally prohibited from reprogramming appropriated funds, individual statutes create exceptions.  
The Department of Homeland Security, for example, may reprogram funds up to $500,000, or ten 
percent of a program’s funds, whichever is less, without congressional authorization.  Michelle 
Mrdeza & Kenneth Gold, Reprogramming Funds: Understanding the Appropriators’ Perspective, 
GEO. UNIV. GOV’T AFFS. INST., https://gai.georgetown.edu/reprogramming-funds-understanding 
[https://perma.cc/T2XK-3YK7].  And the Department of Defense may reprogram funds up to $20 
million, or twenty percent of a program’s funds, whichever is greater.  Id. 
 407 See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 301 (“The head of an Executive department or military department may 
prescribe regulations for the government of his department, the conduct of its employees, the dis-
tribution and performance of its business, and the custody, use, and preservation of its records, 
papers, and property.”).  Courts have approved the use of this authority, for example, by the  
Secretary of Labor to create the Labor Department’s Administrative Review Board.  See Willy v. 
Admin. Rev. Bd., 423 F.3d 483, 491–92 (5th Cir. 2005); see also 3 U.S.C. § 301 (authorizing the 
President to delegate to agency heads in writing, after publication in the Federal Register, any 
function vested in the President by law).  
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interpretation of statutory silence as license to manipulate agency  
structure. 
Congress could also specify qualifications for executive branch ap-
pointments more frequently, in an effort to ensure that nominees have 
baseline experience or expertise.  There is a debate over Congress’s con-
stitutional authority to establish statutory qualifications for executive 
branch appointees incident to its power to create executive branch of-
fices.408  Historically, Congress has specified qualifications sparingly,409 
no doubt out of reluctance to interfere with the President’s constitutional 
appointment power.  But such requirements do exist.410  In response to 
structural deregulation, Congress could impose experience or expertise 
criteria more often, and strategically, in a manner designed not to en-
croach too much on the President’s power to select his preferred nomi-
nees.  The biggest downside to this strategy is that it might not work.  
Faced with legislation purporting to limit his appointment power, a 
President might veto the bill (forcing a two-thirds override, which may 
be difficult), or issue a signing statement signaling his disagreement on 
constitutional grounds.  Or he might simply ignore the limitation.411 
There may be other ways to bolster agencies against structural de-
regulation, for example by increasing the independence of internal 
agency watchdogs, like IGs, who serve an important accountability 
function.  Even though IGs investigate agency waste, fraud, and other 
misconduct412 and are not, strictly speaking, overseers of the regulatory 
process, their presence might inhibit Presidents from pursuing nontrans-
parent strategies to erode agency capacity.413  Failing to appoint IGs, or 
firing them without replacement, is analogous to shooting out the lights 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 408 See HENRY B. HOGUE, CONG. RSCH. SERV., RL33886, STATUTORY QUALIFICATIONS 
FOR EXECUTIVE BRANCH POSITIONS 3–7 (2015) (discussing the history of interbranch conflict 
over whether Congress may establish such qualifications incident to its constitutional authority to 
establish executive branch offices). 
 409 Id. at 7. 
 410 See, e.g., Brian D. Feinstein, Identity-Conscious Administrative Law: Lessons from Financial 
Regulators, GEO. WASH. L. REV. (forthcoming) (manuscript at 21–27) (on file with Harvard Law 
School Library), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3787704 [https://perma.cc/ 
UEM3-3RAR] (surveying existing requirements for agency heads and other leaders). 
 411 HOGUE, supra note 408, at 1–2, 4 (noting that President George W. Bush did just that when 
Congress for the first time specified qualifications for the FEMA Administrator in the Post-Katrina 
Emergency Management Reform Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-295, 120 Stat. 1394, following the 
Agency’s inadequate response to Hurricane Katrina in 2005). 
 412 Inspector General Act of 1978, 5 U.S.C. app. § 2(2), § 4(a). 
 413 Inspectors general choose which matters to audit and investigate without agency interference, 
and they report their findings to both agency leadership and Congress.  See Pozen, supra note 151, 
at 1143–44 (citing inspectors general as one of several important checks on government misbehav-
ior).  In addition, inspectors general are exempt from the rule that agencies may not dissent from 
the President’s budget proposals; they are explicitly authorized to argue that such proposals “would 
substantially inhibit the Inspector General from performing the duties of the office.”  Pasachoff, 
supra note 134, at 2226 (quoting 5 U.S.C. app. § 6(g)(3)). 
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before a burglary: by removing an internal watchdog not beholden to 
him, a President can obscure misbehavior.414  Congress already protects 
the independence of IGs, but still greater protections may be neces-
sary.415  And Congress may also consider extending similar protections 
to certain other categories of agency personnel, like scientists.416   
Another way to increase transparency is to strengthen internal com-
plaint processes that permit employees to report unethical behavior or 
raise other concerns about agency action.417  Reinforcing confidence in 
these channels and protecting those who use them by strictly enforcing 
retaliation bans may embolden staff who might otherwise remain silent 
to expose instances of structural deregulation. 
Congress might also consider strengthening civil service protections, 
for example by revisiting whether Presidents should retain the power to 
establish new civil service classifications with fewer-than-normal pro-
tections,418 an authority that, in any event, appears to conflict with the 
Pendleton Act’s original emphasis on a professional civil service free 
from political influence.419 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 414 Over seventy federal IGs are creatures of statute, and those statutes make many IGs subject 
to the Article II, Section 2 appointments process.  See FRANCIS, supra note 391, at 11.  Thirty-six 
IGs, generally those associated with the larger government agencies, must be nominated by the 
President before they can be confirmed by the Senate.  See id.  Toward the end of the Trump 
Administration, fifteen IG positions were vacant.  See COUNCIL OF THE INSPECTORS  
GEN. ON INTEGRITY & EFFICIENCY, supra note 391, at 17.  The State  
Department IG slot was vacant for over five years, from 2008 until a permanent replacement was 
confirmed in 2013.  See Schmitz, supra note 391; Spero, supra note 391.  That inspector general 
then served until 2020, when he was fired by President Trump and replaced with an acting IG.  See 
Meridith McGraw & Nahal Toosi, Trump Ousts State Department Watchdog, POLITICO (May 15, 
2020, 11:21 PM), https://www.politico.com/news/2020/05/15/state-department-inspector-general-
fired-261536 [https://perma.cc/UGU3-Z6WD]. 
 415 See, e.g., BEN WILHELM, CONG. RSCH. SERV., IF11546, REMOVAL OF INSPECTORS 
GENERAL: RULES, PRACTICE, AND CONSIDERATIONS FOR CONGRESS 2 (2020); Danielle 
Brian, It’s More Clear Now Than Ever: Inspectors General Need Stronger Protections, PROJECT 
ON GOV’T OVERSIGHT (Apr. 13, 2020), https://www.pogo.org/analysis/2020/04/its-more-clear-
now-than-ever-inspectors-general-need-stronger-protections [https://perma.cc/9NWC-DSV2];  
Danielle Brian & Liz Hempowicz, Good Governance Paper No. 11: Strengthening Inspectors  
General, JUST SEC. (Oct. 27, 2020), https://www.justsecurity.org/73075/good-governance-paper-no-
11-strengthening-inspectors-general [https://perma.cc/5YJU-Z3YE]; Press Release, Sen. Chuck 
Grassley, Grassley Leads Bipartisan Bill to Bolster Inspector General Protections (June 18, 2020), 
https://www.grassley.senate.gov/news/news-releases/grassley-leads-bipartisan-bill-bolster-inspec-
tor-general-protections [https://perma.cc/6CHY-QHGT].  
 416 See WILHELM, supra note 415, at 2 (noting potential challenges to such protections under 
the separation of powers).  
 417 See Joe Davidson, Perspective, Some Federal Agencies Have Dissent Channels. A Report Says 
They Aren’t Working, WASH. POST (July 31, 2020, 6:00 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/ 
politics/some-federal-agencies-have-dissent-channels-a-report-says-they-arent-working/2020/07/30/ 
d242a114-d29e-11ea-af07-1d058ca137ae_story.html [https://perma.cc/F67V-F2PC]. 
 418 See supra section III.B.2.a, pp. 644–46. 
 419 See, e.g., Sean M. Theriault, Patronage, the Pendleton Act, and the Power of the People, 65 J. 
POL. 50, 54–57 (2003) (overviewing the history of civil service reform of the spoils system as had 
been popularized by Andrew Jackson). 
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Finally, Congress might appropriate agency funds with greater spec-
ificity and impose more conditions on agency spending, which would 
limit the President’s ability to delay, divert, and otherwise impact 
agency budgets.420  However, the U.S. Congress already appropriates in 
a far more prescriptive manner than the governments of many other 
developed countries, and greater specificity might produce more  
ossification.421 
2.  Stronger Oversight Ex Post. — The ex ante measures described 
above could help to impede structural deregulation, but they are not 
without drawbacks and could go too far in limiting administrative flex-
ibility.  They may also enhance congressional influence in ways that 
might further politicize agency decisionmaking, enabling members of 
Congress to interfere more readily in day-to-day agency management. 
It may be preferable then, to rely to a greater extent on ex post over-
sight measures that do not intrude excessively on agency discretion, as 
a check on structural deregulation.  Oversight is designed to encourage 
good behavior and promote political accountability.  The Government 
Performance and Results Act of 1993422 (GPRA) already helps to keep 
Congress abreast of agency performance, but it does not focus specifi-
cally on the incapacitation we are worried about, and the President has 
too much influence over its implementation.  As amended by the GPRA 
Modernization Act of 2010,423 this law requires agencies to consult with 
Congress and other stakeholders to develop four-year strategic plans, set 
long-term goals for their major functions, establish performance 
measures, and report results.424 
In addition to multiyear strategic plans, agencies must produce an-
nual performance plans with fiscal year performance goals, objectives 
on how to achieve these goals, and an explanation of how performance 
is measured and verified.425  Agencies must also post annual updates on 
performance on their websites.  And a subset of executive branch agen-
cies must establish “priority goals” for which they must conduct quar-
terly reviews.  The OMB plays a central role in administering the 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 420 Cf. Joachim Wehner, The Case for Congressional Budgeting, 71 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 349, 350–
51 (2011) (questioning the capacity of Presidents to be fiscal stewards and arguing for a stronger 
congressional role). 
 421 Most other leading jurisdictions, by contrast, set objective budgets rather than the line-item 
budget accounts that have evolved in this country.  See id. at 349 (comparing appropriations process 
in the United States to those in other developed countries).  
 422 Pub. L. No. 103-62, 107 Stat. 285.  For an overview summarizing the reforms, see CLINTON 
T. BRASS, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R42379, CHANGES TO THE GOVERNMENT PERFORMANCE 
AND RESULTS ACT (GPRA) (2012). 
 423 Pub. L. No. 111-352, 124 Stat. 3866. 
 424 See id. § 2, 124 Stat. 3866–67. 
 425 See Alfred Ho, GPRA After a Decade: Lessons from the Government Performance and Results 
Act and Related Federal Forms: Introduction, 30 PUB. PERFORMANCE & MGMT. REV. 307, 307 
(2007). 
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GPRA.426  For example, OMB must determine whether agencies meet 
the performance goals in their Agency Performance Plans, and if not, 
OMB and the agencies must produce various reports and plans to ad-
dress any unmet goals.427 
We cannot do justice to the GPRA’s complex scheme here.  It is, to 
be sure, highly bureaucratic and burdensome for agencies.  More prob-
lematic for our purposes is that this elaborate goal-setting, performance 
review, and reporting scheme — while requiring agencies to consult with 
various congressional committees and generating numerous products on 
agency performance for Congress to review — is largely overseen and 
implemented by the OMB, which means, ultimately, that it falls signifi-
cantly under presidential control and direction.428  But a similar set of 
requirements less subject to presidential interference could bring in-
stances of structural deregulation (or at least their consequences) to light. 
Congress could also enable stronger oversight by engaging nonparti-
san agencies, such as the GAO, the National Academy of Public  
Administration, and the Administrative Conference of the United States 
in monitoring agencies to ensure that they are adequately staffed and 
capacitated to perform their statutory functions.  While the GAO al-
ready performs assessments of agency performance,429 it could be 
charged specifically with investigating whether agencies are subject to 
presidential undermining using the tools we have described as structural 
deregulation, and reporting those findings to Congress and the public.  
Another possibility is for Congress to expand the purview of the IGs 
beyond ensuring whether agency officials are complying with legal re-
quirements to include responsibility for evaluating presidential interfer-
ence of the sort we have described. 
All of this monitoring, investigating, reporting, and publicizing may 
not amount to much if Congress is unwilling to act on the information 
by holding oversight hearings, calling agency and White House officials 
to testify, and using all of the other instruments at its disposal, including 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 426 See BRASS, supra note 422, at 7; WALTER GROSZYK, IMPLEMENTATION OF THE 
GOVERNMENT PERFORMANCE AND RESULTS ACT OF 1993, at ¶ 26 (1995), https://govinfo. 
library.unt.edu/npr/library/omb/gpra.html [https://perma.cc/W9LQ-CWXQ] (examining the experi-
ence of the U.S. government two years after the GPRA was implemented). 
 427 See BRASS, supra note 422, at 8.  See generally EXEC. OFF. OF THE PRESIDENT & OFF. 
OF MGMT. & BUDGET, CIRCULAR NO. A–11: PREPARATION, SUBMISSION, AND EXECUTION 
OF THE BUDGET (2017), https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/whitehouse.gov/files/omb/ 
assets/a11_current_year/a11_2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/8XXB-LYT7] (providing an overview of 
the federal performance framework related to agencies’ Strategic Plans, Annual Performance Plans, 
and Annual Performance Reports requirements). 
 428 BRASS, supra note 422, at 18–19. 
 429 Id. at 20–21. 
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its lawmaking and appropriations powers.  But at least greater trans-
parency about structural deregulation would better enable the public to 
hold the President and Congress, both, to account. 
3.  Administrative Law Remedies. — As noted above, the legal and 
procedural requirements of the APA have been held not to apply to pres-
idential action.430  Still, many instances of structural deregulation that 
originate with the President but are in practice carried out by the agen-
cies — such as hiring freezes, agency reorganizations, and funding real-
locations — should be subject to the APA.  Nevertheless, many such 
actions might escape judicial review if courts deem them to be “commit-
ted to agency discretion by law.”431  Congress could address this problem 
by imposing guidelines for such actions in particular agency statutes.  
Revisions to the APA might also specify that major managerial actions 
are reviewable under the “arbitrary and capricious” standard of review 
in § 706(2)(A).432 
Rather than waiting for Congress to promulgate statutory criteria, 
agencies could fortify themselves against structural deregulation.  One 
way they could do so is by establishing, through regulation, the “law” 
against which subsequent managerial actions could be measured.  In 
Physicians for Social Responsibility v. Wheeler,433 the D.C. Circuit con-
cluded that structural changes by agency heads were reviewable so long 
as there was a meaningful legal standard to guide that review.434  That 
meaningful standard need not be expressed in legislation, the court held, 
but could take the form of an agency regulation or even a policy state-
ment.435  Therefore, agencies could themselves promulgate the criteria 
against which subsequent structural changes like the transfer of person-
nel, the treatment of whistleblowers, and the composition of advisory 
committees could be measured. 
Courts should also reconsider their deference to agency inaction and 
delay due to scarce resources where those resources intentionally were 
made scarce.  Administrations should not be able to incapacitate agen-
cies and then later claim incapacitation as grounds for inaction.  Courts’ 
general reluctance to intervene in agency priority setting is understand-
able as a matter of comparative institutional competence.436  However, 
where parties have presented compelling evidence of structural deregu-
lation, that deference is less appropriate.  Professor Eric Biber has sug-
gested that courts reviewing agency delay take into account whether the 
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agency is acting in good faith in asserting that it has insufficient re-
sources to take the action at issue.437  Evaluating evidence of structural 
deregulation could be part of this good faith assessment. 
Agencies should also make managerial decisions more transparent so 
the public can discern when political appointees are making decisions 
with serious consequences for the structural integrity of their agencies.  
A subset of managerial decisions might merit not just publication but 
public participation.  Congress could reconsider the scope of the APA’s 
exclusion of rules directed at “agency management or personnel” from 
notice-and-comment requirements.  Policies important enough to meet 
the definition of a rule should not automatically be exempt from com-
ment.  To avoid unnecessary delay, most management policies could be 
promulgated as direct final rules, which go into effect on a specified date 
if the agency receives no substantial adverse comments.438  This ap-
proach would provide opportunity for comment on controversial 
changes without unduly increasing ossification or stymieing routine  
adjustments. 
CONCLUSION 
The main purpose of this Article is to identify and label structural 
deregulation, and to argue that it is a serious problem with significant 
implications for American democratic governance.  For several decades 
now, with the approval of the Supreme Court, the American presidency 
has amassed expansive powers, and Presidents have exerted increasingly 
tight control over the administrative state.  For the most part, scholars 
have portrayed this development favorably, imagining that good faith 
chief executives aim to place their stamp on the bureaucracy and take 
credit for its achievements.  As we have explained, however, this por-
trayal overlooks the dangerous potential of a powerful President bent 
on undermining the government’s core capacities. 
We have defined structural deregulation to include those things a 
President can do that systematically erode and undermine agency staff, 
limit or sideline expertise, constrict resources, and destroy morale — the 
foundational capacities on which agencies rely to perform their statutory 
duties.  Structural deregulation causes damage cumulatively and incre-
mentally, relatively invisibly, and largely unaccountably.  We have dis-
tinguished these measures from what we call substantive deregulation, 
which consists of more narrowly targeted regulatory rollbacks that use 
transparent legal procedures, are typically subject to judicial review, and 
are fairly easily reversed. 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
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Structural deregulation has troubling long-term implications for the 
constitutional separation of powers.  We have argued that Presidents 
who embark on a campaign of undermining agency capacity are acting 
in a manner inconsistent with their constitutional duty to take care to 
execute the laws faithfully, and they may encroach on Congress’s law-
making power by disabling agencies from accomplishing their lawfully 
delegated tasks.  Structural deregulation also contravenes well- 
established administrative law norms such as transparency and account-
ability, which remain important to a well-functioning democracy that 
depends on bureaucratic management.  Finally, the “stickiness” of struc-
tural deregulation challenges democratic norms that disfavor binding 
the hands of political successors. 
We have shown that public law, on the whole, provides few oppor-
tunities to redress or prevent structural deregulation.  Constitutional law 
and administrative law both have blind spots when it comes to presi-
dential management of the bureaucracy, especially when the President’s 
mission is incapacitation.  Specific statutes meant to protect the civil 
service or inoculate agency budgets from presidential control do not help 
much either — they are vulnerable to workarounds.  These blind spots 
and workarounds have allowed structural deregulation to flourish, a sit-
uation which we believe requires a political solution that only Congress 
can provide.  
